Why do so many tie the block size debate to creating a fee market, as if one
didn't already exist? Yes, today we frequently see many low priority
transactions included into the next block, but that does not mean there is not
a marketplace for block space. It just means miners are not being
On Sun, May 10, 2015 at 9:21 PM, Gavin Andresen gavinandre...@gmail.com wrote:
a while I think any algorithm that ties difficulty to block size is just a
complicated way of dictating minimum fees.
Thats not the long term effect or the motivation-- what you're seeing
is that the subsidy gets in
On Sun, May 10, 2015 at 8:45 PM, Sergio Lerner
sergioler...@certimix.com wrote:
Can the system by gamed?
Users can pay fees or a portion of fees out of band to miner(s); this
is undetectable to the network.
It's also behavior that miners have engaged in since at least 2011 (in
two forms;
Le 11/05/2015 00:31, Mark Friedenbach a écrit :
I'm on my phone today so I'm somewhat constrained in my reply, but the key
takeaway is that the proposal is a mechanism for miners to trade subsidy
for the increased fees of a larger block. Necessarily it only makes sense
to do so when the
Le 08/05/2015 22:33, Mark Friedenbach a écrit :
* For each block, the miner is allowed to select a different difficulty
(nBits) within a certain range, e.g. +/- 25% of the expected difficulty,
and this miner-selected difficulty is used for the proof of work check. In
addition to adjusting
Two years ago I presented a new way to create a fee market that does not
depend on the block chain limit.
This proposal has not been formally analyzed in any paper since then,
but I think it holds a good promise to untangle the current problem
regarding increasing the tps and creating the fee
Let me make sure I understand this proposal:
On Fri, May 8, 2015 at 11:36 PM, Gregory Maxwell gmaxw...@gmail.com wrote:
(*) I believe my currently favored formulation of general dynamic control
idea is that each miner expresses in their coinbase a preferred size
between some minimum (e.g.
I'm on my phone today so I'm somewhat constrained in my reply, but the key
takeaway is that the proposal is a mechanism for miners to trade subsidy
for the increased fees of a larger block. Necessarily it only makes sense
to do so when the marginal fee per KB exceeds the subsidy fee per KB. It
How much will that cost me?
The network is hashing at 310PetaHash/sec right now.
Takes 600 seconds to find a block, so 186,000PH per block
186,000 * 0.00038 = 70 extra PH
If it takes 186,000 PH to find a block, and a block is worth 25.13 BTC
(reward plus fees), that 70 PH costs:
(25.13
I feel your pain. I've had the same thing happen to me in the past. And I
agree it's more likely to occur with my proposed scheme but I think with HD
wallets there will still be UTXOs left unspent after most transactions
since, for privacy sake it's looking for the smallest set of addresses that
On 05/08/2015 11:36 PM, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
Another related point which has been tendered before but seems to have
been ignored is that changing how the size limit is computed can help
better align incentives and thus reduce risk. E.g. a major cost to the
network is the UTXO impact of
Micropayment channels are not pie in the sky proposals. They work today on
Bitcoin as it is deployed without any changes. People just need to start
using them.
On May 10, 2015 11:03, Owen Gunden ogun...@phauna.org wrote:
On 05/08/2015 11:36 PM, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
Another related point
That's a lot of work, a lot of extra utxo's, and a lot of blockchain spam, just
so I can do a convoluted form of arithmetic on my balance.
If a tx contained an explicit miner fee and a change address, but did not
compute the change, letting the network compute it (and therefore merge
transactions
This is my biggest headache with practical bitcoin usage. I'd love to hear it if
anyone has any clever solutions to the wallet/utxo locked problem. Spending
unconfirmed outputs really requires a different security model on the part of
the receiver than #confirmations, but isn't inherently bad if
This has been frequently explored on IRC.
My general conclusion is dollar bills - pick highly common denominations
of bitcoins. Aggregate to obtain these denominations, but do not aggregate
further.
This permits merge avoidance (privacy++), easy coinjoin where many hide in
the noise
15 matches
Mail list logo
