Re: [Bitcoin-development] Block Size Increase Requirements
Comments in line: > On May 8, 2015, at 11:08 PM, Peter Todd wrote: > > Makes it trivial to find miners and DoS attack them - a huge risk to the > network as a whole, as well as the miners. > > Right now pools already get DoSed all the time through their work > submission systems; getting DoS attacked via their nodes as well would > be a disaster. It seems that using a -miner flag to follow rules about smaller blocks would only reveal miner nodes if one sent the node a solved block that that was valid in every way except the block size. While not impossible, I wouldn't call this trivial, as it still requires wasting an entire block's worth of energy. >> When in "miner mode", the client would reject 4MB blocks and wouldn't build >> on them. The reference client might even track the miner and the non-miner >> chain tip. >> >> Miners would refuse to build on 5MB blocks, but merchants and general users >> would accept them. > > That'd be an excellent way to double-spend merchants, significantly > increasing the chance that the double-spend would succeed as you only > have to get sufficient hashing power to get the lucky blocks; you don't > need enough hashing power to *also* ensure those blocks don't become the > longest chain, removing the need to sybil attack your target. > I think this could be mitigated by counting confirmations differently. We should think of confirmations as only coming from blocks following the miners' more strict rule set. So if a merchant were to see payment for the first time in a block that met their own size restrictions but not the miners', then they would simply count it as unconfirmed. If they get deep enough in the chain, though, the client should probably count them as being confirmed anyway, even if they don't meet the client nodes' expectation of the miners' block size limit. This happening probably just means that the client has not updated their software (or -minermaxblocksize configuration, depending on how it is implemented) in a long time. I actually like Tier's suggestion quite a bit. I think we could have the default client limit set to some higher number, and have miners agree out of band on the latest block size limit. Or maybe even build in a way to vote into the blockchain. Best, Stephen -- One dashboard for servers and applications across Physical-Virtual-Cloud Widest out-of-the-box monitoring support with 50+ applications Performance metrics, stats and reports that give you Actionable Insights Deep dive visibility with transaction tracing using APM Insight. http://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/290420510;117567292;y ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] [BIP] Normalized Transaction IDs
We should make sure to consider how BIP34 affects normalized transaction ids, since the height of the block is included in the scriptSig ensuring that the txid will be different. We wouldn't want to enable replay attacks in the form of spending coinbase outputs in the same way they were spent from a previous block. So maybe normalized txids should strip the scriptSigs of all transactions except for coinbase transactions? This seems to make sense, since coinbase transactions are inherently not malleable anyway. Also, s7r linked to my 'Build your own nHashType' proposal (although V2 is here: https://github.com/scmorse/bitcoin-misc/blob/master/sighash_proposal_v2.md). I just wanted to add that I think even with normalized ids, it could still be useful to be able to apply these flags to choose which parts of the transaction become signed. I've also seen vague references to some kind of a merklized abstract syntax tree, but am not fully sure how that would work. Maybe someone on here could explain it? Best, Stephen > On May 15, 2015, at 5:54 AM, s7r wrote: > > Hello, > > How will this exactly be safe against: > a) the malleability of the parent tx (2nd level malleability) > b) replays > > If you strip just the scriptSig of the input(s), the txid(s) can still > be mutated (with higher probability before it gets confirmed). > > If you strip both the scriptSig of the parent and the txid, nothing can > any longer be mutated but this is not safe against replays. This could > work if we were using only one scriptPubKey per tx. But this is not > enforced, and I don't think it's the proper way to do it. > > Something similar can be achieved if you would use a combination of > flags from here: > > https://github.com/scmorse/bitcoin-misc/blob/master/sighash_proposal.md > > But this has some issues too. > > I've read your draft but didn't understand how exactly will this prevent > normal malleability as we know it, second level malleability and replays > as well as how will we do the transition into mapping the txes in the > blockchain to normalized txids. Looking forward to read more on this > topic. Thanks for the brainstorming ;) > > >> On 5/13/2015 3:48 PM, Christian Decker wrote: >> Hi All, >> >> I'd like to propose a BIP to normalize transaction IDs in order to >> address transaction malleability and facilitate higher level protocols. >> >> The normalized transaction ID is an alias used in parallel to the >> current (legacy) transaction IDs to address outputs in transactions. It >> is calculated by removing (zeroing) the scriptSig before computing the >> hash, which ensures that only data whose integrity is also guaranteed by >> the signatures influences the hash. Thus if anything causes the >> normalized ID to change it automatically invalidates the signature. When >> validating a client