[As an aside I agree that there are lots of things to improve here,
but the fact that users can in theory be forced off of tor via DOS
attacks is not immediately concerning to me because its a conscious
choice users would make to abandon their privacy
Bitcoin already has a large population
On Thu, Nov 27, 2014 at 2:22 AM, Gregory Maxwell gmaxw...@gmail.com wrote:
Since this attack vector has been discussed, I started making some
measurements on how effective it is to connect to Bitcoin using Tor,
and I found that the number of connections dropping to near-zero is
a situation
Two minor observations:
DecodeBase58Check is listed as inline, but isnt actually inlined in the
header.
This makes it both non-present in libbitcoin_common.a and unavailable
to other code that would use libbitcoin_common.a as a library. (bug?)
In general, the hierarchy of tools is poor/weak. for
I might be mistaken, but it seems to me this paper discusses unintended
ways of obtaining the IP addresses of clients involved in transactions on
the core Bitcoin network.
Tor was mentioned only insofar as it might be one's first thought of how to
mitigate this risk, yet Bitcoin over Tor has its
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A recent comment on this (I think)...
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/4564#issuecomment-49558760
Reflecting on an approach from a different but related project, as a
result of an issue discussion in DW, stealth and coinjoin from that
Heya,
I was wondering about BIP 65 regarding the OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY, and thought
it might make more sense to instead have a OP_CHECKLOCKTIME which would simply
push an OP_TRUE or OP_FALSE onto the stack?
That way someone could include multiple OP_CHECKLOCKTIME conditions in a single
On Thu, Nov 27, 2014 at 10:56 PM, Richard Moore m...@ricmoo.com wrote:
Heya,
I was wondering about BIP 65 regarding the OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY, and
thought it might make more sense to instead have a OP_CHECKLOCKTIME which
would simply push an OP_TRUE or OP_FALSE onto the stack?
Updating the
That's what I was trying to say... The researchers are deanonymizing
transactions from non-Tor connected hosts. So why are we talking about Tor
limitations in response to this? Shouldn't we be discussing how to address
the issues in Bitcoin proper?
M
On 11/27/2014 9:30 PM, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
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On 27 November 2014 18:46:23 GMT-05:00, Gregory Maxwell gmaxw...@gmail.com
wrote:
snip 100% accurate commentary from gmaxwell
The things you're suggesting were all carefully designed out of the
proposal, perhaps the BIP text needs some more
On Fri, Nov 28, 2014 at 12:45 AM, Mistr Bigs mister...@gmail.com wrote:
That's what I was trying to say... The researchers are deanonymizing
transactions from non-Tor connected hosts. So why are we talking about Tor
limitations in response to this? Shouldn't we be discussing how to address
the
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