On Tue, Jul 30, 2013 at 04:11:41PM -0400, Peter Todd wrote:
> Unrelated to Tor, but an interesting possibility to improve SPV security
> is to ask for the history of a given txout - that is the previous
> transactions that funded it. You could even do this with a
> zero-knowledge proof, sampling so
On Tue, Jul 30, 2013 at 09:36:50PM +0200, Wendell wrote:
> Thank you Peter.
>
> Does this advice apply equally to both full and SPV nodes? At this point I'm
> merely curious, since we don't have the option to run bitcoinj over Tor right
> now anyway.
Yes, although remember that in general SPV n
Thank you Peter.
Does this advice apply equally to both full and SPV nodes? At this point I'm
merely curious, since we don't have the option to run bitcoinj over Tor right
now anyway.
-wendell
grabhive.com | twitter.com/grabhive | gpg: 6C0C9411
On Jul 30, 2013, at 8:30 PM, Peter Todd wrote:
On Tue, Jul 30, 2013 at 02:01:39PM +0200, Bazyli Zygan wrote:
> > I think to support Tor really well [in bitcoinj], we'd need not only to
> > make SOCKS work, but also add a way to use hidden peers and then try and
> > come up with an anti-sybil heuristic. Unfortunately it's unclear what such
>
Apparently that won't help. That's just embeding the existing tor code and
rerouting internal Cocoa internet communication via tors proxy.
What guys need is bigger configurability in tor itself. I can understand that.
It's doable tough.
Gosh, why a day has only 24h? :)
/b
grabhive.com (http:/
I suppose it isn't quite what you're talking about but we did push this out
today:
Tor.framework, for Cocoa developers, similar to our BitcoinKit:
https://github.com/grabhive/Tor.framework
-wendell
grabhive.com | twitter.com/grabhive | gpg: 6C0C9411
On Jul 30, 2013, at 4:01 PM, Jeff Garzik wro
On Tue, Jul 30, 2013 at 8:41 AM, Mike Hearn wrote:
> * Talk the Tor protocol directly and have the app explicitly pick its own
> diverse set of exit nodes, one per p2p connection. This is likely to be
> complicated. Last time I looked Tor doesn't provide any kind of library or
> API.
This has bee
Various ideas are possible:
* Use the Tor SOCKS proxy in such a way that it creates a guaranteed
independent circuit to a different exit node each time you connect. This
gets you back to the slightly stronger clearnet heuristic of "if I saw a
bunch of peers announce my tx, then it's probably valid
Hi everyone,
We at Hive had plans to make our wallet proxy through Tor by default. When it
became apparent that this was not presently possible because bitcoinj lacks
SOCKS support, it opened a minor discussion suggesting that this is perhaps not
advisable practice for SPV wallets in the first
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