supporting this BIP would use both the normalized tx >> ID as well as the legacy tx ID when validating transactions. >> >> The detailed writeup can be found >> here: >> https://github.com/cdecker/bips/blob/normalized-txid/bip-00nn.mediawiki. >> >> @gmaxwell: I'd like to request a BIP number, unless there is something >> really wrong with the proposal. >> >> In addition to being a simple alternative that solves transaction >> malleability it also hugely simplifies higher level protocols. We can >> now use template transactions upon which sequences of transactions can >> be built before signing them. >> >> I hesitated quite a while to propose it since it does require a hardfork >> (old clients would not find the prevTx identified by the normalized >> transaction ID and deem the spending transaction invalid), but it seems >> that hardforks are no longer the dreaded boogeyman nobody talks about. >> I left out the details of how the hardfork is to be done, as it does not >> really matter and we may have a good mechanism to apply a bunch of >> hardforks concurrently in the future. >> >> I'm sure it'll take time to implement and upgrade, but I think it would >> be a nice addition to the functionality and would solve a long standing >> problem :-) >> >> Please let me know what you think, the proposal is definitely not set in >> stone at this point and I'm sure we can improve it further. >> >> Regards, >> Christian >> >> >> -- >> One dashboard for servers and applications across Physical-Virtual-Cloud >> Widest out-of-the-box monitoring support with 50+ applications >> Performance metrics, stats and reports that give you Actionable Insights >> Deep dive visibility with transaction tracing using APM Insight. >> http://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/290420510;117567292;y >> >> >> >> ___ >> Bitcoin-development mailing list >> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net >> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > > ---
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposed alternatives to the 20MB step function
Tier Nolan writes: > On Sat, May 9, 2015 at 4:36 AM, Gregory Maxwell wrote: > >> An example would >> be tx_size = MAX( real_size >> 1, real_size + 4*utxo_created_size - >> 3*utxo_consumed_size). > > > This could be implemented as a soft fork too. > > * 1MB hard size limit > * 900kB soft limit I like this too. Some tweaks: 1) Nomenclature: call tx_size "tx_cost" and real_size "tx_bytes"? 2) If we have a reasonable hard *byte* limit, I don't think that we need the MAX(). In fact, it's probably OK to go negative. 3) ... or maybe not, if any consumed UTXO was generated before the soft fork (reducing Tier's perverse incentive). 4) How do we measure UTXO size? There are some constant-ish things in there (eg. txid as key, height, outnum, amount). Maybe just add 32 to scriptlen? 5) Add a CHECKSIG cost. Naively, since we allow 20,000 CHECKSIGs and 1MB blocks, that implies a cost of 50 bytes per CHECKSIG (but counted correctly, unlike now). This last one implies that the initial cost limit would be 2M, but in practice probably somewhere in the middle. tx_cost = 50*num-CHECKSIG + tx_bytes + 4*utxo_created_size - 3*utxo_consumed_size > A 250 byte transaction with 2 inputs and 2 outputs would have an adjusted > size of 252 bytes. Now cost == 352. Cheers, Rusty. -- One dashboard for servers and applications across Physical-Virtual-Cloud Widest out-of-the-box monitoring support with 50+ applications Performance metrics, stats and reports that give you Actionable Insights Deep dive visibility with transaction tracing using APM Insight. http://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/290420510;117567292;y ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] [BIP] Normalized Transaction IDs
On Friday, May 15, 2015 9:54:55 AM s7r wrote: > If you strip both the scriptSig of the parent and the txid, nothing can > any longer be mutated but this is not safe against replays. This could > work if we were using only one scriptPubKey per tx. But this is not > enforced, ... Assuming you mean one output per scriptPubKey (and not limiting tx to one output), the alternative is essentially undefined, and creates real problems for Bitcoin today. It's not something we should go out of the way to support or encourage. Therefore, regardless of whatever other options are available, I would like to see a scriptPubKey-only sighash type for strong safety within all malleability situations (including CoinJoin and other sender-respends) that more advanced wallet software could take advantage of in the future (while strictly enforcing no-reuse on its own wallet to avoid known replays). Luke -- One dashboard for servers and applications across Physical-Virtual-Cloud Widest out-of-the-box monitoring support with 50+ applications Performance metrics, stats and reports that give you Actionable Insights Deep dive visibility with transaction tracing using APM Insight. http://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/290420510;117567292;y ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] [BIP] Normalized Transaction IDs
