[Bitcoin-development] IMPORTANT - Bitcoin Dev List Move Tuesday, June 23rd 8pm UTC

2015-06-20 Thread Warren Togami Jr.
This is an important notice to all members of the Bitcoin Dev List.


*Tuesday, June 23rd 8pm UTC (1pm PDT) the following will happen.*

   - The current list at bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net will
   reject all posts.
   - The current archives at
   http://sourceforge.net/p/bitcoin/mailman/bitcoin-development/ will be
   exported.
   - The test archives at the new list will be wiped and replaced with an
   import from the old list.
   - The new list
   https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev will be
   open to posts after the archive import is complete.

https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Everyone may to subscribe at the new list now.  Feel free to make test
posts.   Anything posted prior to the switchover on Tuesday will be wiped
from the archives.

*DMARC Status*
A current issue with this list is posts from domains that require DKIM
signature verification will end up in the spam folder at popular providers
like gmail.  Initially the new list will have that exact same problem as we
will continue to have the subject tag and footer.  Within a few weeks LF
will upgrade Mailman to do automatic Munge From
http://wiki.list.org/DEV/DMARC which will solve this problem.

Warren Togami
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-20 Thread Ivan Brightly
Yep - similarly: you live in a neighborhood with a local coffee store. Sure
you could use a stolen credit card or a fake $5 bill, but it's not worth
the risk of being caught for a $3 coffee. And on the other side, the store
can deal with 1% of transactions getting reversed or having a fake bill so
they don't change their procedures.

Perfection is not necessary in all situations.

On Sat, Jun 20, 2015 at 12:02 AM, Eric Lombrozo elombr...@gmail.com wrote:


  On Jun 19, 2015, at 8:48 PM, Luke Dashjr l...@dashjr.org wrote:
 
  On Saturday, June 20, 2015 1:23:03 AM Aaron Voisine wrote:
  They don't need to be made cryptographically safe, they just have to be
  safer than, for instance, credit card payments that can be charged
 back. As
  long as it's reasonably good in practice, that's fine.
 
  They never will be. You can get a decent rate of success merely by
 making one
  transaction propagate fast (eg, 1 input, 1 output) and the other slow
 (eg,
  1000 inputs, 1000 outputs) and choosing your peers carefully. The only
 reason
  unconfirmed transactions aren't double spent today is because nobody is
  seriously *trying*.
 
  Luke
 


 Newspapers are often sold in vending machines that make it possible for
 anyone to just pay the price of one and take them all…and most of the time
 they are not that carefully monitored. Why? Because most people have better
 things to do than try to steal a few newspapers. They probably were much
 more closely monitored earlier in their history…but once it became clear
 that despite the obvious attack vector very few people actually try to game
 it, vendors figured it wasn’t really that big a risk. Same thing applies to
 people trying to steal a piece of bubble gum at the cash register at a
 convenience store by double-spending.

 - Eric Lombrozo

 
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Hard fork via miner vote

2015-06-20 Thread Matt Whitlock
On Saturday, 20 June 2015, at 8:11 pm, Pieter Wuille wrote:
 you want full nodes that have not noticed the fork to fail rather than see a 
 slow but otherwise functional chain.

Isn't that what the Alert mechanism is for? If these nodes continue running 
despite an alert telling them they're outdated, then it must be intentional.

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Hard fork via miner vote

2015-06-20 Thread Pieter Wuille
On Sat, Jun 20, 2015 at 7:26 PM, David Vorick david.vor...@gmail.com
wrote:

 I see it as unreasonable to expect all nodes to upgrade during a hardfork.
 If you are intentionally waiting for that to happen, it's possible for an
 extreme minority of nodes to hold the rest of the network hostage by simply
 refusing to upgrade. However you want nodes to be able to protest until it
 is clear that they have lost the battle without being at risk of getting
 hardforked out of the network unexpectedly.


You can't observe the majority of nodes, only miners, and weighed by
hashrate. If you need a mechanism for protest, that should happen before
the hard fork change code is rolled out. I am assuming a completely
uncontroversial change, in order to not confuse this discussion with the
debate about what hard forks should be done.

So I am not talking about protest, just about deploying a change. And yes,
it is unreasonable to expect that every single node will upgrade. But there
is a difference between ignoring old unmaintained nodes that do not
influence anyone's behaviour, and ignoring the nodes that power miners
producing actual blocks. In addition, having no blocks on the old chain is
safer than producing a small number, as you want full nodes that have not
noticed the fork to fail rather than see a slow but otherwise functional
chain.

-- 
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Hard fork via miner vote

2015-06-20 Thread Tier Nolan
I agree giving notice that the change is going to happen is critical for a
hard fork.  If miners vote in favor, they need to give people time to
upgrade (or to decide to reject the fork).

The BIP 100 proposal is that no change will happen until a timestamp is
reached.  It isn't clear exactly how it would work.

Testnet: Sep 1st 2015
Mainnet: Jan 11th 2016

It suggests 90% of 12000 blocks (~83 days).

This means that if 10800 of the last 12000 blocks are the updated version,
then the change is considered locked in.

I think having an earlier fail threshold would be a good idea too.  This
guarantees notice.

Assuming 3 is old rule and 4 is new rule

If the median of 11 timestamp is after 1st Sep 2015 and less than 10800 of
the last 12000 blocks are version 4+, then reject version 4 blocks
If the median of 11 timestamp is after 1st Nov 2015 and at least 10800 of
the last 12000 blocks are version 4+, then reject version 3 blocks
(lock-in)
If the median of 11 timestamp is after 1st Jan 2016 and at least 10800 of
the last 12000 blocks are version 4+, the allow new rule

This means that if the 90% threshold is lost at any time between 1st Sep
and 1st Nov, then the fork is rejected.  Otherwise, after the 1st Nov, it
is locked in, but the new rules don't activate until 1st Jan.

For block size, miners could still soft fork back to 1MB after 1st Nov, it
there is a user/merchant revolt (maybe that would be version 5 blocks).


On Sat, Jun 20, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Pieter Wuille pieter.wui...@gmail.com
wrote:

 Hello all,

 I've seen ideas around hard fork proposals that involve a block version
 vote (a la BIP34, BIP66, or my more recent versionbits BIP draft). I
 believe this is a bad idea, independent of what the hard fork itself is.

 Ultimately, the purpose of a hard fork is asking the whole community to
 change their full nodes to new code. The purpose of the trigger mechanism
 is to establish when that has happened.

 Using a 95% threshold, implies the fork can happen when at least 5% of
 miners have not upgraded, which implies some full nodes have not (as miners
 are nodes), and in addition, means the old chain can keep growing too,
 confusing old non-miner nodes as well.

 Ideally, the fork should be scheduled when one is certain nodes will have
 upgraded, and the risk for a fork will be gone. If everyone has upgraded,
 no vote is necessary, and if nodes have not, it remains risky to fork them
 off.

 I understand that, in order to keep humans in the loop, you want an
 observable trigger mechanism, and a hashrate vote is an easy way to do
 this. But at least, use a minimum timestamp you believe to be reasonable
 for upgrade, and a 100% threshold afterwards. Anything else guarantees that
 your forking change happens *knowingly* before the risk is gone.

 You may argue that miners would be asked to - and have it in their best
 interest - to not actually make blocks that violate the changed rule before
 they are reasonably sure that everyone has upgraded. That is possible, but
 it does not gain you anything over just using a 100% threshold, as how
 would they be reasonably sure everyone has upgraded, while blocks creater
 by non-upgraded miners are still being created?

 TL;DR: use a timestamp switchover for a hard fork, or add a block voting
 threshold as a means to keep humans in the loop, but if you do, use 100% as
 threshold.

 --
 Pieter


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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-20 Thread Eric Lombrozo

 On Jun 20, 2015, at 4:37 PM, justusranv...@riseup.net wrote:
 
 Signed PGP part
 On 2015-06-20 18:20, Jorge Timón wrote:
  On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 6:42 PM, Eric Lombrozo elombr...@gmail.com
  wrote:
  If we want a non-repudiation mechanism in the protocol, we should
  explicitly define one rather than relying on “prima facie”
  assumptions. Otherwise, I would recommend not relying on the existence
  of a signed transaction as proof of intent to pay…
 
  Non-repudiation can be built on top of the payment protocol layer.
 
 
 Non-repudiation is an intrinsic property of the ECDSA signatures which
 Bitcoin uses - it's not a feature that needs to be built.
 
 There's no way to accidentally sign a transaction and accidentally
 announce it publicly. There is no form of third-party error that can
 result in a payee receiving an erroneous contract.
 
 

Justus,

We don’t even have a concept of identity in the Bitcoin protocol, let alone 
non-repudiation. What good is non-repudiation if there’s no way to even 
associate a signature with a legal entity?

Sure, we could use the ECDSA signatures in transactions as part of a 
non-repudiation scheme - but the recipient would have to also have a means to 
establish the identity of the sender and associate it with the the transaction.


Furthermore, in light of the fact that there *are* fully legitimate use cases 
for sending conflicting transactions…and the fact that determination of intent 
isn’t always entirely clear…we should refrain from attaching any further 
significance transaction signatures other than that “the sender was willing to 
have it included in the blockchain if a miner were to have seen it and accepted 
it…but perhaps the sender would have changed their mind before it actually did 
get accepted.”

- Eric Lombrozo


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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-20 Thread Eric Lombrozo

 On Jun 20, 2015, at 5:27 PM, justusranv...@riseup.net wrote:
 
 Signed PGP part
 On 2015-06-20 19:19, Eric Lombrozo wrote:
  On Jun 20, 2015, at 4:37 PM, justusranv...@riseup.net wrote:
 
  Signed PGP part
  On 2015-06-20 18:20, Jorge Timón wrote:
   On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 6:42 PM, Eric Lombrozo elombr...@gmail.com
   wrote:
   If we want a non-repudiation mechanism in the protocol, we should
   explicitly define one rather than relying on “prima facie”
   assumptions. Otherwise, I would recommend not relying on the existence
   of a signed transaction as proof of intent to pay…
  
   Non-repudiation can be built on top of the payment protocol layer.
 
 
  Non-repudiation is an intrinsic property of the ECDSA signatures which
  Bitcoin uses - it's not a feature that needs to be built.
 
  There's no way to accidentally sign a transaction and accidentally
  announce it publicly. There is no form of third-party error that can
  result in a payee receiving an erroneous contract.
 
 
 
  Justus,
 
  We don’t even have a concept of identity in the Bitcoin protocol, let
  alone non-repudiation. What good is non-repudiation if there’s no way
  to even associate a signature with a legal entity?
 
  Sure, we could use the ECDSA signatures in transactions as part of a
  non-repudiation scheme - but the recipient would have to also have a
  means to establish the identity of the sender and associate it with
  the the transaction.
 
 
  Furthermore, in light of the fact that there *are* fully legitimate
  use cases for sending conflicting transactions…and the fact that
  determination of intent isn’t always entirely clear…we should refrain
  from attaching any further significance transaction signatures other
  than that “the sender was willing to have it included in the
  blockchain if a miner were to have seen it and accepted it…but perhaps
  the sender would have changed their mind before it actually did get
  accepted.”
 
 Bitcoin has no concept of identity, but in any type of commercial
 transaction the parties involved must know some minimal amount of
 identity information in order to transact at all.
 
 Except for some identifiable special cases, I think a payee is perfectly
 justified in treating a double spend of a payment sent to them as part
 of a commercial transaction as a fraud attempt and employing whatever
 non-Bitcoin recourse mechanisms, if any, they have access to.
 
 From the perspective of the network, the obviously correct action for
 any node or miner is to relay the first version of any transaction they
 see. The primary purpose of mining is to resolve this
 otherwise-unresolvable problem of determining which transaction among a
 set of conflicting transactions happened first.
 
 If a node or miner wants to deviate from the obviously correct
 behaviour, and if they want to avoid harming the value of the network,
 they should be particularly careful to make sure their deviation from
 first seen doesn't introduce harmful unintended side effects, like
 making fraud easier.
 

The contract between the buyer and seller is actually outside the Bitcoin 
network. Yes, a merchant that gets cheated could seek some other recourse in 
such an event…but the behavior you’re claiming as “obviously correct” is NOT 
obviously correct.  In fact, there are arguments against this “obviously 
correct” way even if we were to accept the premise that the signature implies a 
promise to pay (which I think many reasonable individuals would also dispute). 
For instance, by relaying conflicting transactions it makes it potentially 
easier for others to discover the double-spend attempt (of course, this 
requires wallets to not be lazy about this…perhaps such relays could be flagged 
or placed in a special message type).

- Eric Lombrozo





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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-20 Thread justusranvier
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

On 2015-06-20 19:19, Eric Lombrozo wrote:
 On Jun 20, 2015, at 4:37 PM, justusranv...@riseup.net wrote:
 
 Signed PGP part
 On 2015-06-20 18:20, Jorge Timón wrote:
  On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 6:42 PM, Eric Lombrozo elombr...@gmail.com
  wrote:
  If we want a non-repudiation mechanism in the protocol, we should
  explicitly define one rather than relying on “prima facie”
  assumptions. Otherwise, I would recommend not relying on the existence
  of a signed transaction as proof of intent to pay…
 
  Non-repudiation can be built on top of the payment protocol layer.
 
 
 Non-repudiation is an intrinsic property of the ECDSA signatures which
 Bitcoin uses - it's not a feature that needs to be built.
 
 There's no way to accidentally sign a transaction and accidentally
 announce it publicly. There is no form of third-party error that can
 result in a payee receiving an erroneous contract.
 
 
 
 Justus,
 
 We don’t even have a concept of identity in the Bitcoin protocol, let
 alone non-repudiation. What good is non-repudiation if there’s no way
 to even associate a signature with a legal entity?
 
 Sure, we could use the ECDSA signatures in transactions as part of a
 non-repudiation scheme - but the recipient would have to also have a
 means to establish the identity of the sender and associate it with
 the the transaction.
 
 
 Furthermore, in light of the fact that there *are* fully legitimate
 use cases for sending conflicting transactions…and the fact that
 determination of intent isn’t always entirely clear…we should refrain
 from attaching any further significance transaction signatures other
 than that “the sender was willing to have it included in the
 blockchain if a miner were to have seen it and accepted it…but perhaps
 the sender would have changed their mind before it actually did get
 accepted.”

Bitcoin has no concept of identity, but in any type of commercial 
transaction the parties involved must know some minimal amount of 
identity information in order to transact at all.

Except for some identifiable special cases, I think a payee is perfectly 
justified in treating a double spend of a payment sent to them as part 
of a commercial transaction as a fraud attempt and employing whatever 
non-Bitcoin recourse mechanisms, if any, they have access to.

