On Wed, Aug 20, 2014 at 3:26 AM, Troy Benjegerdes ho...@hozed.org wrote:
If bitcoin wants to become irrelevant, then by all means, continue to
depend on github and all the unknown attack surface it exposes.
Those of us that do run our own servers will migrate to higher quality
alternatives.
Hi there,
quote:
[...]
If two distinct transactions (with unrelated bitcoin addresses)
come from the same set of 8 peers, the attacker can conclude that they
originated from the same user. This gives another method (in addition
to transaction graph analysis) for an attacker to link different
I would be very happy if we upgraded the P2P protocol with MAC keys and a
simple home grown encryption layer, because:
1. It's practically guaranteed that 5-eyes intelligence agencies are
either systematically deanonymising Bitcoin users already (linking
transactions to real world
Misbehaving addresses can have their connecting difficulty
scaled up, which should make it uneconomic to try to DoS the usage of
Tor exit nodes for connecting to Bitcoin.
You can't solve DoS by requiring all clients to do complicated work, all
that means is that weak clients (like users
Thank you for your feedback regarding Custodial Identities. I will address
it to the mailing list for transparency.
Think of it as a 1-of-2 multisig edge case where Custodian Identities are
actively managed by the Bitcoin Assigned Custodial Identities
Authority/Regional Bitcoin Custodial Identity
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