Wrong patch? This looks like node.js code for something called txtool.
--
Michael
On Fri, Nov 22, 2013 at 1:46 PM, Jeff Garzik wrote:
> Trying something new... a [simple] patch sent to the list, for
> discussion. Seems unlikely to be controversial. github access is
> temporarily disabled,
On Tue, Jul 23, 2013 at 4:36 AM, Pieter Wuille wrote:
> Apart from that, exposing this HTTP-based interface publicly has its
> own problems, like security risks and potential DoS risks. If
> anything, we should be reducing the attack surface rather than
> increase it. IMHO, the only thing that sho
+1 and thank you. I've prototyped a couple different Bitcoin projects that
would benefit from this.
I'm traveling with poor 'net so I haven't read the patches yet. I echo pull
request comments about using Accept and Accept-Encoding headers. Same for
an API version number in the URL.
It'd be helpf
On Mon, Jun 3, 2013 at 5:43 PM, Melvin Carvalho wrote:
> Sorry if this is a stupid question, but why would someone want to
> sacrifice their bitcoins?
>
Good question. One reason is https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Fidelity_bonds
Cheers,
Michael
---
On Fri, May 31, 2013 at 5:56 AM, Rune Kjær Svendsen wrote:
> I have an application that wants to keep up with new blocks as they come
> in. For that I can use the -blocknotify option with bitcoind, which will
> execute my application for each new block.
>
> The problem is that my app isn't necessa
On Tue, Jan 31, 2012 at 12:17 AM, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 30, 2012 at 11:33 PM, Michael Hendricks wrote:
>> address manager point to the attacker. If a client has 8 connections
>> to the network, a Sybil attack would succeed 1.7% of the time.
>
> Meh, careful
On Tue, Jan 31, 2012 at 12:17 AM, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 30, 2012 at 11:33 PM, Michael Hendricks wrote:
>> address manager point to the attacker. If a client has 8 connections
>> to the network, a Sybil attack would succeed 1.7% of the time.
>
> Meh, careful
On Mon, Jan 30, 2012 at 7:05 PM, Gavin Andresen wrote:
> Given the randomness in Pieter's design, that seems extremely unlikely
> / difficult to do. Is it possible to do a back-of-the-envelope
> calculation to figure out what percentage of nodes on the network an
> attacker would have to control t
On Sun, Jan 29, 2012 at 7:31 PM, Pieter Wuille wrote:
> wanting to move to IPv6 support in the Satoshi bitcoin client
> somewhere in the future, the way IP addresses were managed is not
> really possible anymore. Right now, basically all addresses ever seen
> are kept - both on-disk and in-memory,
2011/11/17 Martinx - ジェームズ
> Testing the 0.5.0 in Linux, I see a strange behaviour:
>
> 1- Open qt-client, blockchain stops the downloading at 10%... Wait 30
> minutes... not reach 11%...
>
> 2- Close and reopen the qt-client, blockchain start again at 0%...
> Normal!?
>
> 3- Now the download
On Mon, Oct 24, 2011 at 8:55 AM, Gavin Andresen wrote:
> If you assume the client has all previous transactions, then you could
> get the transaction input's prevout (from the memory pool or disk) and
> then ExtractAddress() from it. That is probably a bad idea for
> listtransactions, since fetchi
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