- From the perspective of the network, the obviously correct action for 
any node or miner is to relay the first version of any transaction they 
see. The primary purpose of mining is to resolve this 
otherwise-unresolvable problem of determining which transaction among a 
set of conflicting transactions happened first.

If a node or miner wants to deviate from the obviously correct 
behaviour, and if they want to avoid harming the value of the network, 
they should be particularly careful to make sure their deviation from 
first seen doesn't introduce harmful unintended side effects, like 
making fraud easier.

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-20 Thread Eric Lombrozo

 On Jun 20, 2015, at 4:47 PM, Eric Lombrozo elombr...@gmail.com wrote:
 
 
 On Jun 20, 2015, at 4:16 PM, Jorge Timón jti...@jtimon.cc wrote:
 
 On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 5:37 PM, Eric Lombrozo elombr...@gmail.com wrote:
 The Bitcoin network was designed (or should be designed) with the 
 requirement that it can withstand deliberate double-spend attacks that can 
 come from anywhere at any time…
 
 I disagree with this premise. Please, don't take this as an argument
 from authority fallacy, but I will cite Satoshi to express what I
 think the assumptions while using the system should be:
 
 As long as a majority of CPU power is controlled by nodes that are
 not cooperating to attack the network, they'll generate the longest
 chain and outpace attackers.
 
 I can't say for sure what was meant by attacking the network in this
 context but I personally mean trying to rewrite valid and
 proof-of-work-timestamped history.
 Unconfirmed transactions are simply not part of history yet. Ordering
 unconfirmed transactions in a consensus compatible way without a
 universal clock is impossible, that's why we're using proof of work in
 the first place.
 
 Alternative policies are NOT attacks on the network.
 
 Just to be clear, Jorge, I wasn’t suggesting that unconfirmed transactions 
 are part of any sort of global consensus. In fact, they very much AREN’T. 
 Which is exactly why it is extremely dangerous to accept unconfirmed 
 transactions as final unless you clearly have assessed the risks and it makes 
 sense for the particular business use case.
 
 - Eric Lombrozo

I think the misunderstanding was in perhaps my earlier statement seemed like I 
was suggesting that it’s the protocol’s responsibility to protect merchants 
from double-spends. On the contrary - I think we agree - the protocol CANNOT 
make any guarantees to ANYONE until we do converge on a history. The “design” I 
speak of here is more on the merchant side.

- Eric Lombrozo


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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Frank Flores
Has anyone from Mycelium weighed in on this? Is their doublespend attack
detection broken with this kind of irresponsible behavior?

On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 3:39 PM, Matt Whitlock b...@mattwhitlock.name
wrote:

 On Friday, 19 June 2015, at 9:18 am, Adrian Macneil wrote:
  If full-RBF sees any significant adoption by miners, then it will
 actively
  harm bitcoin adoption by reducing or removing the ability for online or
 POS
  merchants to accept bitcoin payments at all.

 Retail POS merchants probably should not be accepting vanilla Bitcoin
 payments, as Bitcoin alone does not (and cannot) guarantee the
 irreversibility of a transaction until it has been buried several blocks
 deep in the chain. Retail merchants should be requiring a co-signature from
 a mutually trusted co-signer that vows never to sign a double-spend. The
 reason we don't yet see such technology permeating the ecosystem is
 because, to date, zero-conf transactions have been irreversible enough,
 but this has only been a happy accident; it was never promised, and it
 should not be relied upon.


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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Mailman incompatibility with DKIM ...

2015-06-19 Thread Jeff Garzik
On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 12:47 PM, Adam Weiss a...@signal11.com wrote:

 Hi Warren,

 If you set dmarc_moderation_action to Munge from, the list will detect
 when someone posts from a domain that publishes a request for strict
 signature checking for all mails originating from it (in DNS) and rewrite
 the envelope-from to the list's address.  Reply-to will be added and set to
 the original sender.


That seems to change Reply behavior for those recipients?  It would seem to
accidentally direct mail intended to DKIM-user + list to DKIM-user.

-- 
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Bitcoin core developer and open source evangelist
BitPay, Inc.  https://bitpay.com/
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Remove Us Please

2015-06-19 Thread Jameson Lopp
You're only strengthening Gigas' point about the mailing list by posting
derisive emails. Take your nonconstructive comments elsewhere.

- Jameson

On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 4:01 PM, Brian Hoffman brianchoff...@gmail.com
wrote:

 damn he was just on the verge of solving the underlaying problem with
 Bitcoin and you interrupted his focus.

 On Jun 19, 2015, at 3:55 PM, John Bodeen john-bod...@uiowa.edu wrote:

 from their website, humorous bits highlighted


 *October 14, 2014 *In latest Hiatus new, the company has taken on yet
 another crazy project but this one is going to benefit the world in which
 it entered not long ago.  The company had done a lot of research on crypto
 currencies, built one for itself, for testing purposes (GigasCorpCoin) and
 found the underlaying problem of Bitcoin and was poised to solve it.
 Company execs decided it would be a good investment to launch its own coin
 and back it itself.
 The company is currently in motion and will hire an expert to do some of
 the coding by October 14, 2015.  Company President refused to be
 interviewed due to too much work that needs done for this secret and
 upcoming project.


 On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 10:34 AM, Jameson Lopp jameson.l...@gmail.com
 wrote:

 You are free to remove yourself; the URL is at the bottom of every email:
 https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development

 On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 12:41 PM, Gigas Gaming Inc. 
 corpor...@gigasgaming.com wrote:

 This is no longer a mailing list, this is a chatroom.
 Please remove this email from your list, you are now interfering with
 official company business.

 Thanks


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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Jeffrey Paul
It seems to me that FSS RBF must enforce identical OP_RETURN data on the output 
scripts as the first seen transaction, as well, to safely continue support for 
various other applications built atop the blockchain.

Is there a canonical implementation of FSS RBF around somewhere I can review?

Best,
-jp

-- 
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5539 AD00 DE4C 42F3 AFE1 1575 0524 43F4 DF2A 55C2

 On 19.06.2015, at 15:52, Chun Wang 1240...@gmail.com wrote:
 
 Before F2Pool's launch, I performed probably the only successful
 bitcoin double spend in the March 2013 fork without any mining power.
 [ https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=152348.0 ] I know how bad
 the full RBF is. We are going to switch to FSS RBF in a few hours.
 Sorry.
 
 On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 9:44 PM, Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org wrote:
 On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 09:33:05AM -0400, Stephen Morse wrote:
 It is disappointing that F2Pool would enable full RBF when the safe
 alternative, first-seen-safe RBF, is also available, especially since the
 fees they would gain by supporting full RBF over FSS RBF would likely be
 negligible. Did they consider using FSS RBF instead?
 
 Specifically the following is what I told them:
 
 We are
 interested in the replace-by-fee patch, but I am not following the
 development closely, more background info is needed, like what the
 difference between standard and zeroconf versions? Thanks.
 
 Great!
 
 Basically both let you replace one transaction with another that pays a
 higher fee. First-seen-safe replace-by-fee adds the additional criteria
 that all outputs of the old transaction still need to be paid by the new
 transaction, with = as many Bitcoins. Basically, it makes sure that if
 someone was paid by tx1, then tx2 will still pay them.
 
 I've written about how wallets can use RBF and FSS-RBF to more
 efficiently use the blockchain on the bitcoin-development mailing list:
 
 http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg07813.html
 http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg07829.html
 
 Basically, for the purpose of increasing fees, RBF is something like %50
 cheaper than CPFP, and FSS-RBF is something like %25 cheaper.
 
 In addition, for ease of implementation, my new FSS-RBF has a number of
 other restrictions. For instance, you can't replace multiple
 transactions with one, you can't replace a transaction whose outputs
 have already been spent, you can't replace a transaction with one that
 spends additional unconfirmed inputs, etc. These restrictions aren't
 set in stone, but they do make the code simpler and less likely to
 have bugs.
 
 In comparison my previous standard RBF patch can replace multiple
 transactions with one, can replace long chains of transactions, etc.
 It's willing to do more computation before deciding if a transaction
 should be replaced, with more complex logic; it probably has a higher
 chance of having a bug or DoS attack.
 
 You've probably seen the huge controversy around zeroconf with regard to
 standard replace-by-fee. While FSS RBF doesn't make zeroconf any safer,
 it also doesn't make it any more dangerous, so politically with regard
 to zeroconf it makes no difference. You *can* still use it doublespend
 by taking advantage of how different transactions are accepted
 differently, but that's true of *every* change we've ever made to
 Bitcoin Core - by upgrading to v0.10 from v0.9 you've also broken
 zeroconf in the same way.
 
 
 Having said that... honestly, zeroconf is pretty broken already. Only
 with pretty heroic measures like connecting to a significant fraction of
 the Bitcoin network at once, as well as connecting to getblocktemplate
 supporting miners to figure out what transactions are being mined, are
 services having any hope of avoiding getting ripped off. For the average
 user their wallets do a terrible job of showing whether or not an
 unconfirmed transaction will go through. For example, Schildbach's
 Bitcoin wallet for Android has no code at all to detect double-spends
 until they get mined, and I've been able to trick it into showing
 completely invalid transactions. In fact, currently Bitcoin XT will
 relay invalid transactions that are doublepsends, and Schildbach's
 wallet displays them as valid, unconfirmed, payments. It's really no
 surprise to me that nearly no-one in the Bitcoin ecosystem accepts
 unconfirmed transactions without some kind of protection that doesn't
 rely on first-seen-safe mempool behavior. For instance, many ATM's these
 days know who their customers are due to AML requirements, so while you
 can deposit Bitcoins and get your funds instantly, the protection for
 the ATM operator is that they can go to the police if you rip them off;
 I've spoken to ATM operators who didn't do this who've lost hundreds or
 even thousands of dollars before giving up on zeroconf.
 
 My big worry with zeroconf is a service like Coinbase or Shapeshift
 coming to rely on it, and then 

Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Matt Whitlock
On Friday, 19 June 2015, at 9:18 am, Adrian Macneil wrote:
 If full-RBF sees any significant adoption by miners, then it will actively
 harm bitcoin adoption by reducing or removing the ability for online or POS
 merchants to accept bitcoin payments at all.

Retail POS merchants probably should not be accepting vanilla Bitcoin payments, 
as Bitcoin alone does not (and cannot) guarantee the irreversibility of a 
transaction until it has been buried several blocks deep in the chain. Retail 
merchants should be requiring a co-signature from a mutually trusted co-signer 
that vows never to sign a double-spend. The reason we don't yet see such 
technology permeating the ecosystem is because, to date, zero-conf transactions 
have been irreversible enough, but this has only been a happy accident; it 
was never promised, and it should not be relied upon.

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Remove Us Please

2015-06-19 Thread Brian Hoffman
damn he was just on the verge of solving the underlaying problem with Bitcoin 
and you interrupted his focus.

 On Jun 19, 2015, at 3:55 PM, John Bodeen john-bod...@uiowa.edu wrote:
 
 from their website, humorous bits highlighted
 
 October 14, 2014 
 In latest Hiatus new, the company has taken on yet another crazy project but 
 this one is going to benefit the world in which it entered not long ago.  The 
 company had done a lot of research on crypto currencies, built one for 
 itself, for testing purposes (GigasCorpCoin) and found the underlaying 
 problem of Bitcoin and was poised to solve it.  Company execs decided it 
 would be a good investment to launch its own coin and back it itself.
 The company is currently in motion and will hire an expert to do some of the 
 coding by October 14, 2015.  Company President refused to be interviewed due 
 to too much work that needs done for this secret and upcoming project.
 
 On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 10:34 AM, Jameson Lopp jameson.l...@gmail.com 
 mailto:jameson.l...@gmail.com wrote:
 You are free to remove yourself; the URL is at the bottom of every email: 
 https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development 
 https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
 
 On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 12:41 PM, Gigas Gaming Inc. 
 corpor...@gigasgaming.com mailto:corpor...@gigasgaming.com wrote:
 This is no longer a mailing list, this is a chatroom.
 Please remove this email from your list, you are now interfering with
 official company business.
 
 Thanks
 
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Alternate HD path structure: BIP, blog, or wat?

2015-06-19 Thread Matt Smith
I'm not sure I understand your question about the need to store paths in
the wallet database -- there's no way to infer the path of an address
inside an HD wallet from the address alone (short of an exhaustive
search), and HD wallets need to store either the paths, addresses, or
both that have been previously derived/used to monitor the blockchain
usefully, but those facts aren't new or specific to this path format.

The motivation for this path structure over standard bip44 is that it
separates the concept of network (or which blockchain I'm using) and
coin_type (or what kind of thing I'm sending over that blockchain).

This is useful, for example, if I want to import a wallet into my
application and I know that an account was in use at

m/##'/0'/99'/0'

where 99 is the identifier for, say, counterparty - I only need to check
the addresses derived below that path for balances against
counterpartyd. It may be worth pointing out that I expect multisig HD
wallet imports to require master keys and a list of account paths – not
a list of addresses, as it's very possible that a new address could be
derived between the time when the wallet data was exported and when it
will be imported.

This use case might be very specific to our model, but the reason I
figured we should request a BIP # for this is that to start using it, we
need to pick a number for the purpose field and don't want to do it
arbitrarily (and risk having to change it later) or overload 44 (which
would be misleading).

Did I either  a) answer  or  b) misunderstand  your questions?
--
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https://gem.co | GH: @thedoctor



On 6/19/15 2:25 PM, Matt @ Envrin Group wrote:
 
 Hi Matt,
 
 I think your best bet is probably just push it out privately via blog
 post / Github, and see if it gains any traction with other developers.
 
 I'm a little uncertain as to the relevance though.  All those variables
 (purpose, network, asset_type, account, change, index) need to be stored
 internally within the wallet database, as there's no way to retrieve the
 path used from just the address, correct?  In that case, what's the
 meaning of that exact path structure when a) it can't be retrieved from
 just the address, and b) the values will be stored internally within the
 wallet when you lookup the address.
 
 Matt



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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Aaron Voisine
 What retail needs is escrowed microchannel hubs (what lightning provides,
for example), which enable untrusted instant payments. Not reliance on
single-signer zeroconf transactions that can never be made safe.

They don't need to be made cryptographically safe, they just have to be
safer than, for instance, credit card payments that can be charged back. As
long as it's reasonably good in practice, that's fine.


Aaron Voisine
co-founder and CEO
breadwallet.com

On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 6:09 PM, Mark Friedenbach m...@friedenbach.org
wrote:

 What retail needs is escrowed microchannel hubs (what lightning provides,
 for example), which enable untrusted instant payments. Not reliance on
 single-signer zeroconf transactions that can never be made safe.

