Re: [Bitcoin-development] Deanonymisation of clients in Bitcoin P2P network paper

2014-11-26 Thread Jeff Garzik
I don't recall being contacted directly, but the attack has been discussed. It relies on a number of conditions. For example, if you are over Tor, they try to kick the machine off Tor, _assuming_ that it will fall back to non-Tor. That's only true for dual stack nodes, which are not really 100%

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Deanonymisation of clients in Bitcoin P2P network paper

2014-11-26 Thread odinn
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Please see also the following: https://cpunks.org//pipermail/cypherpunks/2014-November/005971.html Respect, - -Odinn Jeff Garzik: I don't recall being contacted directly, but the attack has been discussed. It relies on a number of

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Deanonymisation of clients in Bitcoin P2P network paper

2014-11-26 Thread Isidor Zeuner
Hello there, quote: Please see also the following: https://cpunks.org//pipermail/cypherpunks/2014-November/005971.html I agree about the severity of the Tor/Bitcoin issue, but I see no point in bashing Bitcoin's financial privacy characteristics as the linked pages seem to do. Bitcoin can

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Deanonymisation of clients in Bitcoin P2P network paper

2014-11-26 Thread Gregory Maxwell
Since this attack vector has been discussed, I started making some measurements on how effective it is to connect to Bitcoin using Tor, and I found that the number of connections dropping to near-zero is a situation which occurs rather frequently, which suggests that there is still room to

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposal: PoW-based throttling of addresses (was: Outbound connections rotation)

2014-11-26 Thread Isidor Zeuner
Hi Mike, thanks for your assessment. Please find my replies in-line: DKIM is hardly a PoW; signing is cheap and gets cheaper all the time. I used to work in the email business and big bulk mailers all spent far more CPU time on other aspects of their business, the overhead of DKIM is