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On 8/18/13 8:09 PM, John Dillon wrote:
On the other hand, a tx with some txin proofs can be safely relayed by SPV
nodes, an interesting concept. Do the UTXO commitment people have
keeping proof
size small in mind?
More than a kilobyte, probably
On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 5:09 AM, John Dillon
john.dillon...@googlemail.comwrote:
Here's another question for you Mike: So does bitcoinj have any
protections against peers flooding you with useless garbage? It'd be
easy to rack up a user's data bill for instance by just creating junk
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On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 2:15 PM, Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org wrote:
On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 10:01:16AM -0400, Peter Todd wrote:
Doing this also makes it more difficult to sybil the network - for
instance right now you can create SPV honeypots
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On Sat, Aug 17, 2013 at 8:35 AM, Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net wrote:
There shouldn't be a smaller subset of Bloom filtering nodes because the
idea of making it optional is a stupid one.
If you're worried about DoS, come up with real fixes instead of trying to
break features that work.
It is
Cool. Maybe it's time for another development update on the foundation blog?
On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 3:00 AM, Gavin Andresen gavinandre...@gmail.comwrote:
Mike asked what non-0.9 code I'm working on; the three things on the top
of my list are:
1) Smarter fee handling on the client side,
The only other thing I'd like to see there is the start of a new anti-DoS
framework. I think once the outline is in place other people will be able
to fill it in appropriately. But the current framework has to be left
behind.
If I had to choose one thing to evict to make time for that, it'd be
https://togami.com/~warren/archive/2013/example-bitcoind-dos-mitigation-via-iptables.txt
*Anti-DoS Low Hanging Fruit: source IP or subnet connection limits*
If you disallow the same IP and/or subnet from establishing too many TCP
connections with your node, it becomes more expensive for attackers
A ban-subnet RPC would be a reasonable addition, but obviously DoS
attackers that are IP or bandwidth constrained are really just script
kiddies. Also anything that involves every node operator doing manual
intervention rather works against decentralisation and having a big
network. That's why I
On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 02:24:04PM +0200, Mike Hearn wrote:
The only other thing I'd like to see there is the start of a new anti-DoS
framework. I think once the outline is in place other people will be able
to fill it in appropriately. But the current framework has to be left
behind.
Part of
That change was made in response to user complaints. Heck we get complaints
about battery life and bandwidth impact even with Bloom filtering. We can't
just randomly start using peoples bandwidth for relaying blocks, especially
as I guess most SPV nodes are behind NAT.
If Gavin is right and the
On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 6:41 AM, Warren Togami Jr. wtog...@gmail.com wrote:
If you disallow the same IP and/or subnet from establishing too many TCP
connections with your node,
[...]
has almost zero drawbacks,
There are whole countries who access the internet from single IP
addresses. There
On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 04:36:20PM +0200, Mike Hearn wrote:
That change was made in response to user complaints. Heck we get complaints
about battery life and bandwidth impact even with Bloom filtering. We can't
just randomly start using peoples bandwidth for relaying blocks, especially
as I
On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 4:59 PM, Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org wrote:
UPNP seems to work well for the reference client. What's the situation
there on Android?
Not sure - it could be investigated. I think UPNP is an entirely
userspace-implementable protocol, so in theory it could be done by a
On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 05:11:35PM +0200, Mike Hearn wrote:
On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 4:59 PM, Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org wrote:
UPNP seems to work well for the reference client. What's the situation
there on Android?
Not sure - it could be investigated. I think UPNP is an entirely
A sane default that better protects users could be...
If (plugged into power) (wifi) then non-bloom peers are OK. It would
protect those users more than reliance upon on the smaller subset of bloom
nodes. Scale back to the less secure behavior when battery and bandwidth
matters.
Warren
On
On 16 August 2013 03:00, Gavin Andresen gavinandre...@gmail.com wrote:
Mike asked what non-0.9 code I'm working on; the three things on the top
of my list are:
1) Smarter fee handling on the client side, instead of hard-coded fees. I
was busy today generating scatter-plots and histograms of
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