On Fri, May 15, 2015 at 10:54 AM, s7r wrote: > Hello, > > How will this exactly be safe against: > a) the malleability of the parent tx (2nd level malleability) > The signature signs everything except the signature itself. The normalized txid doesn't include that signature, so mutations of the signature don't cause the normalized txid to change. If the refund transaction refers to the parent using the normalised txid, then it doesn't matter if the parent has a mutated signature. The normalized transaction ignores the mutation. If the parent is mutated, then the refund doesn't even have to be modified, it still refers to it. If you want a multi-level refund transaction, then all refund transactions must use the normalized txids to refer to their parents. The "root" transaction is submitted to the blockchain and locked down. > b) replays > If there are 2 transactions which are mutations of each other, then only one can be added to the block chain, since the other is a double spend. The normalized txid refers to all of them, rather than a specific transaction. > If you strip just the scriptSig of the input(s), the txid(s) can still > be mutated (with higher probability before it gets confirmed). > Mutation is only a problem if it occurs after signing. The signature signs everything except the signature itself. > If you strip both the scriptSig of the parent and the txid, nothing can > any longer be mutated but this is not safe against replays. Correct, but normalized txids are safe against replays, so are better. I think the new signature opcode fixes things too. The question is hard fork but clean solution vs a soft fork but a little more hassle. -- One dashboard for servers and applications across Physical-Virtual-Cloud Widest out-of-the-box monitoring support with 50+ applications Performance metrics, stats and reports that give you Actionable Insights Deep dive visibility with transaction tracing using APM Insight. http://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/290420510;117567292;y___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] [BIP] Normalized Transaction IDs
Hello, How will this exactly be safe against: a) the malleability of the parent tx (2nd level malleability) b) replays If you strip just the scriptSig of the input(s), the txid(s) can still be mutated (with higher probability before it gets confirmed). If you strip both the scriptSig of the parent and the txid, nothing can any longer be mutated but this is not safe against replays. This could work if we were using only one scriptPubKey per tx. But this is not enforced, and I don't think it's the proper way to do it. Something similar can be achieved if you would use a combination of flags from here: https://github.com/scmorse/bitcoin-misc/blob/master/sighash_proposal.md But this has some issues too. I've read your draft but didn't understand how exactly will this prevent normal malleability as we know it, second level malleability and replays as well as how will we do the transition into mapping the txes in the blockchain to normalized txids. Looking forward to read more on this topic. Thanks for the brainstorming ;) On 5/13/2015 3:48 PM, Christian Decker wrote: > Hi All, > > I'd like to propose a BIP to normalize transaction IDs in order to > address transaction malleability and facilitate higher level protocols. > > The normalized transaction ID is an alias used in parallel to the > current (legacy) transaction IDs to address outputs in transactions. It > is calculated by removing (zeroing) the scriptSig before computing the > hash, which ensures that only data whose integrity is also guaranteed by > the signatures influences the hash. Thus if anything causes the > normalized ID to change it automatically invalidates the signature. When > validating a client supporting this BIP would use both the normalized tx > ID as well as the legacy tx ID when validating transactions. > > The detailed writeup can be found > here: https://github.com/cdecker/bips/blob/normalized-txid/bip-00nn.mediawiki. > > @gmaxwell: I'd like to request a BIP number, unless there is something > really wrong with the proposal. > > In addition to being a simple alternative that solves transaction > malleability it also hugely simplifies higher level protocols. We can > now use template transactions upon which sequences of transactions can > be built before signing them. > > I hesitated quite a while to propose it since it does require a hardfork > (old clients would not find the prevTx identified by the normalized > transaction ID and deem the spending transaction invalid), but it seems > that hardforks are no longer the dreaded boogeyman nobody talks about. > I left out the details of how the hardfork is to be done, as it does not > really matter and we may have a good mechanism to apply a bunch of > hardforks concurrently in the future. > > I'm sure it'll take time to implement and upgrade, but I think it would > be a nice addition to the functionality and would solve a long standing > problem :-) > > Please let me know what you think, the proposal is definitely not set in > stone at this point and I'm sure we can improve it further. > > Regards, > Christian > > > -- > One dashboard for servers and applications across Physical-Virtual-Cloud > Widest out-of-the-box monitoring support with 50+ applications > Performance metrics, stats and reports that give you Actionable Insights > Deep dive visibility with transaction tracing using APM Insight. > http://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/290420510;117567292;y > > > > ___ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > -- One dashboard for servers and applications across Physical-Virtual-Cloud Widest out-of-the-box monitoring support with 50+ applications Performance metrics, stats and reports that give you Actionable Insights Deep dive visibility with transaction tracing using APM Insight. http://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/290420510;117567292;y ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