 On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 5:47 PM, Andreas Petersson andr...@petersson.at
 wrote:

 I have some experience here. If you are seriously suggesting these
 measures, you might as well kill retail transactions altogether.

 In practice, if a retail place starts to accept bitcoin they have a
 similar situation as with cash, only that the fraud potential is much
 lower. (e.g. 100-dollar bill for a sandwich might turn out fake later)
 and the fraud frequency is also much lower.

 0-conf concerns were never a problem in practice. except for 2-way atms
 i have never heard of a problem that was caused by double spends.
 while adding these measures is generally positive, requiring them means
 excluding 99.9% of the potential users. so you might as well not do it.

 RBF as implemented by F2Pool just flat out lowers Bitcoins utility
 value. So it's a bad thing.

 for any online or automated system, waiting for a handful of
 confirmations was always recommended practice.

 Am 19.06.2015 um 22:39 schrieb Matt Whitlock:
  Retail POS merchants probably should not be accepting vanilla Bitcoin
  payments, as Bitcoin alone does not (and cannot) guarantee the
  irreversibility of a transaction until it has been buried several
  blocks deep in the chain. Retail merchants should be requiring a
  co-signature from a mutually trusted co-signer that vows never to sign
  a double-spend.



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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Luke Dashjr
On Saturday, June 20, 2015 1:23:03 AM Aaron Voisine wrote:
 They don't need to be made cryptographically safe, they just have to be
 safer than, for instance, credit card payments that can be charged back. As
 long as it's reasonably good in practice, that's fine.

They never will be. You can get a decent rate of success merely by making one 
transaction propagate fast (eg, 1 input, 1 output) and the other slow (eg, 
1000 inputs, 1000 outputs) and choosing your peers carefully. The only reason 
unconfirmed transactions aren't double spent today is because nobody is 
seriously *trying*.

Luke

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Mark Friedenbach
What retail needs is escrowed microchannel hubs (what lightning provides,
for example), which enable untrusted instant payments. Not reliance on
single-signer zeroconf transactions that can never be made safe.

On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 5:47 PM, Andreas Petersson andr...@petersson.at
wrote:

 I have some experience here. If you are seriously suggesting these
 measures, you might as well kill retail transactions altogether.

 In practice, if a retail place starts to accept bitcoin they have a
 similar situation as with cash, only that the fraud potential is much
 lower. (e.g. 100-dollar bill for a sandwich might turn out fake later)
 and the fraud frequency is also much lower.

 0-conf concerns were never a problem in practice. except for 2-way atms
 i have never heard of a problem that was caused by double spends.
 while adding these measures is generally positive, requiring them means
 excluding 99.9% of the potential users. so you might as well not do it.

 RBF as implemented by F2Pool just flat out lowers Bitcoins utility
 value. So it's a bad thing.

 for any online or automated system, waiting for a handful of
 confirmations was always recommended practice.

 Am 19.06.2015 um 22:39 schrieb Matt Whitlock:
  Retail POS merchants probably should not be accepting vanilla Bitcoin
  payments, as Bitcoin alone does not (and cannot) guarantee the
  irreversibility of a transaction until it has been buried several
  blocks deep in the chain. Retail merchants should be requiring a
  co-signature from a mutually trusted co-signer that vows never to sign
  a double-spend.



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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Eric Lombrozo
It all comes down to managing risk. If you’ve got a decent risk model with 
capped losses and safe recovery mechanisms…and it’s still profitable…it’s fine. 
But most payment processors and merchants right now probably don’t have 
particularly good risk models and are making many dangerous assumptions…and 
probably would not be able to gracefully handle very many risk scenarios.

- Eric Lombrozo


 On Jun 19, 2015, at 6:23 PM, Aaron Voisine vois...@gmail.com wrote:
 
  What retail needs is escrowed microchannel hubs (what lightning provides, 
  for example), which enable untrusted instant payments. Not reliance on 
  single-signer zeroconf transactions that can never be made safe.
 
 They don't need to be made cryptographically safe, they just have to be safer 
 than, for instance, credit card payments that can be charged back. As long as 
 it's reasonably good in practice, that's fine.
 
 
 Aaron Voisine
 co-founder and CEO
 breadwallet.com http://breadwallet.com/
 On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 6:09 PM, Mark Friedenbach m...@friedenbach.org 
 mailto:m...@friedenbach.org wrote:
 What retail needs is escrowed microchannel hubs (what lightning provides, for 
 example), which enable untrusted instant payments. Not reliance on 
 single-signer zeroconf transactions that can never be made safe.
 
 On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 5:47 PM, Andreas Petersson andr...@petersson.at 
 mailto:andr...@petersson.at wrote:
 I have some experience here. If you are seriously suggesting these
 measures, you might as well kill retail transactions altogether.
 
 In practice, if a retail place starts to accept bitcoin they have a
 similar situation as with cash, only that the fraud potential is much
 lower. (e.g. 100-dollar bill for a sandwich might turn out fake later)
 and the fraud frequency is also much lower.
 
 0-conf concerns were never a problem in practice. except for 2-way atms
 i have never heard of a problem that was caused by double spends.
 while adding these measures is generally positive, requiring them means
 excluding 99.9% of the potential users. so you might as well not do it.
 
 RBF as implemented by F2Pool just flat out lowers Bitcoins utility
 value. So it's a bad thing.
 
 for any online or automated system, waiting for a handful of
 confirmations was always recommended practice.
 
 Am 19.06.2015 um 22:39 schrieb Matt Whitlock:
  Retail POS merchants probably should not be accepting vanilla Bitcoin
  payments, as Bitcoin alone does not (and cannot) guarantee the
  irreversibility of a transaction until it has been buried several
  blocks deep in the chain. Retail merchants should be requiring a
  co-signature from a mutually trusted co-signer that vows never to sign
  a double-spend.
 
 
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Andreas Petersson
I have some experience here. If you are seriously suggesting these
measures, you might as well kill retail transactions altogether.

In practice, if a retail place starts to accept bitcoin they have a
similar situation as with cash, only that the fraud potential is much
lower. (e.g. 100-dollar bill for a sandwich might turn out fake later)
and the fraud frequency is also much lower.

0-conf concerns were never a problem in practice. except for 2-way atms
i have never heard of a problem that was caused by double spends.
while adding these measures is generally positive, requiring them means
excluding 99.9% of the potential users. so you might as well not do it.

RBF as implemented by F2Pool just flat out lowers Bitcoins utility
value. So it's a bad thing.

for any online or automated system, waiting for a handful of
confirmations was always recommended practice.

Am 19.06.2015 um 22:39 schrieb Matt Whitlock:
 Retail POS merchants probably should not be accepting vanilla Bitcoin
 payments, as Bitcoin alone does not (and cannot) guarantee the
 irreversibility of a transaction until it has been buried several
 blocks deep in the chain. Retail merchants should be requiring a
 co-signature from a mutually trusted co-signer that vows never to sign
 a double-spend.  



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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Alternate HD path structure: BIP, blog, or wat?

2015-06-19 Thread Andreas Petersson
m/##'/0'/99'/0'

where 99 is the identifier for, say, counterparty


What is stopping you from using m/44'/9'/a'/c/i as descibed here:
http://doc.satoshilabs.com/slips/slip-0044.html

to avoid having an internal mapping from 9'- 0' to find out what
blockchain to query, this sounds like it should be trivial for any wallet.


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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Alternate HD path structure: BIP, blog, or wat?

2015-06-19 Thread Matt @ Envrin Group

Say you generate a child key using the path m/6'/4'/7'/99'/0/196, which 
is what your proposed path structure would be, and it results in the 
address 1DpY7PtPVURvjrGsdAjbZAZ7cL9GD8tc5w.

When the wallet notices a transaction in the blockchain that has 
1DpY7PtPVURvjrGsdAjbZAZ7cL9GD8tc5w as an output, it's going to have to 
lookup the address within its database to get the values 6/4/7/99/0/196, 
as there's no way to retrieve them from just the address.  So 
technically, you might as well just use m/account'/change/index if using 
hardened child keys, or m/change/index if not, as recommended, because 
the wallet will still function the exact same way.

Matt



On 06/20/2015 06:31 AM, Matt Smith wrote:
 I'm not sure I understand your question about the need to store paths in
 the wallet database -- there's no way to infer the path of an address
 inside an HD wallet from the address alone (short of an exhaustive
 search), and HD wallets need to store either the paths, addresses, or
 both that have been previously derived/used to monitor the blockchain
 usefully, but those facts aren't new or specific to this path format.

 The motivation for this path structure over standard bip44 is that it
 separates the concept of network (or which blockchain I'm using) and
 coin_type (or what kind of thing I'm sending over that blockchain).

 This is useful, for example, if I want to import a wallet into my
 application and I know that an account was in use at

 m/##'/0'/99'/0'

 where 99 is the identifier for, say, counterparty - I only need to check
 the addresses derived below that path for balances against
 counterpartyd. It may be worth pointing out that I expect multisig HD
 wallet imports to require master keys and a list of account paths – not
 a list of addresses, as it's very possible that a new address could be
 derived between the time when the wallet data was exported and when it
 will be imported.

 This use case might be very specific to our model, but the reason I
 figured we should request a BIP # for this is that to start using it, we
 need to pick a number for the purpose field and don't want to do it
 arbitrarily (and risk having to change it later) or overload 44 (which
 would be misleading).

 Did I either  a) answer  or  b) misunderstand  your questions?
 --
 Matt Smith | Gem
 https://gem.co | GH: @thedoctor



 On 6/19/15 2:25 PM, Matt @ Envrin Group wrote:
 Hi Matt,

 I think your best bet is probably just push it out privately via blog
 post / Github, and see if it gains any traction with other developers.

 I'm a little uncertain as to the relevance though.  All those variables
 (purpose, network, asset_type, account, change, index) need to be stored
 internally within the wallet database, as there's no way to retrieve the
 path used from just the address, correct?  In that case, what's the
 meaning of that exact path structure when a) it can't be retrieved from
 just the address, and b) the values will be stored internally within the
 wallet when you lookup the address.

 Matt


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Re: [Bitcoin-development] improving development model (Re: Concerns Regarding Threats by a Developer to Remove Commit Access from Other Developers

2015-06-19 Thread Tom Harding
On 6/19/2015 6:43 AM, Mike Hearn wrote:
 No surprise, the position of Blockstream employees is that hard forks
 must never happen and that everyone's ordinary transactions should go
 via some new network that doesn't yet exist.

If my company were working on spiffy new ideas that required a hard fork
to implement, I'd be rather dismayed to see the blocksize hard fork
happen *before those ideas were ready*.

Because then I'd eventually have to convince people that those ideas
were worth a hard fork all on their own.  It would be much easier to
convince people to roll them in with the already necessary blocksize
hard fork, if that event could be delayed.

As far as I know, Blockstream representatives have never said that
waiting for other changes to be ready is a reason to delay the blocksize
hard fork.  So if this were the real reason, it would suggest they have
been hiding their true motives for making such a fuss about the
blocksize issue.

I've got no evidence at all to support thoughts like this... just the
paranoid mindset that seems to infect a person who gets involved in
bitcoin.  But the question is every bit as valid as Adam's query into
your motives.



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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Concerns Regarding Threats by a Developer to Remove Commit Access from Other Developers

2015-06-19 Thread Eric Lombrozo
I don’t think the issue is between larger blocks on the one hand and things 
like lightning on the other - these two ideas are quite orthogonal.

Larger blocks aren’t really about addressing basic scalability concerns - for 
that we’ll clearly need architectural and algorithmic improvements…and will 
likely need to move to a model where it isn’t necessary for everyone to 
validate everyone else’s latte purchases. Larger blocks might, at best, keep 
the current system chugging along temporarily - although I’m not sure that’s 
necessarily such a great thing…we need to create a fee market sooner or later, 
and until we do this, block size issues will continue to crop up again and 
again and economic incentives will continue to be misplaced. It would be nice 
to have more time to really develop a good infrastructure for this…but without 
real market pressures, I’m not sure it will happen at all. Necessity is the 
mother of invention, after all. The question is how to introduce a fee market 
smoothly and with the overwhelming consensus of the community - and that's 
where it starts to get tricky.

——

On a separate note, as several others have pointed out in this thread (but I 
wanted to add my voice to this as well), maintenance of source code 
repositories is NOT the real issue here. The bitcoin/bitcoin project on github 
is a reference implementation of the Satoshi protocol…but it is NOT the only 
implementation…and it wasn’t really meant to be. Anyone is free to fork it, 
extend it, improve upon it, or create an entirely new network with its own 
genesis block…a separate cryptoledger.

The real issue regarding XT is NOT the forking of source code nor issues 
surrounding commit access to repositories. The real issue is the *forking of a 
cryptoledger*.

Open source repositories are meant to be forked - in fact, it is often 
encouraged. It is also encouraged that improvements be submitted for review and 
possibly merged back into the parent repository…although this doesn’t always 
happen.

However, we currently have no mechanisms in place to support merging of forked 
cryptoledgers. Software, and most other forms of digital content, generally 
increases in value with more copies made. However, money is scarce…by design. 
The entire value of the assets of a decentralized cryptoledger rests on the 
assumption that nobody can just unilaterally fork it and change the rules. Yes, 
convincing other people to do things a certain way is HARD…yes, it can be 
frustratingly slow…I’ve tried to push for many changes to the Bitcoin 
network…and have only succeeded a very small number of times. And yes, it’s 
often been quite frustrating. But trying to unilaterally impose a change of 
consensus rules for an existing cryptoledger sets a horrendous precedent…this 
isn’t just about things like block size limits, which is a relatively petty 
issue by comparison.

It would be very nice to have a similar workflow with consensus rule evolution 
as we do with most other open source projects. You create a fork, demonstrate 
that your ideas are sound by implementing them and giving others something that 
works so they can review them, and then merge your contributions back in. 
However, the way Bitcoin is currently designed, this is unfortunately 
impossible to do this with consensus rules. Once a fork, always a fork - a.k.a. 
altcoins. Say what you will about how most altcoins are crap - at least most of 
them have the decency of starting with a clean ledger.


- Eric Lombrozo


 On Jun 18, 2015, at 5:57 PM, Chris Pacia ctpa...@gmail.com wrote:
 
 On 06/18/2015 06:33 PM, Mark Friedenbach wrote:
 
   * Get safe forms of replace-by-fee and child-pays-for-parent finished and 
 in 0.12.
   * Develop cross-platform libraries for managing micropayment channels, and 
 get wallet authors to adopt
   * Use fidelity bonds, solvency proofs, and other tricks to minimize the 
 risk of already deployed off-chain solutions as an interim measure until:
   * Deploy soft-fork changes for truly scalable solutions like Lightning 
 Network.
 
