On Sat, May 24, 2014 at 1:27 PM, Ashley Holman wrote:
>
> * Skip the inv/getdata sequence for new blocks - just push them out
> directly to save 1 roundtrip per hop
>
Upon further reflection, I remove this from my proposal. It's an unrelated
optimisation that probably distracts from the main poi
Hi,
On this list there has been some discussion around techniques to speed up
block propagation, with a particular focus on reducing the extra orphan
risk carried by larger blocks.
The current store-and-forward method means that larger blocks will
propagate with higher latency. One proposed solu
FWIW
That said, keep in mind the github discussion(1) that was had: if all
the DNS seeds being down breaks your application, your application is
broken and insecure. The only exception is initial startup, and even
then you should have fallbacks such as hardcoded node lists and manual
peer entry. I
On Fri, May 23, 2014 at 9:48 AM, Kyle Jerviss wrote:
> Multisig is great for irreversible actions, but pointless most of the
> time, which is why no PGP developer or user ever thought to implement it.
>
> If you lose a key and an attacker signs a bogus email or commit with it,
> we all roll back w
Multisig is great for irreversible actions, but pointless most of the
time, which is why no PGP developer or user ever thought to implement it.
If you lose a key and an attacker signs a bogus email or commit with it,
we all roll back with no lasting harm done.
Wladimir wrote:
> On Thu, May 22,
I know the likelihood of this happening is slim, but if these are the
desired features we should consider switching to monotone (monotone.ca)
which has a much more flexible DAG structure and workflow built around
programmable multi-sig signing of commits. We could still maintain the
github account
On Wed, May 21, 2014 at 7:10 PM, Wladimir wrote:
> Hello Chris,
>
> On Wed, May 21, 2014 at 6:39 PM, Chris Beams wrote:
>> I'm personally happy to comply with this for any future commits, but wonder
>> if you've considered the arguments against commit signing [1]? Note
>> especially the reference
On Thu, May 22, 2014 at 8:06 PM, Jeff Garzik wrote:
> Related: Current multi-sig wallet technology being rolled out now,
> with 2FA and other fancy doodads, is now arguably more secure than my
> PGP keyring. My PGP keyring is, to draw an analogy, a non-multisig
> wallet (set of keys), with all t
8 matches
Mail list logo
