Re: [Bitcoin-development] The insecurity of merge-mining

2014-01-10 Thread Jorge Timón
On 1/10/14, Peter Todd wrote: > Because there aren't that many pools out there and Ixcoin (and devcoin) > appear to have been lucky enough to servive long enough to get the > support of a reasonably big one. Once you do that, the potential > attackers have PR to think about. (namecoin especially h

Re: [Bitcoin-development] The insecurity of merge-mining

2014-01-10 Thread Peter Todd
On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 01:29:03PM +0100, Jorge Timón wrote: > On 1/10/14, Peter Todd wrote: > > Situations where decentralized consensus systems are competing for > > market share in some domain certainely apply. For instance if I were to > > create a competitor to Namecoin, perhaps because I tho

Re: [Bitcoin-development] The insecurity of merge-mining

2014-01-10 Thread Jorge Timón
On 1/10/14, Peter Todd wrote: > Come to think of it, we've got that exact situation right now: the new > Twister P2P Microblogging thing has a blockchain for registering > usernames that could have been easily done with Namecoin, thus in theory > Namecoin owners have an incentive to make sure the

Re: [Bitcoin-development] The insecurity of merge-mining

2014-01-10 Thread Jorge Timón
On 1/10/14, Peter Todd wrote: >> Fair enough. >> Do you see any case where an independently pow validated altcoin is >> more secure than a merged mined one? > > Situations where decentralized consensus systems are competing for > market share in some domain certainely apply. For instance if I were

Re: [Bitcoin-development] The insecurity of merge-mining

2014-01-10 Thread Peter Todd
On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 06:11:28AM -0500, Peter Todd wrote: > > Fair enough. > > Do you see any case where an independently pow validated altcoin is > > more secure than a merged mined one? > > Situations where decentralized consensus systems are competing for > market share in some domain certain

Re: [Bitcoin-development] The insecurity of merge-mining

2014-01-10 Thread Peter Todd
On Thu, Jan 09, 2014 at 06:19:04PM +0100, Jorge Timón wrote: > On 1/6/14, Peter Todd wrote: > > On Sat, Jan 04, 2014 at 01:27:42AM +0100, Jorge Timón wrote: > > It's not meant to prove anything - the proof-of-sacrificed-bitcoins > > mentioned(*) in it is secure only if Bitcoin itself is secure and

Re: [Bitcoin-development] The insecurity of merge-mining

2014-01-09 Thread Jorge Timón
On 1/6/14, Peter Todd wrote: > On Sat, Jan 04, 2014 at 01:27:42AM +0100, Jorge Timón wrote: > It's not meant to prove anything - the proof-of-sacrificed-bitcoins > mentioned(*) in it is secure only if Bitcoin itself is secure and > functional. I referred you to it because understanding the system

Re: [Bitcoin-development] The insecurity of merge-mining

2014-01-06 Thread Peter Todd
On Sat, Jan 04, 2014 at 01:27:42AM +0100, Jorge Timón wrote: > > It's a thought experiment; read my original post on how to make a > > zerocoin alt-chain and it might make more sense: > > > > http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg02472.html > > > > Even better mig

Re: [Bitcoin-development] The insecurity of merge-mining

2014-01-03 Thread Jorge Timón
On 1/3/14, Peter Todd wrote: > On Fri, Jan 03, 2014 at 08:14:25PM +0100, Jorge Timón wrote: >> > You assume the value of a crypto-currency is equal to all miners, it's >> > not. >> >> They should be able to sell the reward at similar prices in the market. >> Attackers are losing the opportunity co

Re: [Bitcoin-development] The insecurity of merge-mining

2014-01-03 Thread Peter Todd
On Fri, Jan 03, 2014 at 08:14:25PM +0100, Jorge Timón wrote: > > You assume the value of a crypto-currency is equal to all miners, it's > > not. > > They should be able to sell the reward at similar prices in the market. > Attackers are losing the opportunity cost of mining the currency by > attac

Re: [Bitcoin-development] The insecurity of merge-mining

2014-01-03 Thread Jorge Timón
On 1/1/14, Peter Todd wrote: > On Tue, Dec 31, 2013 at 01:14:05AM +, Luke-Jr wrote: >> On Monday, December 30, 2013 11:22:25 PM Peter Todd wrote: >> > that you are using merge-mining is a red-flag because without majority, >> > or >> > at least near-majority, hashing power an attacker can 51%

Re: [Bitcoin-development] The insecurity of merge-mining

2013-12-31 Thread Peter Todd
On Wed, Jan 01, 2014 at 05:09:27AM +, Luke-Jr wrote: > > You assume the value of a crypto-currency is equal to all miners, it's > > not. > > > > Suppose I create a merge-mined Zerocoin implementation with a 1:1 > > BTC/ZTC exchange rate enforced by the software. You can't argue this is > > a s

Re: [Bitcoin-development] The insecurity of merge-mining

2013-12-31 Thread Luke-Jr
On Wednesday, January 01, 2014 4:53:42 AM Peter Todd wrote: > On Tue, Dec 31, 2013 at 01:14:05AM +, Luke-Jr wrote: > > On Monday, December 30, 2013 11:22:25 PM Peter Todd wrote: > > > that you are using merge-mining is a red-flag because without majority, > > > or at least near-majority, hashin

Re: [Bitcoin-development] The insecurity of merge-mining

2013-12-31 Thread Peter Todd
On Tue, Dec 31, 2013 at 01:14:05AM +, Luke-Jr wrote: > On Monday, December 30, 2013 11:22:25 PM Peter Todd wrote: > > that you are using merge-mining is a red-flag because without majority, or > > at least near-majority, hashing power an attacker can 51% attack your > > altcoin at negligible co