 One of my biggest concerns is that these solutions (lightning network in 
 particular) could end up being worse, in terms of decentralization, than 
 would be a bitcoin network using larger blocks. We don't exactly know what 
 the economies of scale are for pay hubs and could very well end up with far 
 fewer hubs than nodes at any conceivable block size.
 
 Of course, it could also turn out to be fantastic, but it seems like an 
 enormous gamble to basically force everyone in the ecosystem to collectively 
 spend millions of dollars upgrading to Lightning and then see whether it's 
 actually an improvement in terms of decentralization.
 
 To me, a much more sane approach would be to allow people to voluntarily opt 
 in to those other solutions after we've had an opportunity to experiment with 
 them and see how they actually function in practice, but that can't happen if 
 the network runs out of capacity first.

Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Peter Todd
On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 09:37:49PM +0800, Chun Wang wrote:
 Hello. We recognize the problem. We will switch to FSS RBF soon. Thanks.

No worries, let me know if you have any issues. You have my phone
number.

While my own preference - and a number of other devs - is full-RBF,
either one is a good step forward for Bitcoin.

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Peter Todd
On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 09:33:03AM -0400, Gavin Andresen wrote:
 I just sent the following email to F2Pool:
 
 
 I was disappointed to see Peter Todd claiming that you have (or will?) run
 his replace-by-fee patch.
 
 I strongly encourage you to wait until most wallet software supports
 replace-by-fee before doing that, because until that happens replace-by-fee
 just makes it easier to steal from bitcoin-accepting merchants.

Do you mean just full-RBF, or FSS-RBF as well?


Speaking of, could we get a confirmation that Coinbase is, or is not,
one of the merchant service providers trying to get hashing power
contracts with mining pools for guaranteed transaction acceptance? IIRC
you are still an advisor to them. This is a serious concern for the
reasons I outlined in my post.

Equally if anyone else from Coinbase would like to chime in that'd be
great.

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Chun Wang
Before F2Pool's launch, I performed probably the only successful
bitcoin double spend in the March 2013 fork without any mining power.
[ https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=152348.0 ] I know how bad
the full RBF is. We are going to switch to FSS RBF in a few hours.
Sorry.

On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 9:44 PM, Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org wrote:
 On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 09:33:05AM -0400, Stephen Morse wrote:
 It is disappointing that F2Pool would enable full RBF when the safe
 alternative, first-seen-safe RBF, is also available, especially since the
 fees they would gain by supporting full RBF over FSS RBF would likely be
 negligible. Did they consider using FSS RBF instead?

 Specifically the following is what I told them:

 We are
 interested in the replace-by-fee patch, but I am not following the
 development closely, more background info is needed, like what the
 difference between standard and zeroconf versions? Thanks.

 Great!

 Basically both let you replace one transaction with another that pays a
 higher fee. First-seen-safe replace-by-fee adds the additional criteria
 that all outputs of the old transaction still need to be paid by the new
 transaction, with = as many Bitcoins. Basically, it makes sure that if
 someone was paid by tx1, then tx2 will still pay them.

 I've written about how wallets can use RBF and FSS-RBF to more
 efficiently use the blockchain on the bitcoin-development mailing list:

 http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg07813.html
 http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg07829.html

 Basically, for the purpose of increasing fees, RBF is something like %50
 cheaper than CPFP, and FSS-RBF is something like %25 cheaper.

 In addition, for ease of implementation, my new FSS-RBF has a number of
 other restrictions. For instance, you can't replace multiple
 transactions with one, you can't replace a transaction whose outputs
 have already been spent, you can't replace a transaction with one that
 spends additional unconfirmed inputs, etc. These restrictions aren't
 set in stone, but they do make the code simpler and less likely to
 have bugs.

 In comparison my previous standard RBF patch can replace multiple
 transactions with one, can replace long chains of transactions, etc.
 It's willing to do more computation before deciding if a transaction
 should be replaced, with more complex logic; it probably has a higher
 chance of having a bug or DoS attack.

 You've probably seen the huge controversy around zeroconf with regard to
 standard replace-by-fee. While FSS RBF doesn't make zeroconf any safer,
 it also doesn't make it any more dangerous, so politically with regard
 to zeroconf it makes no difference. You *can* still use it doublespend
 by taking advantage of how different transactions are accepted
 differently, but that's true of *every* change we've ever made to
 Bitcoin Core - by upgrading to v0.10 from v0.9 you've also broken
 zeroconf in the same way.


 Having said that... honestly, zeroconf is pretty broken already. Only
 with pretty heroic measures like connecting to a significant fraction of
 the Bitcoin network at once, as well as connecting to getblocktemplate
 supporting miners to figure out what transactions are being mined, are
 services having any hope of avoiding getting ripped off. For the average
 user their wallets do a terrible job of showing whether or not an
 unconfirmed transaction will go through. For example, Schildbach's
 Bitcoin wallet for Android has no code at all to detect double-spends
 until they get mined, and I've been able to trick it into showing
 completely invalid transactions. In fact, currently Bitcoin XT will
 relay invalid transactions that are doublepsends, and Schildbach's
 wallet displays them as valid, unconfirmed, payments. It's really no
 surprise to me that nearly no-one in the Bitcoin ecosystem accepts
 unconfirmed transactions without some kind of protection that doesn't
 rely on first-seen-safe mempool behavior. For instance, many ATM's these
 days know who their customers are due to AML requirements, so while you
 can deposit Bitcoins and get your funds instantly, the protection for
 the ATM operator is that they can go to the police if you rip them off;
 I've spoken to ATM operators who didn't do this who've lost hundreds or
 even thousands of dollars before giving up on zeroconf.

 My big worry with zeroconf is a service like Coinbase or Shapeshift
 coming to rely on it, and then attempting to secure it by gaining
 control of a majority of hashing power. For instance, if Coinbase had
 contracts with 80% of the Bitcoin hashing power to guarantee their
 transactions would get mined, but 20% of the hashing power didn't sign
 up, then the only way to guarantee their transactions could be for the
 80% to not build on blocks containing doublespends by the 20%. There's
 no way in a decentralized network to come to consensus about what
 transactions are or are 

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Mailman incompatibility with DKIM ...

2015-06-19 Thread Warren Togami Jr.
On Thu, Jun 18, 2015 at 11:56 PM, Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net wrote:

 We already removed the footer because it was incompatible with DKIM
 signing.  Keeping the [Bitcoin-dev]  prepend tag in subject is compatible
 with DKIM header signing only if the poster manually prepends it in their
 subject header.


 I still see footers being added to this list by SourceForge?


The new list currently has footers removed during testing.  I am not
pleased with the need to remove the subject tag and footer to be more
compatible with DKIM users.




 Opinions?


 I've asked Jeff to not use his @bitpay.com account for now.


I'm guessing DKIM enforcement is not very common because of issues like
this?

It seems that Sourceforge silently drops DKIM enforced mail like
jgarzik's.  LF seems to pass along their mail but mangles the header/body
and makes DKIM verification fail, which causes gmail to toss it into the
spam folder.  I think this behavior is slightly worse than Sourceforge
because it makes the poster think their message was successfully sent (it
is in the archive), but many subscribers never see it due to the spam
binning.

I don't see any good solution to this except an auto-reject for DKIM
enforced domain postings.  Yes this is rather terrible, but the instant
rejection is vastly better than Sourceforge silently dropping the post or
LF getting stuck in spam filters.

We should also auto-reject any other reason for mail getting stuck in the
moderation queue like including non-subscribers.  I considered
auto-rejecting spam too, but that could go horribly wrong as a false From
address could make the Mailman server into a spammer itself.  We may have
no choice but to silently drop spam for that reason.

Warren
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Concerns Regarding Threats by a Developer to Remove Commit Access from Other Developers

2015-06-19 Thread Mike Hearn

 Yeah, but increasing block-size is not a longterm solution.


Are you sure? That sort of statement is hard to answer because it doesn't
say what you think long term is, or how much you expect Bitcoin to grow.

Satoshi thought it was a perfectly fine long term solution because he
thought hardware would get cheaper as fast or faster than Bitcoin would
grow. You may disagree with him, but as we're talking about the future are
you 100% certain he was wrong? I did calculations a long time ago that
suggested even with today's hardware (+some software optimisations) it
would be feasible to keep up with Visa.

Hardware improvements can be unintuitive. There's a spreadsheet here that
lets you play with various parameters.

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1PJvrAAOVYVszfRRLhKqd1R9lRiOAImzAfdeb6ajATEY/edit#gid=1451669128

(note: the spreadsheet says avg txn size is 250 bytes, but if you check the
formula for the middle column, it does actually use 500 bytes as the
multiplier hard coded).


 Necessary higher fees are a logical consequence of lower subsidies.
 Bitcoin was basically free to use at the beginning because miners got paid
 with new coins at  the expense of those who already hold coins.
 Eventually there needs to be a mechanism which matches supply and demand.


That's not clear either, I'm afraid.

Remember that there's an upper limit on how high Bitcoin fees can go. When
fees become higher than what the banking system charges, many users won't
use Bitcoin for moving money around anymore. Fees cannot really go much
higher than that even if you assume the currency is still attractive for
other reasons, because people would just sell their coins for fiat, move
the fiat, and buy back the coins the other side.

The way mining will be funded in future is an open question. There are
differing proposals. Still, even with a higher hard block size limit,
miners can always refuse to mine transactions that don't include a
particular fee. So if you're worried about this, miners aren't being forced
into any particular policy.
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Adrian Macneil

 For instance, if Coinbase had
 contracts with 80% of the Bitcoin hashing power to guarantee their
 transactions would get mined, but 20% of the hashing power didn't sign
 up, then the only way to guarantee their transactions could be for the
 80% to not build on blocks containing doublespends by the 20%.


This seems to be more of a problem with centralized mining than zeroconf
transactions.

Speaking of, could we get a confirmation that Coinbase is, or is not,
 one of the merchant service providers trying to get hashing power
 contracts with mining pools for guaranteed transaction acceptance? IIRC
 you are still an advisor to them. This is a serious concern for the
 reasons I outlined in my post.


We have no contracts in place or plans to do this that I am aware of.

However, we do rely pretty heavily on zeroconf transactions for merchant
processing, so if any significant portion of the mining pools started
running your unsafe RBF patch, then we would probably need to look into
this as a way to prevent fraud.

In the long term, I would love to see a safe, decentralized solution for
accepting zeroconf transactions. However, right now there is no such
solution supported by any wallets in use, and I don't think breaking the
current bitcoin behavior for everyone is the best way to achieve this.

Adrian
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Peter Todd
On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 09:33:05AM -0400, Stephen Morse wrote:
 It is disappointing that F2Pool would enable full RBF when the safe
 alternative, first-seen-safe RBF, is also available, especially since the
 fees they would gain by supporting full RBF over FSS RBF would likely be
 negligible. Did they consider using FSS RBF instead?

Specifically the following is what I told them:

 We are
 interested in the replace-by-fee patch, but I am not following the
 development closely, more background info is needed, like what the
 difference between standard and zeroconf versions? Thanks.

Great!

Basically both let you replace one transaction with another that pays a
higher fee. First-seen-safe replace-by-fee adds the additional criteria
that all outputs of the old transaction still need to be paid by the new
transaction, with = as many Bitcoins. Basically, it makes sure that if
someone was paid by tx1, then tx2 will still pay them.

I've written about how wallets can use RBF and FSS-RBF to more
efficiently use the blockchain on the bitcoin-development mailing list:

http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg07813.html
http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg07829.html

Basically, for the purpose of increasing fees, RBF is something like %50
cheaper than CPFP, and FSS-RBF is something like %25 cheaper.

In addition, for ease of implementation, my new FSS-RBF has a number of
other restrictions. For instance, you can't replace multiple
transactions with one, you can't replace a transaction whose outputs
have already been spent, you can't replace a transaction with one that
spends additional unconfirmed inputs, etc. These restrictions aren't
set in stone, but they do make the code simpler and less likely to
have bugs.

In comparison my previous standard RBF patch can replace multiple
transactions with one, can replace long chains of transactions, etc.
It's willing to do more computation before deciding if a transaction
should be replaced, with more complex logic; it probably has a higher
chance of having a bug or DoS attack.

You've probably seen the huge controversy around zeroconf with regard to
standard replace-by-fee. While FSS RBF doesn't make zeroconf any safer,
it also doesn't make it any more dangerous, so politically with regard
to zeroconf it makes no difference. You *can* still use it doublespend
by taking advantage of how different transactions are accepted
differently, but that's true of *every* change we've ever made to
Bitcoin Core - by upgrading to v0.10 from v0.9 you've also broken
zeroconf in the same way.


Having said that... honestly, zeroconf is pretty broken already. Only
with pretty heroic measures like connecting to a significant fraction of
the Bitcoin network at once, as well as connecting to getblocktemplate
supporting miners to figure out what transactions are being mined, are
services having any hope of avoiding getting ripped off. For the average
user their wallets do a terrible job of showing whether or not an
unconfirmed transaction will go through. For example, Schildbach's
Bitcoin wallet for Android has no code at all to detect double-spends
until they get mined, and I've been able to trick it into showing
completely invalid transactions. In fact, currently Bitcoin XT will
relay invalid transactions that are doublepsends, and Schildbach's
wallet displays them as valid, unconfirmed, payments. It's really no
surprise to me that nearly no-one in the Bitcoin ecosystem accepts
unconfirmed transactions without some kind of protection that doesn't
rely on first-seen-safe mempool behavior. For instance, many ATM's these
days know who their customers are due to AML requirements, so while you
can deposit Bitcoins and get your funds instantly, the protection for
the ATM operator is that they can go to the police if you rip them off;
I've spoken to ATM operators who didn't do this who've lost hundreds or
even thousands of dollars before giving up on zeroconf.

My big worry with zeroconf is a service like Coinbase or Shapeshift
coming to rely on it, and then attempting to secure it by gaining
control of a majority of hashing power. For instance, if Coinbase had
contracts with 80% of the Bitcoin hashing power to guarantee their
transactions would get mined, but 20% of the hashing power didn't sign
up, then the only way to guarantee their transactions could be for the
80% to not build on blocks containing doublespends by the 20%. There's
no way in a decentralized network to come to consensus about what
transactions are or are not valid without mining itself, so you could
end up in a situation where unless you're part of one of the big pools
you can't reliably mine at all because your blocks may get rejected for
containing doublespends.

