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On Wed, Apr 17, 2013 at 9:48 AM, Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net wrote:
So it'd be nice if this ended up not being necessary. Experience indicates
that rational miners typically don't pursue a short-termist
profit-at-any-cost agenda - free
When did I say DoS was unimportant? I just wrote a giant email explaining
how it can be resolved.
I think it's worth pointing out that Bitcoin was launched with no DoS
protection at all, and it's still here. There are still obvious DoS bugs
being fixed with every release. So yes, it's important
On Thu, Apr 18, 2013 at 10:32:24AM +0200, Mike Hearn wrote:
RE: shutting down services dependent on replacement. No, good users of
replacement would still end up taking priority over the constantly churning
DoS replacements. The most you can shut down is one contract. Obviously, if
there's no
On Thu, Apr 18, 2013 at 05:04:44AM -0400, Peter Todd wrote:
An attack still shuts down useful tx replacement though. For instance in
the adjusting payments example an attacker sets up a legit adjusting
payment channel, does a bunch of adjustments, and then launches their
attack. They broadcast
An attack still shuts down useful tx replacement though. For instance in
the adjusting payments example an attacker sets up a legit adjusting
payment channel, does a bunch of adjustments, and then launches their
attack. They broadcast enough adjustments that their adjustment session
looks
On Thu, Apr 18, 2013 at 11:28 AM, Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net wrote:
With the sipaspeed patches it seems ECDSA can be processed on modern cores
at something like 20,000 signatures per second. So it'd take a bit over 4
seconds to process all of them (cpu time).
Sorry brainfart, s/cores/cpus/.
...and actually, that's not a problem if the defender is online, because
they can just broadcast the highest sequence numbered tx, which blocks
further broadcasts by the attacker.
Good point - transactions can be ordered by highest version seen before
they're signature checked. Even without
On Thu, Apr 18, 2013 at 11:28:48AM +0200, Mike Hearn wrote:
Let's include bandwidth. Say the contract (multi-sig input + the outputs)
is about 700 bytes. 43,200 transactions is then about 29 megabytes of data.
On a fairly normal 10mbit connection that would take about 23 seconds to
transfer.
Indeed, as I mentioned in my first mail, nodes can be told how much
bandwidth they're allowed to use and then prioritize within that, so I
don't see any way convergence can fail. And regardless, I used 10mbit for
the calculations, that isn't exactly unlimited. My home internet connection
is better
sure it's worth doing, at least immediately. Weakening the non-final ==
non-standard test to give a window of, say, 3 blocks, would be fine I
think.
Sure. I think Gavin wants some kind of wider memory pool limiter policy
which would encompass such a thing already.
Yes.
I don't want to
I understand that Gavin has spent effort on security efforts against
small-scale attackers. It's the fact that he is so dismissive of the
threat that large attackers play that is what bothers me. But if I am
being divisive I understand.
I posted a clarification of what the reward is for exactly
On Fri, Apr 19, 2013 at 12:38 AM, John Dillon
john.dillon...@googlemail.com wrote:
I understand that Gavin has spent effort on security efforts against
small-scale attackers. It's the fact that he is so dismissive of the
threat that large attackers play that is what bothers me. But if I am
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