But there's so much 'dry powder' out there (GPUs), I wonder if *not*
supporting merge-mining is any better? At least the attacker has to do
some unique PoW, so you hope it's costing them something.
With lots of people having access to 100TH+ there's not really much
'cost' to doing a 51%
Has anyone seen the talk at 30c3 on the current NSA capabilities?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0w36GAyZIA
Specifically they are able to beat the speed of light between you and a
website such that if you communicate with Bob, they can sent competing
packets that will arrive before Bob's
On Tue, Dec 31, 2013 at 5:39 AM, Drak d...@zikula.org wrote:
The NSA has the ability, right now to change every download of bitcoin-qt,
on the fly and the only cure is encryption.
Please cut it out with the snake oil pedaling. This is really over the
top. You're invoking the NSA as the threat
Given that hardly anyone checks the signatures, it's fair to say downloads
aren't protected by anything at the moment. SSL for downloads can only
raise the bar, never lower it, and if the NSA want to kick off the process
of revoking some of the big CA's then I'm game (assuming anyone detects it
of
Interesting. I think the original BitDNS discussion was more interesting
that what currently is happening with namecoin, see
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1790.0
Satoshi said there: 1) IP records don't need to be in the chain, just do
registrar function not DNS. And CA problem solved,
I didn't know about the dedicated server meltdown, it wasn't any of my infra. Anyway, my previous offer still stands.One less 'security theater' approach would be if we could provide forward-validation of updates using the blockchain. It's always going to be up to the user the first time they
We already have a wonderful system for secure updating - gitian-downloader. We
just neither use it not bother making actual gitian releases so anyone can use
it to verify signatures of downloads.
Jeremy Spilman jer...@taplink.co wrote:
I didn't know about the dedicated server meltdown, it
On Tue, Dec 31, 2013 at 01:14:05AM +, Luke-Jr wrote:
On Monday, December 30, 2013 11:22:25 PM Peter Todd wrote:
that you are using merge-mining is a red-flag because without majority, or
at least near-majority, hashing power an attacker can 51% attack your
altcoin at negligible cost by
On Wednesday, January 01, 2014 4:53:42 AM Peter Todd wrote:
On Tue, Dec 31, 2013 at 01:14:05AM +, Luke-Jr wrote:
On Monday, December 30, 2013 11:22:25 PM Peter Todd wrote:
that you are using merge-mining is a red-flag because without majority,
or at least near-majority, hashing power
On Wed, Jan 01, 2014 at 05:09:27AM +, Luke-Jr wrote:
You assume the value of a crypto-currency is equal to all miners, it's
not.
Suppose I create a merge-mined Zerocoin implementation with a 1:1
BTC/ZTC exchange rate enforced by the software. You can't argue this is
a scamcoin;
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