One of my goal with standard replace-by-fee is to prevent this scenario
by forcing merchants and others to implement ways of accepting zeroconf
transactions safely that work in a decentralized 

Re: [Bitcoin-development] improving development model (Re: Concerns Regarding Threats by a Developer to Remove Commit Access from Other Developers

2015-06-19 Thread Mike Hearn
Hi Adam,

I am still confused about whether you actually support an increase in the
block size limit to happen right now. As you agree that this layer 2 you
speak of doesn't exist yet, and won't within the next 10-12 months (do you
agree that actually?), can you please state clearly that you will support
Gavin's patch once posted? As Gavin's work takes some ideas from BIP100 but
does/soon will have some code associated with it.

But if we do no RD on layer2, and insist that clients can never
 change to become layer2 aware, and layer2 is too hard etc


I think there's been some confusion here.

I, at least, have never argued that other systems can *never* happen. Never
is a long time, and I myself maintain a payment channels implementation.
These things have their place.

The argument is solely around the need to raise the block size *now* and
not allow the existing layer 1 to gum up and fall over.

If Stroem or Lightning or other block chains or Coinbase or secure hardware
tokens or whatever take off and people start moving bitcoins around that
way - fine. If they're choosing it of their own free will I have no issue
with that, nor does anyone else, I suspect.

However you don't seem fully confident that people actually will choose
whatever is being cooked up as layer 2, if left to their own devices.
Indeed it's impossible for anyone to know that, as no layer 2 actually
exists. Any such implementation could have all sorts of flaws that lead to
it not gaining traction.


 No offence but please find a way to gracefully stop and rejoin the
 constructive process. You can disagree on factors and points and be
 collaborative others disagree frequently and have done productive work
 cordially for years  under the BIP process.


As you know from the discussion with myself and Gavin a few days ago on
IRC, neither of us believe any such constructive process exists. There is
another thread to discuss the lack of such a process.


 - Did you accept payment from companies to lobby for 20MB blocks?


Oh please. Conspiracy theories, now, Adam? My position has been consistent
for years. I don't care whether the figure is 20 or something else (looks
like it'll be lucky 8 instead), but I have always been clear that the limit
must rise.

But for the avoidance of doubt: the answer is no.

Gavin is paid by MIT. The MIT deal gives Gavin complete independence.

I am currently self employed and most of income comes from a client that is
actually interested in Lighthouse. Luckily they have given me some leeway
to do general Bitcoin development as well, which this business falls under.
I would *much* rather be working on Lighthouse than this, and so would they.

But seeing as you've gone there - let me flip this around. Blockstream has
a very serious conflict of interest in this situation. I am by no means the
first to observe this. You are building two major products:

   1. Sidechains, a very complex approach to avoid changing the Bitcoin
   consensus rules to add new features.
   2. Lightning, a so-called layer two system for transaction routing

No surprise, the position of Blockstream employees is that hard forks must
never happen and that everyone's ordinary transactions should go via some
new network that doesn't yet exist.

The problem is that rather than letting the market decide between ordinary
Bitcoin and Lightning, you are attempting to strangle the regular Bitcoin
protocol because you don't trust people to spontaneously realise that they
should be using your companies products.

I know that many of you guys had these views before joining Blockstream. I
am not saying you are being paid to have views you didn't previously have.
I realise that birds of a feather flock together.

Regardless, that conflict of interest DOES exist, whether you like it or
not, because if you succeed in running Bitcoin out of capacity your own
company stands to benefit from selling consulting and services around your
preferred solutions.

With respect to user rights: all the polling done so far suggests users who
are paying attention strongly support increasing the block size. For
example:

Q: Should the bitcoin block size be raised in the next two years
A: 92% yes

http://www.poll-maker.com/results329839xee274Cb0-12#tab-2

Additionally, many Bitcoin users have explicitly delegated handling the
technical details to someone else, like a payment processor or their wallet
developers. Those people are nearly all sure that the block size limit
should rise too.

So please don't engage in idle speculation about users vs companies. They
aren't some kind of opposing forces. Companies live for their users, and
many of those companies were formed by long time Bitcoin users.

And finally, the Bitcoin social contract is not defined by whatever random
state the code was in at the time Gavin decided to focus on research. Both
Gavin and I have been working on Bitcoin longer than you, Gregory or Peter
Todd. The social contract was and still is defined by the 

Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Adrian Macneil
Extremely disappointed to hear this. This change turns double spending from
a calculable (and affordable) risk for merchant payment processors into
certain profit for scammers, and provides no useful benefit for consumers.

I sincerely hope that F2Pool reconsider, given that RBF will decrease the
overall utility of bitcoin and reduce the number of people using it for
online purchases.

Adrian




On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 6:33 AM, Stephen Morse stephencalebmo...@gmail.com
wrote:

 It is disappointing that F2Pool would enable full RBF when the safe
 alternative, first-seen-safe RBF, is also available, especially since the
 fees they would gain by supporting full RBF over FSS RBF would likely be
 negligible. Did they consider using FSS RBF instead?

 Best,
 Stephen

 On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 6:39 AM, Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org wrote:

 Yesterday F2Pool, currently the largest pool with 21% of the hashing
 power, enabled full replace-by-fee (RBF) support after discussions with
 me. This means that transactions that F2Pool has will be replaced if a
 conflicting transaction pays a higher fee. There are no requirements for
 the replacement transaction to pay addresses that were paid by the
 previous transaction.


 I'm a user. What does this mean for me?
 ---

 In the short term, very little. Wallet software aimed at average users
 has no ability to reliably detect conditions where an unconfirmed
 transaction may be double-spent by the sender. For example, Schildbach's
 Bitcoin Wallet for Android doesn't even detect double-spends of
 unconfirmed transactions when connected to a RBF or Bitcoin XT nodes
 that propagate them. The least sophisticated double-spend attack
 possibly - simply broadcasting two conflicting transactions at the same
 time - has about 50% probability of success against these wallets.

 Additionally, SPV wallets based on bitcoinj can't even detect invalid
 transactions reliably, instead trusting the full node(s) it is connected
 too over the unauthenticated, unencrypted, P2P protocol to do validation
 for them. For instance due to a unfixed bug¹ Bitcoin XT nodes will relay
 double-spends that spend the output of the conflicting transaction. I've
 personally tested this with Schildbach's Bitcoin Wallet for Android,
 which shows such invalid transactions as standard, unconfirmed,
 transactions.

 Users should continue to assume that unconfirmed transactions could be
 trivially reversed by the sender until the first confirmation. In
 general, only the sender can reverse a transaction, so if you do trust
 the sender feel free to assume an unconfirmed transaction will
 eventually confirm. However, if you do not trust the sender and/or have
 no other recourse if they double-spend you, wait until at least the
 first confirmation before assuming the transaction will go through.

 In the long term, miner support of full RBF has a number of advantages
 to users, allowing you to more efficiently make transactions, paying
 lower fees. However you'll need a wallet supporting these features; none
 exist yet.


 I'm a business. What does this mean for me?
 ---

 If you use your own node to verify transactions, you probably are in a
 similar situation as average users, so again, this means very little to
 you.

 If you use a payment processor/transaction API such as BitPay, Coinbase,
 BlockCypher, etc. you may or may not be accepting unconfirmed
 transactions, and they may or may not be guaranteed by your payment
 processor even if double-spent. If like most merchants you're using the
 API such that confirmations are required prior to accepting orders (e.g.
 taking a meaningful loss such as shipping a product if the tx is
 reversed) nothing changes for you. If not I recommend you contact your
 payment processor.


 I'm a miner. Why should I support replace-by-fee?
 -

 Whether full or first-seen-safe⁵ RBF support (along with
 child-pays-for-parent) is an important step towards a fully functioning
 transaction fee market that doesn't lead to users' transactions getting
 mysteriously stuck, particularly during network flooding
 events/attacks. A better functioning fee market will help reduce
 pressure to increase the blocksize, particularly from the users creating
 the most valuable transactions.

 Full RBF also helps make use of the limited blockchain space more
 efficiently, with up to 90%+ transaction size savings possible in some
 transaction patterns. (e.g. long payment chains⁶) More users in less
 blockchain space will lead to higher overall fees per block.

 Finally as we'll discuss below full RBF prevents a number of serious
 threats to the existing level playing field that miners operate in.


 Why can't we make accepting unconfirmed txs from untrusted people safe?
 ---

 For a decentralized wallet, the situation 

Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Chun Wang
Hello. We recognize the problem. We will switch to FSS RBF soon. Thanks.

On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 9:33 PM, Stephen Morse
stephencalebmo...@gmail.com wrote:
 It is disappointing that F2Pool would enable full RBF when the safe
 alternative, first-seen-safe RBF, is also available, especially since the
 fees they would gain by supporting full RBF over FSS RBF would likely be
 negligible. Did they consider using FSS RBF instead?

 Best,
 Stephen

 On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 6:39 AM, Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org wrote:

 Yesterday F2Pool, currently the largest pool with 21% of the hashing
 power, enabled full replace-by-fee (RBF) support after discussions with
 me. This means that transactions that F2Pool has will be replaced if a
 conflicting transaction pays a higher fee. There are no requirements for
 the replacement transaction to pay addresses that were paid by the
 previous transaction.


 I'm a user. What does this mean for me?
 ---

 In the short term, very little. Wallet software aimed at average users
 has no ability to reliably detect conditions where an unconfirmed
 transaction may be double-spent by the sender. For example, Schildbach's
 Bitcoin Wallet for Android doesn't even detect double-spends of
 unconfirmed transactions when connected to a RBF or Bitcoin XT nodes
 that propagate them. The least sophisticated double-spend attack
 possibly - simply broadcasting two conflicting transactions at the same
 time - has about 50% probability of success against these wallets.

 Additionally, SPV wallets based on bitcoinj can't even detect invalid
 transactions reliably, instead trusting the full node(s) it is connected
 too over the unauthenticated, unencrypted, P2P protocol to do validation
 for them. For instance due to a unfixed bug¹ Bitcoin XT nodes will relay
 double-spends that spend the output of the conflicting transaction. I've
 personally tested this with Schildbach's Bitcoin Wallet for Android,
 which shows such invalid transactions as standard, unconfirmed,
 transactions.

 Users should continue to assume that unconfirmed transactions could be
 trivially reversed by the sender until the first confirmation. In
 general, only the sender can reverse a transaction, so if you do trust
 the sender feel free to assume an unconfirmed transaction will
 eventually confirm. However, if you do not trust the sender and/or have
 no other recourse if they double-spend you, wait until at least the
 first confirmation before assuming the transaction will go through.

 In the long term, miner support of full RBF has a number of advantages
 to users, allowing you to more efficiently make transactions, paying
 lower fees. However you'll need a wallet supporting these features; none
 exist yet.


 I'm a business. What does this mean for me?
 ---

 If you use your own node to verify transactions, you probably are in a
 similar situation as average users, so again, this means very little to
 you.

 If you use a payment processor/transaction API such as BitPay, Coinbase,
 BlockCypher, etc. you may or may not be accepting unconfirmed
 transactions, and they may or may not be guaranteed by your payment
 processor even if double-spent. If like most merchants you're using the
 API such that confirmations are required prior to accepting orders (e.g.
 taking a meaningful loss such as shipping a product if the tx is
 reversed) nothing changes for you. If not I recommend you contact your
 payment processor.


 I'm a miner. Why should I support replace-by-fee?
 -

 Whether full or first-seen-safe⁵ RBF support (along with
 child-pays-for-parent) is an important step towards a fully functioning
 transaction fee market that doesn't lead to users' transactions getting
 mysteriously stuck, particularly during network flooding
 events/attacks. A better functioning fee market will help reduce
 pressure to increase the blocksize, particularly from the users creating
 the most valuable transactions.

 Full RBF also helps make use of the limited blockchain space more
 efficiently, with up to 90%+ transaction size savings possible in some
 transaction patterns. (e.g. long payment chains⁶) More users in less
 blockchain space will lead to higher overall fees per block.

 Finally as we'll discuss below full RBF prevents a number of serious
 threats to the existing level playing field that miners operate in.


 Why can't we make accepting unconfirmed txs from untrusted people safe?
 ---

 For a decentralized wallet, the situation is pretty bleak. These wallets
 only have a handful of connections to the network, with no way of
 knowing if those connections give an accurate view of what transactions
 miners actually know about.

 The only serious attempt to fix this problem for decentralized wallets
 that has been actually deployed is 

Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Stephen Morse
It is disappointing that F2Pool would enable full RBF when the safe
alternative, first-seen-safe RBF, is also available, especially since the
fees they would gain by supporting full RBF over FSS RBF would likely be
negligible. Did they consider using FSS RBF instead?

Best,
Stephen

On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 6:39 AM, Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org wrote:

 Yesterday F2Pool, currently the largest pool with 21% of the hashing
 power, enabled full replace-by-fee (RBF) support after discussions with
 me. This means that transactions that F2Pool has will be replaced if a
 conflicting transaction pays a higher fee. There are no requirements for
 the replacement transaction to pay addresses that were paid by the
 previous transaction.


 I'm a user. What does this mean for me?
 ---

 In the short term, very little. Wallet software aimed at average users
 has no ability to reliably detect conditions where an unconfirmed
 transaction may be double-spent by the sender. For example, Schildbach's
 Bitcoin Wallet for Android doesn't even detect double-spends of
 unconfirmed transactions when connected to a RBF or Bitcoin XT nodes
 that propagate them. The least sophisticated double-spend attack
 possibly - simply broadcasting two conflicting transactions at the same
 time - has about 50% probability of success against these wallets.

 Additionally, SPV wallets based on bitcoinj can't even detect invalid
 transactions reliably, instead trusting the full node(s) it is connected
 too over the unauthenticated, unencrypted, P2P protocol to do validation
 for them. For instance due to a unfixed bug¹ Bitcoin XT nodes will relay
 double-spends that spend the output of the conflicting transaction. I've
 personally tested this with Schildbach's Bitcoin Wallet for Android,
 which shows such invalid transactions as standard, unconfirmed,
 transactions.

 Users should continue to assume that unconfirmed transactions could be
 trivially reversed by the sender until the first confirmation. In
 general, only the sender can reverse a transaction, so if you do trust
 the sender feel free to assume an unconfirmed transaction will
 eventually confirm. However, if you do not trust the sender and/or have
 no other recourse if they double-spend you, wait until at least the
 first confirmation before assuming the transaction will go through.

 In the long term, miner support of full RBF has a number of advantages
 to users, allowing you to more efficiently make transactions, paying
 lower fees. However you'll need a wallet supporting these features; none
 exist yet.


 I'm a business. What does this mean for me?
 ---

 If you use your own node to verify transactions, you probably are in a
 similar situation as average users, so again, this means very little to
 you.

