Basically the problem with that is that someone could setup a single
full node that has the blockchain and can answer those challenges and
then a bunch of other non-full nodes that just proxy any such challenges
to the single full node.
Rob
On 2015-03-26 23:04, Matt Whitlock wrote:
Maybe I'm
pm, Robert McKay wrote:
Basically the problem with that is that someone could setup a single
full node that has the blockchain and can answer those challenges
and
then a bunch of other non-full nodes that just proxy any such
challenges
to the single full node.
Rob
On 2015-03-26 23:04
On Mon, 28 Jul 2014 07:28:15 -0400, Peter Todd wrote:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
I've got a bitcoin-only exit running myself and right now there is
absolutely no traffic leaving it. If the traffic coming from that
node
was legit I'd expect some to be exiting my node
Here's a packet dump of a connected client:
http://wari.mckay.com/~rm/unknown.tcpdump
Doesn't seem particularly abusive.. only one connection, not doing much
traffic. I don't have any easy way to deserialize this and see if it's
doing anything unusual but it's there if someone wants to have a
Hi Alex,
I think the problem is with my suggestion to use bind forwarding..
basically bind is stripping off the authorative answer bit in the
reply.. this causes the recursor to go into a loop chasing the authority
server which again returns a non-authoritve answer with itself as the
custom SOA record for it - it should work,
right?
What SOA name should it be actually, assuming that NS record for
testnet-seed.alexykot.me [12] is pointing at alexykot.me [13]?
Best regards,
Alex Kotenko
2014-05-30 14:41 GMT+01:00 Robert McKay :
Hi Alex,
I think the problem is with my
to
the
seeder for non-matching requests, forward to other DNS server at
IP:PORT, so you could cascade them.
On Fri, May 30, 2014 at 4:51 PM, Robert McKay rob...@mckay.com
wrote:
No, I don't think so. The problem is the 'aa' flag is missing (see
the
'flags' section in dig). Perhaps if you could
It should be possible to configure bind as a DNS forwarder.. this can
be done in a zone context.. then you can forward the different zones to
different dnsseed daemons running on different non-public IPs or two
different ports on the same IP (or on one single non-public IP since
there's really
On Mon, 19 May 2014 19:49:52 -0400, Jeff Garzik wrote:
On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 4:36 PM, Robert McKay rob...@mckay.com
wrote:
It should be possible to configure bind as a DNS forwarder.. this
can
be done in a zone context.. then you can forward the different zones
to
different dnsseed
On Tue, 20 May 2014 01:44:29 +0100, Robert McKay wrote:
On Mon, 19 May 2014 19:49:52 -0400, Jeff Garzik wrote:
On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 4:36 PM, Robert McKay rob...@mckay.com
wrote:
It should be possible to configure bind as a DNS forwarder.. this
can
be done in a zone context.. then you can
On Wed, 15 Jan 2014 23:51:21 +0100, Mike Hearn wrote:
The goal of all that is that we get to keep our existing IPv4 based
anti-sybil heuristics, so we can’t possibly make anything worse,
only better. Plus, we’ve now set things up so in future if/when we
come up with a better anti-sybil system
On Sun, 8 Dec 2013 13:14:44 -0800, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
On Sun, Dec 8, 2013 at 1:07 PM, Drak d...@zikula.org wrote:
Simple verification relies on being able to answer the email sent to
the
person in the whois records, or standard admin/webmaster@ addresses
to prove
ownership of the
On Fri, 5 Apr 2013 11:48:51 +0200, Mike Hearn wrote:
However, youre somewhat right in the sense that its a self-defeating
attack. If the pool owner went bad, he could pull it off once, but
the
act of doing so would leave a permanent record and many of the people
mining on his pool would
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