Re: [Bitcoin-development] Cold Signing Payment Requests

2013-04-30 Thread Mike Hearn
Backing up a step, I'm not sure what the threat model is for signing the refund address? The same process that's signing the transaction is doing an HTTPS POST with the refund address. It's a real threat, albeit an exotic one. The threat model is a malware compromised host, with a wallet

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Cold Signing Payment Requests

2013-04-30 Thread Jouke Hofman
We do automatic refunds. When bitcoins arrive after an offer has expired (which happens quite often with webwallets that don't broadcast transactions immediately), we return all the bitcoins to a specified bitcoin-address. This happens a couple of times per day and can amount to a couple of

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Cold Signing Payment Requests

2013-04-30 Thread Gavin Andresen
RE: Timo's proposal for protecting the refund address: Seems to me there are two risks: 1) The risk that the merchant's web server will be compromised and the attacker will redirect refunds 2) The risk that the merchant will miss payments because they miss a POST to the payment_url (maybe the

[Bitcoin-development] Fwd: Service bits for pruned nodes

2013-04-30 Thread Rebroad (sourceforge)
As part of a roadmap for block downloading, I think this may be a good time to look into providing an HTTP/HTTPS protocol for block downloading - this would also allow web proxies to cache blocks and thus make it more accessible, as well as cater for resumeable downloads.

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Cold Signing Payment Requests

2013-04-30 Thread Jeremy Spilman
1) The risk that the merchant's web server will be compromised and the attacker will redirect refunds 2) The risk that the merchant will miss payments because they miss a POST to the payment_url (maybe the customer's machine crashes during the HTTPS handshake) If payments are a lot more common

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Fwd: Service bits for pruned nodes

2013-04-30 Thread Jeff Garzik
On Tue, Apr 30, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Rebroad (sourceforge) rebroad+sourceforge@gmail.com wrote: As part of a roadmap for block downloading, I think this may be a good time to look into providing an HTTP/HTTPS protocol for block downloading - this would also allow web proxies to cache blocks

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Fwd: Service bits for pruned nodes

2013-04-30 Thread Andy Parkins
On Tuesday 30 April 2013 19:04:59 Jeff Garzik wrote: The format currently used by bitcoind would be just fine -- blocks/blk.dat for raw data, size-limited well below 1GB. Just need to add a small metadata download, and serve the raw block files. That doesn't seem very generic. It's tied

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Service bits for pruned nodes

2013-04-30 Thread Brenton Camac
Sounds like this part of Bitcoin (block sharing) would definitely benefit from having a REST (HTTP) API. REST-based web APIs are a common feature of most online services these days. Makes writing other client services so much easier. Plus you get the benefit of the HTTP ecosystem for free

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Fwd: Service bits for pruned nodes

2013-04-30 Thread Jeff Garzik
On Tue, Apr 30, 2013 at 3:27 PM, Andy Parkins andypark...@gmail.com wrote: On Tuesday 30 April 2013 19:04:59 Jeff Garzik wrote: The format currently used by bitcoind would be just fine -- blocks/blk.dat for raw data, size-limited well below 1GB. Just need to add a small metadata

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Fwd: Service bits for pruned nodes

2013-04-30 Thread Simon Barber
And then the problem of what domain name to use - ideally a single name would be used so caches had the maximum chance to reuse content. To keep the network distributed perhaps the existing DNS seed mechanism could be used - a few names, each serving a random bitcoind's address. Put :8333