 If you use a payment processor/transaction API such as BitPay, Coinbase,
 BlockCypher, etc. you may or may not be accepting unconfirmed
 transactions, and they may or may not be guaranteed by your payment
 processor even if double-spent. If like most merchants you're using the
 API such that confirmations are required prior to accepting orders (e.g.
 taking a meaningful loss such as shipping a product if the tx is
 reversed) nothing changes for you. If not I recommend you contact your
 payment processor.


 I'm a miner. Why should I support replace-by-fee?
 -

 Whether full or first-seen-safe⁵ RBF support (along with
 child-pays-for-parent) is an important step towards a fully functioning
 transaction fee market that doesn't lead to users' transactions getting
 mysteriously stuck, particularly during network flooding
 events/attacks. A better functioning fee market will help reduce
 pressure to increase the blocksize, particularly from the users creating
 the most valuable transactions.

 Full RBF also helps make use of the limited blockchain space more
 efficiently, with up to 90%+ transaction size savings possible in some
 transaction patterns. (e.g. long payment chains⁶) More users in less
 blockchain space will lead to higher overall fees per block.

 Finally as we'll discuss below full RBF prevents a number of serious
 threats to the existing level playing field that miners operate in.


 Why can't we make accepting unconfirmed txs from untrusted people safe?
 ---

 For a decentralized wallet, the situation is pretty bleak. These wallets
 only have a handful of connections to the network, with no way of
 knowing if those connections give an accurate view of what transactions
 miners actually know about.

 The only serious attempt to fix this problem for decentralized wallets
 that has been actually deployed is Andresen/Harding's double-spend
 relaying, implemented in Bitcoin XT. It relays up to one double-spend
 transaction per double-spent txout, with the intended effect to warn
 

Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Peter Todd
On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 07:00:56AM -0700, Adrian Macneil wrote:
 
  For instance, if Coinbase had
  contracts with 80% of the Bitcoin hashing power to guarantee their
  transactions would get mined, but 20% of the hashing power didn't sign
  up, then the only way to guarantee their transactions could be for the
  80% to not build on blocks containing doublespends by the 20%.
 
 
 This seems to be more of a problem with centralized mining than zeroconf
 transactions.

You're mistaking cause and effect: the contracts will drive
centralization of mining, as only the larger, non-anonymous, players
have the ability to enter into such contracts.

 Speaking of, could we get a confirmation that Coinbase is, or is not,
  one of the merchant service providers trying to get hashing power
  contracts with mining pools for guaranteed transaction acceptance? IIRC
  you are still an advisor to them. This is a serious concern for the
  reasons I outlined in my post.
 
 
 We have no contracts in place or plans to do this that I am aware of.
 
 However, we do rely pretty heavily on zeroconf transactions for merchant
 processing, so if any significant portion of the mining pools started
 running your unsafe RBF patch, then we would probably need to look into
 this as a way to prevent fraud.

What happens if the mining pools who are mining double-spends aren't
doing it delibrately? Sybil attacking pools appears to have been done
before to get double-spends though, equally there are many other changes
the reduce the reliability of transaction confirmations. For instance
the higher demands on bandwidth of a higher blocksize will inevitably
reduce the syncronicity of mempools, resulting in double-spend
opportunities. Similarly many proposals to limit mempool size allow
zeroconf double-spends.

In that case would you enter into such contracts?

-- 
'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Lawrence Nahum
Chun Wang 1240902 at gmail.com writes:

 Hello. We recognize the problem. We will switch to FSS RBF soon. Thanks.

FSS RBF is better than no RBF but we think it is better to use full RBF.

We think Full RBF is better for a number of reasons:

-user experience
-efficiency
-cost
-code complexity

We think FSS RBF is  great progress but ultimately less efficient and more 
complicated to keep alive something that never worked properly.

And why would miner pick the option paying less when other miners run the 
option paying more? It may be soon more than 1-5% of block reward.

A lot of users don't have multiple UTXO handy.

Full RBF is the best, second FSS RBF and we'd be looking into supporting 
them both separately so that miners and users can pick whichever they 
prefer.

If users only had one UTXO it makes sense to use Full RBF since there are no 
other options.

Disclosure: GreenAddress always believed zero conf transactions are not 
secure and that miners have the incentive to run FBF; this bias doesn't make 
the above less true 



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Re: [Bitcoin-development] improving development model (Re: Concerns Regarding Threats by a Developer to Remove Commit Access from Other Developers

2015-06-19 Thread Eric Lombrozo
IPv4 came before IPv6…you pick up on things quickly :)

 On Jun 19, 2015, at 5:48 AM, Marcel Jamin mar...@jamin.net wrote:
 
  At the risk of stating cliches, the Mac came before the Windows PC…Yahoo! 
  came before Google…MySpace came before Facebook…
 
 And TCP/IP came before... oh wait...
 
 2015-06-19 14:02 GMT+02:00 Eric Lombrozo elombr...@gmail.com 
 mailto:elombr...@gmail.com:
 
 On Jun 19, 2015, at 3:45 AM, Dr Adam Back a...@cypherspace.org 
 mailto:a...@cypherspace.org wrote:
 
 That wont be good for the companies either, but they may not see that
 until they've killed it, many companies operate on a1 or 2 year
 time-horizon.  They may say screw layer2, I have a runway and I need
 micropayments to the wazoo and I dont have the dev resources for that.
 
 Exactly, Adam.
 
 Except, I think the genie is out of the bottle - these ideas are too powerful 
 for them to be killed forever. They will probably survive even if this 
 scenario comes to pass…but in a different network under a different name…and 
 Bitcoin will be relegated to the history books and walls of museums.
 
 Most of the potential brainpower available on this Earth to make serious, 
 profound contributions to this movement haven’t even begun to touch it. Just 
 because you happen to run a Bitcoin startup right now…even if you’ve received 
 millions of dollars in funding…don’t think that the whole world has low 
 standards and is lazy! Someone WILL eventually build something better than we 
 can presently imagine.
 
 First mover advantage and the network effect are vastly overrated. At the 
 risk of stating cliches, the Mac came before the Windows PC…Yahoo! came 
 before Google…MySpace came before Facebook…Bitcoin came before we don’t know 
 yet.
 
 
 - Eric Lombrozo
 
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] improving development model (Re: Concerns Regarding Threats by a Developer to Remove Commit Access from Other Developers

2015-06-19 Thread Dr Adam Back
A lot of people think a layer2 is needed, that has a higher
(algorithmic) scale in use of layer1 block-space but preserves
functionality and uplifts security from layer1.  An example would be
lightning or similar.

But there are many things that could be done.  Pure offchain is a weak
form of layer2.  Its running today and maybe its handling 90-99% range
of all transactions right now (mostly in exchanges for example).  This
layer can be incrementally hardened.  It can also have standardised
APIs across vendors of custodians, and opt-in support of those APIs in
wallets.  This would provide a convenience choice.  Greenaddress also
for low-mid assurances solves the unconfirmed transactions. It's
probably not reasonable to expect bitcoin directly solve fast
unconfirmed transactions.   Probably intermediate configurations in
complexity somewhere between greenaddress (2 of 2 + timelocked 1 sig)
and lightning may exist also.  The internet doesnt stop at layer1.

(Which would then leave people who are uninterested in changing client
software to handle layer2, as layer1 will always be enough die-hards
(in the refusing the future and facing the O(n^2) scaling wall or
centralisation death with perplexing optimism :)  Ok, not so
constructive but maybe a gentle reminder that it is not constructive
in the reverse direction either to throw around often false
characterisations.  We're here now to improve bitcoin so lets do that.

What I said here seemed like it maybe subject to misinterpretation so
to clarify:

On 19 June 2015 at 11:22, Dr Adam Back a...@cypherspace.org wrote:
 For example it could hypothetically allow 10MB blocks on
 one chain and 100kB blocks on the main chain.  People say complexity,
 scary.  Sure I am talking longer term, but we have to also make
 concrete forward progress to the future or we'll be stuck here talking
 about perilously large constant changes in 5 years time!

I should clarify that I meant there I was assuming we do one increase
within the next 12 months frame that gives buffer for 5 years rd to
improve things and build layer2.

But if we do no RD on layer2, and insist that clients can never
change to become layer2 aware, and layer2 is too hard etc then our
risk would be we'd be back in the discussion of kicking the can afresh
again in some years with some even more centralising size change.

Sure we should make the transition and introduction to layer2 and an
intermediate crunch smoother, but 20MB now or else isn't really
helping.  It did help get the conversation revived, but at this point
its a hindrance.  Seriously a big hindrance.  No offence but please
find a way to gracefully stop and rejoin the constructive process.
You can disagree on factors and points and be collaborative others
disagree frequently and have done productive work cordially for years
under the BIP process.


About scaling again:

Here is what I said before in my TL;DR post about my thoughts on how
we would start on throughput short-term to have space to do layer2
development.

 I think almost everybody is on board with a combination plan:

 1. work to improve decentralisation (specific technical work already
 underway, and education)
 2. create a plan to increase block-size in a slow fashion to not cause
 system shocks (eg like Jeff is proposing or some better variant)
 3. work on actual algorithmic scaling

 In this way we can have throughput needed for scalability and security
 work to continue.

 As I said you can not scale a O(n^2) broadcast network by changing
 constants, you need algorithmic improvements.

 People are working on them already.  All of those 3 things are being
 actively worked on right now, and in the case of algorithmic scaling
 and improve decentralisation have been worked on for months.


Btw I wonder if Gavin or Mike would be willing to answer another
question I forgot from my TL;DR post which was:

- Did you accept payment from companies to lobby for 20MB blocks?  Do
you consider that something appropriate to publicly disclose if so?
Do you consider that user rights should come above or below company
interests in Bitcoin?


FWIW on pondering that last question should user rights come above or
below company interests I think my view of the guiding principle is
starkly clear to me: that user rights should be the primary thing to
optimise for.  Businesses are providing service to users, their
interests are secondary in so far as if they are enabled to provide
better service thats good.

Bitcoin is a user p2p currency, with a social contract and a strong
user ethos.  Importing and forcing company interests would likely be
the start of a slippery slope towards an end to Bitcoin.   If we allow
business rights to be paramount it seems likely that we will end back
at the status quo as bitcoin payment processors grow, conglomerate and
become paypal/bank like or actual banks and then their interests and
exposures are the same as the banks and they'll want to import their
business models into 

Re: [Bitcoin-development] improving development model (Re: Concerns Regarding Threats by a Developer to Remove Commit Access from Other Developers

2015-06-19 Thread Bryan Bishop
On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 5:45 AM, Dr Adam Back a...@cypherspace.org wrote:

 payment protocol layer in my view.  (If thats not obvious to some
 lurkers I elaborate on that argument  amongst other things here:
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3dAdI3Gzodo )


Someone might find it more convenient to consume that in the form of text
instead:
http://diyhpl.us/wiki/transcripts/bitcoin-adam3us-fungibility-privacy/

- Bryan
http://heybryan.org/
1 512 203 0507
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[Bitcoin-development] Fee Market Effects

2015-06-19 Thread Tim Witters
A lot of standpoints for keeping the current block size are focused on 
creating a healthy fee market. I have some open questions for this list 
in regards to the user incentives of using bitcoin, when such a strong 
fee market is in place.
In my scenario the average fee for a normal transactions will be around 
1$ to put in on the blockchain with a reasonable confirmation time.

1. How will we get user adoptions if the fees on bitcoin transactions 
our not competitive with other services like PayPal and the like. (from 
a payment solution viewpoint) It is one of the main ‘pitch lines’ to get 
people to adopt bitcoin. “Send value to the other side of the world for 
almost 0 fees”

2. Many suggest the use of a level 2 layer will facilitate the 
scalability for bitcoin with technologies like the lightning network. 
But to my knowledge, all these solutions still need to publish to the 
actual blockchain when they need to settle. Meaning you will have to pay 
the fees at least once. In case of lightning this will be when the 
channel is closed. 

This means moves more to a monthly payed service, where you open a 
payment channel each month and pay the fee at the end. But a system like 
this keeps money locked for the duration of the channel. And one of the 
main ‘pitch’ point of the bitcoin economy was you get your money 
instantly, not at the end of the month when the payment channel is 
closed. 

3. The idea of the fee market is people will start using the layer 2 
systems. When this happens, what are the incentives to keep running a 
node? The incentives today are already quite small, the only real one is 
to support the network or make payments through your own trusted node. 
If you are only using a layer 2 solution, are there any reasons left to 
run my own bitcoin node, resulting in less decentralization.

4. Do we need a fee market right now? It seems to me the current 
block reward is still high enough for miners to be able to make money 
and secure the network. No real fee market is therefore needed to help 
these miners. 

Regardless of our opinion, why don’t we let the miners decide? The 
BIP100 proposal seems to do this. If the majority of miners decide they 
want bigger blocks they just vote for this. If they want a fee market 
because their return is enough, they can keep the limit and let the 
demand for more blockspace result in a higher fee market. 
Just some of my thoughts about the results of full blocks and the 
resulting fee market. It seems to me a strong fee market might hurt the 
young ecosystem more, then it might help it (miners are currently 
compensated enough). The same goes for decentralization, when people 
more their resources to the level 2 solution or stop using bitcoin due 
to the higher fees compared to comparable services.
Cheers,
Tim Witters 
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Concerns Regarding Threats by a Developer to Remove Commit Access from Other Developers

2015-06-19 Thread GC

When is the right time to allow space pressure to rise that ratio?
When the subsidy is at 1.5625, for example, it may be too late to

I don¹t believe we have to decide, the miners will do that and are doing
that already.

start a non-catastrophic transition from subsidies to fees.
I don't claim to know that, but it's something that worries me.
No matter how many people say that's too far away in the future to
worry about it, I still worry about it and I'm sure more people do.
What if when it's time to care about it we discover that we should
have started to do things about it long ago to minimize the risks of
this transition?

Hmmm. What should be the price of an email? How much should DARPA have
charged for using TCP/IP?

I see a lot of well-paid, first-world technologists arguing for commercial
returns on a nacent protocol which could could offer benefits to the
unbanked.
Is that really the vision: to (re)build a de-centralized Paypal with
slightly cheaper fees and cool hooks into off-chain commercial systems
providing profits for the already rich?

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Mailman incompatibility with DKIM ...

2015-06-19 Thread Warren Togami Jr.
On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 12:24 AM, Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net wrote:

 The new list currently has footers removed during testing.  I am not
 pleased with the need to remove the subject tag and footer to be more
 compatible with DKIM users.


 Lists can do what are effectively MITM attacks on people's messages in any
 way they like, if they resign for the messages themselves. That seems fair
 to me!  :)


Mailman isn't resigning it.  Should it be?  Does other mailing list
software?




  I'm guessing DKIM enforcement is not very common because of issues like
 this?


 DKIM is used by most mail on the internet. DMARC rules that publish in DNS
 statements like All mail from bitpay.com is signed correctly so trash
 any that isn't are used on some of the worlds most heavily phished domains
 like google.com, PayPal, eBay, and indeed BitPay.

 These rules are understood and enforced by all major webmail providers
 including Gmail. It's actually only rusty geek infrastructure that has
 problems with this, I've never heard of DKIM/DMARC users having issues
 outside of dealing with mailman. The vast majority of email users who never
 post to technical mailing lists benefit from it significantly.

 Really everyone should use them. Adding cryptographic integrity to email
 is hardly a crazy idea :)


I understand the reason to protect the heavily phished domains.  I heard
that LKML does not modify the subject or add a footer, perhaps because it
would make it incompatible with DKIM of the several big corporate domains
who participate.

I suppose it is somewhat acceptable for us to remove subject tags and
footers if we have no choice...

Warren
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Concerns Regarding Threats by a Developer to Remove Commit Access from Other Developers

2015-06-19 Thread Eric Lombrozo

 On Jun 19, 2015, at 2:37 AM, Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net wrote:
 
 Or alternatively, fix the reasons why users would have negative experiences 
 with full blocks
 
 It's impossible, Mark. By definition if Bitcoin does not have sufficient 
 capacity for everyone's transactions, some users who were using it will be 
 kicked out to make way for the others. Whether that happens in some kind of 
 stable organised way or (as with the current code) a fairly chaotic way 
 doesn't change the fundamental truth: some users will find their bitcoin 
 savings have become uneconomic to spend.
 
 Here's a recent user complaint that provides a preview of coming attractions:
 
 https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/39r3bi/breadwallet_asking_me_to_pay_over_10_network_fee/
  
 https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/39r3bi/breadwallet_asking_me_to_pay_over_10_network_fee/
 
 Hello, I'm just trying to send my small Sarutobi-tips stash (12,159 bits) 
 onto a paper wallet. When I try to send it, a window pops up stating 
 insufficient funds for bitcoin network fee, reduce payment amount by 1,389 
 bits? This would be a fee of $0.32 to send my $2.82, leaving me with $2.50.
 
 These sorts of complaints will get more frequent and more extreme in the 
 coming months. I realise that nobody at Blockstream is  in the position of 
 running an end user facing service, but many of us are  and we will be 
 the ones that face the full anger of ordinary users as Bitcoin hits the wall.

Mike,

With all due respect, many of us DO run end user facing services…and would 
rather see a fundamental problem *fixed* rather than merely covered up 
temporarily…hoping nobody notices.

The user experience of Bitcoin is already horrendous…unless you use a 
centralized validator web wallet. Even SPV is fundamentally broken (and I would 
have pegged you for being one of the people most directly aware of this fact). 
If we’re going for centralized validation, why even use a blockchain in the 
first place? We already have much faster, more efficient technology that can do 
that kind of stuff at a fraction of the cost. If you have well-established 
entities running banking services, we have other mechanisms in place that can 
help keep them honest…other far more efficient protocols. We’re basically 
defeating the very purpose of this invention.

Then there are a bunch of other “inconveniences” about the way Bitcoin 
currently works. For instance, have you ever received a bunch of small payments 
(i.e. a crowdsale) and then found yourself in the position of having to 
suddenly move a big chunk of that on the blockchain…only to discover all the 
txouts you were spending added up to hundreds of kB or more? Or have you ever 
had to send a small payment but only had one large output in your wallet…which 
meant that the entirety of those funds were tied up until the first transaction 
got signed and propagated? Yes, the protocol has MANY serious issues…of which 
the “send and forget” fee model as opposed to the “send and bid model” is just 
one.

Bitcoin was designed from the beginning with the idea that sooner or later fees 
would be a significant component of the network. The problem was never really 
fully addressed and solved - I’m glad to see that finally some good people in 
this space are starting to seriously think about solutions.

Mike, are you telling us you’d rather avoid user complaints at all costs even 
if that means building something shitty for them that doesn’t really serve its 
stated purpose? If those are your standards then no thanks, I don’t want to be 
part of your fork. And I don’t think I’m alone in this sentiment.


- Eric Lombrozo


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Re: [Bitcoin-development] improving development model (Re: Concerns Regarding Threats by a Developer to Remove Commit Access from Other Developers

2015-06-19 Thread Eric Lombrozo

 On Jun 19, 2015, at 3:45 AM, Dr Adam Back a...@cypherspace.org 
 mailto:a...@cypherspace.org wrote:
 
 That wont be good for the companies either, but they may not see that
 until they've killed it, many companies operate on a1 or 2 year
 time-horizon.  They may say screw layer2, I have a runway and I need
 micropayments to the wazoo and I dont have the dev resources for that.

Exactly, Adam.

Except, I think the genie is out of the bottle - these ideas are too powerful 
for them to be killed forever. They will probably survive even if this scenario 
comes to pass…but in a different network under a different name…and Bitcoin 
will be relegated to the history books and walls of museums.

Most of the potential brainpower available on this Earth to make serious, 
profound contributions to this movement haven’t even begun to touch it. Just 
because you happen to run a Bitcoin startup right now…even if you’ve received 
millions of dollars in funding…don’t think that the whole world has low 
standards and is lazy! Someone WILL eventually build something better than we 
can presently imagine.

First mover advantage and the network effect are vastly overrated. At the risk 
of stating cliches, the Mac came before the Windows PC…Yahoo! came before 
Google…MySpace came before Facebook…Bitcoin came before we don’t know yet.


- Eric Lombrozo


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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Concerns Regarding Threats by a Developer to Remove Commit Access from Other Developers

2015-06-19 Thread Benjamin
Yeah, but increasing block-size is not a longterm solution. Necessary
higher fees are a logical consequence of lower subsidies. Bitcoin was
basically free to use at the beginning because miners got paid with
new coins at  the expense of those who already hold coins. Eventually
there needs to be a mechanism which matches supply and demand.

On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 11:37 AM, Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net wrote:
 Or alternatively, fix the reasons why users would have negative
 experiences with full blocks


 It's impossible, Mark. By definition if Bitcoin does not have sufficient
 capacity for everyone's transactions, some users who were using it will be
 kicked out to make way for the others. Whether that happens in some kind of
 stable organised way or (as with the current code) a fairly chaotic way
 doesn't change the fundamental truth: some users will find their bitcoin
 savings have become uneconomic to spend.

 Here's a recent user complaint that provides a preview of coming
 attractions:

 https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/39r3bi/breadwallet_asking_me_to_pay_over_10_network_fee/

 Hello, I'm just trying to send my small Sarutobi-tips stash (12,159 bits)
 onto a paper wallet. When I try to send it, a window pops up stating
 insufficient funds for bitcoin network fee, reduce payment amount by 1,389
 bits? This would be a fee of $0.32 to send my $2.82, leaving me with $2.50.


 These sorts of complaints will get more frequent and more extreme in the
 coming months. I realise that nobody at Blockstream is  in the position of
 running an end user facing service, but many of us are  and we will be
 the ones that face the full anger of ordinary users as Bitcoin hits the
 wall.

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Concerns Regarding Threats by a Developer to Remove Commit Access from Other Developers

2015-06-19 Thread GC
Benjamin,

Timeframe for network congestion and users experiencing service
degradation = between now and middle of next year.

Timeframe for transaction fees topping block reward fees = many years in
the future, based on current ratio of block reward to fees.

What is the more pressing requirement now? A working ³fee market² or a
reliable, useful payment network that scales without falling over in the
next 2-3 years.

On 19/6/15 4:53 pm, Benjamin benjamin.l.cor...@gmail.com wrote:

Yeah, but increasing block-size is not a longterm solution. Necessary
higher fees are a logical consequence of lower subsidies. Bitcoin was
basically free to use at the beginning because miners got paid with
new coins at  the expense of those who already hold coins. Eventually
there needs to be a mechanism which matches supply and demand.

On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 11:37 AM, Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net wrote:
 Or alternatively, fix the reasons why users would have negative
 experiences with full blocks


 It's impossible, Mark. By definition if Bitcoin does not have sufficient
 capacity for everyone's transactions, some users who were using it will
be
 kicked out to make way for the others. Whether that happens in some
kind of
 stable organised way or (as with the current code) a fairly chaotic way
 doesn't change the fundamental truth: some users will find their bitcoin
 savings have become uneconomic to spend.

 Here's a recent user complaint that provides a preview of coming
 attractions:

 
https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/39r3bi/breadwallet_asking_me_to
_pay_over_10_network_fee/

 Hello, I'm just trying to send my small Sarutobi-tips stash (12,159
bits)
 onto a paper wallet. When I try to send it, a window pops up stating
 insufficient funds for bitcoin network fee, reduce payment amount by
1,389
 bits? This would be a fee of $0.32 to send my $2.82, leaving me with
$2.50.


 These sorts of complaints will get more frequent and more extreme in the
 coming months. I realise that nobody at Blockstream is  in the position
of
 running an end user facing service, but many of us are  and we will
be
 the ones that face the full anger of ordinary users as Bitcoin hits the
 wall.

 
-
-

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[Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Peter Todd
Yesterday F2Pool, currently the largest pool with 21% of the hashing
power, enabled full replace-by-fee (RBF) support after discussions with
me. This means that transactions that F2Pool has will be replaced if a
conflicting transaction pays a higher fee. There are no requirements for
the replacement transaction to pay addresses that were paid by the
previous transaction.


I'm a user. What does this mean for me?
---

In the short term, very little. Wallet software aimed at average users
has no ability to reliably detect conditions where an unconfirmed
transaction may be double-spent by the sender. For example, Schildbach's
Bitcoin Wallet for Android doesn't even detect double-spends of
unconfirmed transactions when connected to a RBF or Bitcoin XT nodes
that propagate them. The least sophisticated double-spend attack
possibly - simply broadcasting two conflicting transactions at the same
time - has about 50% probability of success against these wallets.

Additionally, SPV wallets based on bitcoinj can't even detect invalid
transactions reliably, instead trusting the full node(s) it is connected
too over the unauthenticated, unencrypted, P2P protocol to do validation
for them. For instance due to a unfixed bug¹ Bitcoin XT nodes will relay
double-spends that spend the output of the conflicting transaction. I've
personally tested this with Schildbach's Bitcoin Wallet for Android,
which shows such invalid transactions as standard, unconfirmed,
transactions.

Users should continue to assume that unconfirmed transactions could be
trivially reversed by the sender until the first confirmation. In
general, only the sender can reverse a transaction, so if you do trust
the sender feel free to assume an unconfirmed transaction will
eventually confirm. However, if you do not trust the sender and/or have
no other recourse if they double-spend you, wait until at least the
first confirmation before assuming the transaction will go through.

In the long term, miner support of full RBF has a number of advantages
to users, allowing you to more efficiently make transactions, paying
lower fees. However you'll need a wallet supporting these features; none
exist yet.


I'm a business. What does this mean for me?
---

If you use your own node to verify transactions, you probably are in a
similar situation as average users, so again, this means very little to
you.

If you use a payment processor/transaction API such as BitPay, Coinbase,
BlockCypher, etc. you may or may not be accepting unconfirmed
transactions, and they may or may not be guaranteed by your payment
processor even if double-spent. If like most merchants you're using the
API such that confirmations are required prior to accepting orders (e.g.
taking a meaningful loss such as shipping a product if the tx is
reversed) nothing changes for you. If not I recommend you contact your
payment processor.


I'm a miner. Why should I support replace-by-fee?
-

Whether full or first-seen-safe⁵ RBF support (along with
child-pays-for-parent) is an important step towards a fully functioning
transaction fee market that doesn't lead to users' transactions getting
mysteriously stuck, particularly during network flooding
events/attacks. A better functioning fee market will help reduce
pressure to increase the blocksize, particularly from the users creating
the most valuable transactions.

Full RBF also helps make use of the limited blockchain space more
efficiently, with up to 90%+ transaction size savings possible in some
transaction patterns. (e.g. long payment chains⁶) More users in less
blockchain space will lead to higher overall fees per block.

Finally as we'll discuss below full RBF prevents a number of serious
threats to the existing level playing field that miners operate in.


Why can't we make accepting unconfirmed txs from untrusted people safe?
---

For a decentralized wallet, the situation is pretty bleak. These wallets
only have a handful of connections to the network, with no way of
knowing if those connections give an accurate view of what transactions
miners actually know about.

The only serious attempt to fix this problem for decentralized wallets
that has been actually deployed is Andresen/Harding's double-spend
relaying, implemented in Bitcoin XT. It relays up to one double-spend
transaction per double-spent txout, with the intended effect to warn
recipients. In practice however this functionality makes it easier to
double-spend rather than harder, by giving an efficient and easy way to
get double-spends to miners after the fact. Notably my RBF
implementation even connects to Bitcoin XT nodes, reserving a % of all
incoming and outgoing connection slots for them.

Additionally Bitcoin XT's double-spend relaying is subject to attacks
include bandwidth exhaustion, sybil 

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Concerns Regarding Threats by a Developer to Remove Commit Access from Other Developers

2015-06-19 Thread Jorge Timón
On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 11:37 AM, Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net wrote:
 Or alternatively, fix the reasons why users would have negative
 experiences with full blocks


 It's impossible, Mark. By definition if Bitcoin does not have sufficient
 capacity for everyone's transactions, some users who were using it will be
 kicked out to make way for the others. Whether that happens in some kind of
 stable organised way or (as with the current code) a fairly chaotic way
 doesn't change the fundamental truth: some users will find their bitcoin
 savings have become uneconomic to spend.

He doesn't mean that: he means solving the mempool and crashes and
hitting the limit would have.
If the chain has limited size it is a scarce resource and people have
to bid for it: nothing unexpected or wrong about that.
Of course, people that believe the limit should be completely removed
eventually because they don't care about mining being decentralized
(or fail to see the relation between the two) may have a very
different view about this.

On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 12:08 PM, GC slashdevn...@hotmail.com wrote:
 Timeframe for transaction fees topping block reward fees = many years in
 the future, based on current ratio of block reward to fees.

Do you think that this ratio is unrelated to an abundant (non-scarce)
block size?
When is the right time to allow space pressure to rise that ratio?
When the subsidy is at 1.5625, for example, it may be too late to
start a non-catastrophic transition from subsidies to fees.
I don't claim to know that, but it's something that worries me.
No matter how many people say that's too far away in the future to
worry about it, I still worry about it and I'm sure more people do.
What if when it's time to care about it we discover that we should
have started to do things about it long ago to minimize the risks of
this transition?

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Concerns Regarding Threats by a Developer to Remove Commit Access from Other Developers

2015-06-19 Thread Brooks Boyd
On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 4:37 AM, Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net wrote:

 Or alternatively, fix the reasons why users would have negative
 experiences with full blocks


 It's impossible, Mark. *By definition* if Bitcoin does not have
 sufficient capacity for everyone's transactions, some users who were using
 it will be kicked out to make way for the others. Whether that happens in
 some kind of stable organised way or (as with the current code) a fairly
 chaotic way doesn't change the fundamental truth: *some users will find
 their bitcoin savings have become uneconomic to spend*.

 Here's a recent user complaint that provides a preview of coming
 attractions:


 https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/39r3bi/breadwallet_asking_me_to_pay_over_10_network_fee/

 Hello, I'm just trying to send my small Sarutobi-tips stash (12,159 bits)
 onto a paper wallet. When I try to send it, a window pops up stating
 insufficient funds for bitcoin network fee, reduce payment amount by 1,389
 bits? This would be a fee of $0.32 to send my $2.82, leaving me with $2.50.



Has there been any talk about reducing the time between blocks? If blocks
were allowed to come twice as fast, they would be able to clear pending
transactions in the mempool the same as if the block size doubled, but
would allow mining to stay more decentralized since miners wouldn't be
working on such large-scale blocks? It would still take more storage space
to store the blockchain, though.

Brooks
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Mailman incompatibility with DKIM ...

2015-06-19 Thread Mike Hearn

 Mailman isn't resigning it.  Should it be?  Does other mailing list
 software?


Mailman must take responsibility for the mail itself. It doesn't have to
actually sign with DKIM to do so: for backwards compatibility, spam filters
fall back to other heuristics to try and figure out the 'owner' of the mail
if it doesn't use DKIM. Those heuristics can go wrong of course. Ideally
all mail would be DKIM signed. There's no reason not to do it, really.

Yes mailing lists that edit people's emails resign. For example, from a
recent message to the bitcoinj list

DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;
*d=googlegroups.com http://googlegroups.com*; s=20120806;
h=to:from:subject:date:lines:message-id:references:mime-version
 :content-type:user-agent:in-reply-to:x-original-sender
 :x-original-authentication-results:reply-to:precedence:mailing-list
 :list-id:list-post:list-help:list-archive:sender:list-subscribe
 :list-unsubscribe;



 I suppose it is somewhat acceptable for us to remove subject tags and
 footers if we have no choice...


Good email clients can extract the same information from the headers
anyway. I filter all my mail based on them, and the headers also contain
unsubscribe instructions. Gmail is capable of using them programmatically.
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[Bitcoin-development] Mailman incompatibility with DKIM ...

2015-06-19 Thread Warren Togami Jr.
Both you and jgarzik experienced mail getting tossed into gmail's spam
folder thanks to DKIM... I am concerned that DKIM is too fragile and not
very compatible with mailing lists.

We already removed the footer because it was incompatible with DKIM
signing.  Keeping the [Bitcoin-dev]  prepend tag in subject is compatible
with DKIM header signing only if the poster manually prepends it in their
subject header.

I am already concerned that the lack of the Mailman footer will make it
hard to identify where exactly subscribers need to go to unsubscribe or
look at archives.  Removing the subject tag might make DKIM enforcement
work a lot better, but I can easily see our obtuse subscribers as being
extra confused by this.

Opinions?

Warren

On Thu, Jun 18, 2015 at 11:38 PM, Arthur art...@powaaa.com wrote:

 warren | bad_duck: try manually adding [Bitcoin-dev]  to the beginning
 of the subject

 --
 Arthur

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[Bitcoin-development] improving development model (Re: Concerns Regarding Threats by a Developer to Remove Commit Access from Other Developers

2015-06-19 Thread Dr Adam Back
Nicely put Eric.  Relatedly my initial experience with Bitcoin in
trying to improve bitcoin in fungibility, privacy  decentralisation,
I found some interesting things, like Confidential Transactions (that
Greg Maxwell has now optimised via a new generalisation of the
hash-ring signature construct he invented and with Pieter made part of
the alpha side-chain release) and a few other things.

As I went then to discuss and learn: a) what are the characteristics
needed for inclusion (clearly things need to fit in with how things
work, not demand massive rewrites to accommodate and to not conflict
with existing important design considerations), so that I could make
proposals in a practically deployable way, and then b) the
practicality of getting a proposed change that say people found
clearly useful.  Then I bumped into the realisation that this is
actually really high risk to change, and consensus critical coding
security is very complex and there are some billion $ resting on
getting this rigidly correct under live conditions, so that deployment
must be cautious and incremental and rigorously tested.

So then I focussed instead on question of whether we could improve
bitcoins development model: how could we allow bitcoin to more rapidly
and agilely test beta features or try novel things to see how they
would work (as someone might do in a feature branch of a normal FOSS
project, to code and test a proposal for later addition), but with
criteria we want real bticoins so there is economic incentive as that
is actually part of the bitcoin protocol so you've not validated
something unless you're run it in a real network with money.  I was
hypothesising therefore we need a way to run bitcoin beta network.
There's a thread about this here stretching back to may 2013.

Or similarly to run in parallel kind of subnets with different
trade-offs or features that are not easy to merge or high risk to
apply all at once to bitcoin with the inflight billions in capital and
transactions on it.

Anyway I thought that was a productive line of thinking, and generally
people seemed to agree and problem statement of 2wp: then 1wp
mechanism was proposed and then Greg extracted a concept from his
SNARK witness idea (which encapsulates a snark variant of a 2wp) but
now without snarks, then 2wp a conservative crypto 2wp proposal was
made.  This was dec 2013 I think on wizards channel.  The sidechain
alpha release now makes this a (alpha quality and so testnet coin, and
without DMMS peg) reality.  I could imagine others who have a desire
to try things could elect to do so and copy that patch-set and make
more side-chains.

This is inherently non-coercive because you largely do not directly
change bitcoin by doing this, people elect to use which ever chain
suits them best given their usecase.  If the sidechain is really early
stage it should have test-net coins in it not bitcoins in it, but
still its caveat emptor kind of beta chain, with good testing but
non-trivial to soft-fork on bitcoin but managable refactor a sidechain
to integrate something novel or try some existing feature (like the
segregated witness which robustly addresses malleability for example)

So I dont want to say side-chains are some magical solution to
everything, but its a direction that others may like to consider for
how to test or even run alternative trade-offs bitcoin side-chains in
parallel.  For example it could hypothetically allow 10MB blocks on
one chain and 100kB blocks on the main chain.  People say complexity,
scary.  Sure I am talking longer term, but we have to also make
concrete forward progress to the future or we'll be stuck here talking
about perilously large constant changes in 5 years time!

This approach also avoids the one-size fits all problem.

Extension-blocks are an in-chain sub-net type of thing that has a
security boost by being soft-fork enforced (relative to side-chains
which are looser coupled and so more flexible relative to the simplest
form of extension-blocks)

Adam

On 19 June 2015 at 07:59, Eric Lombrozo elombr...@gmail.com wrote:
 I don’t think the issue is between larger blocks on the one hand and things
 like lightning on the other - these two ideas are quite orthogonal.

 Larger blocks aren’t really about addressing basic scalability concerns -
 for that we’ll clearly need architectural and algorithmic improvements…and
 will likely need to move to a model where it isn’t necessary for everyone to
 validate everyone else’s latte purchases. Larger blocks might, at best, keep
 the current system chugging along temporarily - although I’m not sure that’s
 necessarily such a great thing…we need to create a fee market sooner or
 later, and until we do this, block size issues will continue to crop up
 again and again and economic incentives will continue to be misplaced. It
 would be nice to have more time to really develop a good infrastructure for
 this…but without real market pressures, I’m not sure it will happen at all.
 

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Concerns Regarding Threats by a Developer to Remove Commit Access from Other Developers

2015-06-19 Thread Mike Hearn

 Or alternatively, fix the reasons why users would have negative
 experiences with full blocks


It's impossible, Mark. *By definition* if Bitcoin does not have sufficient
capacity for everyone's transactions, some users who were using it will be
kicked out to make way for the others. Whether that happens in some kind of
stable organised way or (as with the current code) a fairly chaotic way
doesn't change the fundamental truth: *some users will find their bitcoin
savings have become uneconomic to spend*.

Here's a recent user complaint that provides a preview of coming
attractions:

https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/39r3bi/breadwallet_asking_me_to_pay_over_10_network_fee/

Hello, I'm just trying to send my small Sarutobi-tips stash (12,159 bits)
 onto a paper wallet. When I try to send it, a window pops up stating
 insufficient funds for bitcoin network fee, reduce payment amount by 1,389
 bits? This would be a fee of $0.32 to send my $2.82, leaving me with $2.50.


These sorts of complaints will get more frequent and more extreme in the
coming months. I realise that nobody at Blockstream is  in the position of
running an end user facing service, but many of us are  and we will be
the ones that face the full anger of ordinary users as Bitcoin hits the
wall.
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Mailman incompatibility with DKIM ...

2015-06-19 Thread Mike Hearn

 We already removed the footer because it was incompatible with DKIM
 signing.  Keeping the [Bitcoin-dev]  prepend tag in subject is compatible
 with DKIM header signing only if the poster manually prepends it in their
 subject header.


I still see footers being added to this list by SourceForge?


 Opinions?


I've asked Jeff to not use his @bitpay.com account for now.

The only real fix is to use a mailing list operator that is designed to
operate correctly with DKIM/DMARC, either by not modifying messages in
transit, or by re-sending (and ideally re-signing) under their own identity.

Though I'm sure this won't be an issue for the Linux Foundation, the latter
approach is dangerous because it means the list operator takes full
responsibility for any spamming that occurs from that domain. If the mail
server is ever hacked or spammers start posting to the lists themselves,
all that spam will be seen as originating from the listserv itself and the
reputation will be degraded. It can end with everyone's mail going to the
spam folder.
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Mailman incompatibility with DKIM ...

2015-06-19 Thread Mike Hearn

 The new list currently has footers removed during testing.  I am not
 pleased with the need to remove the subject tag and footer to be more
 compatible with DKIM users.


Lists can do what are effectively MITM attacks on people's messages in any
way they like, if they resign for the messages themselves. That seems fair
to me!  :)


  I'm guessing DKIM enforcement is not very common because of issues like
 this?


DKIM is used by most mail on the internet. DMARC rules that publish in DNS
statements like All mail from bitpay.com is signed correctly so trash any
that isn't are used on some of the worlds most heavily phished domains
like google.com, PayPal, eBay, and indeed BitPay.

These rules are understood and enforced by all major webmail providers
including Gmail. It's actually only rusty geek infrastructure that has
problems with this, I've never heard of DKIM/DMARC users having issues
outside of dealing with mailman. The vast majority of email users who never
post to technical mailing lists benefit from it significantly.

Really everyone should use them. Adding cryptographic integrity to email is
hardly a crazy idea :)


 It seems that Sourceforge silently drops DKIM enforced mail like jgarzik's.


It's not SourceForge, it's your spam filter. His mail gets through to me
but it's all in the spam folder.
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Chun Wang
On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 10:00 PM, Adrian Macneil adr...@coinbase.com wrote:
 However, we do rely pretty heavily on zeroconf transactions for merchant
 processing, so if any significant portion of the mining pools started
 running your unsafe RBF patch, then we would probably need to look into this
 as a way to prevent fraud.

This might be useful to you: https://www.f2pool.com/api/mempool

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread justusranvier
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

On 2015-06-19 15:11, Peter Todd wrote:
 If you ask me to pay you 1BTC at address A and I create tx1 that pays
 1BTC to A1 and 2BTC of chain to C, what's wrong with me creating tx2
 that still pays 1BTC to A, but now only pays 1.999BTC to C? I'm not
 defrauding you, I'm just reducing the value of my change address to pay
 a higher fee. Similarly if I now need to pay Bob 0.5BTC, I can create
 tx3 paying 1BTC to A, 0.5BTC to B, and 1.498BTC to C.
 
 Yet from the point of view of an external observer they have no idea 
 why
 the transaction outputs reduced in size, nor any way of knowing if 
 fraud
 did or did not occur.

If there are two transactions which spend the same inputs, and each 
transaction has completely different output scripts, then this is prima 
facie fraudulent. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prima_facie

If the two transactions have identical output scripts, and one output is 
reduced in value to increase the transaction fee, that has the 
appearance of honest dealing. There is a possibility that the payer has 
chose to under-pay their payee in order to over-pay the miner, but 
that's not what a reasonable observer would assume at first glance.

Adding outputs to a transaction, while keeping all the existing outputs 
exactly how they are is another way of increasing the transaction fee of 
a transaction and is prima facie non-fraudulent.

Note that child-pays-for-parent has none of this ambiguity.

 What do you think of Bitcoin XT then? It relays double-spends, which
 makes it much easier to get double-spends to miners than before. In
 particular you see a lot of zero-fee transactions being replaced by
 fee-paying transactions, relayed through Bitcoin XT nodes and then
 mined. Is that encouraging fraud?

I haven't closely looked into the features of Bitcoin XT because I'm 
hoping that it never becomes relevant. I do want to see a heterogenous 
implementation network develop, but Bitcoin XT doesn't really count 
since it's a derivative of the Bitcoin Core codebase.

In general, I think every signed Bitcoin transaction sent between 
different parties is part of a valid, enforceable contract (using common 
law definitions which predate any particular legal jurisdiction). 
Handling contracts and money is Serious Business and so the decision of 
how software should respond to double spends should not be made 
frivolously.

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Jeff Garzik
Yes, FSS RBF is far better.


On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 6:52 AM, Chun Wang 1240...@gmail.com wrote:

 Before F2Pool's launch, I performed probably the only successful
 bitcoin double spend in the March 2013 fork without any mining power.
 [ https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=152348.0 ] I know how bad
 the full RBF is. We are going to switch to FSS RBF in a few hours.
 Sorry.

 On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 9:44 PM, Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org wrote:
  On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 09:33:05AM -0400, Stephen Morse wrote:
  It is disappointing that F2Pool would enable full RBF when the safe
  alternative, first-seen-safe RBF, is also available, especially since
 the
  fees they would gain by supporting full RBF over FSS RBF would likely be
  negligible. Did they consider using FSS RBF instead?
 
  Specifically the following is what I told them:
 
  We are
  interested in the replace-by-fee patch, but I am not following the
  development closely, more background info is needed, like what the
  difference between standard and zeroconf versions? Thanks.
 
  Great!
 
  Basically both let you replace one transaction with another that pays a
  higher fee. First-seen-safe replace-by-fee adds the additional criteria
  that all outputs of the old transaction still need to be paid by the new
  transaction, with = as many Bitcoins. Basically, it makes sure that if
  someone was paid by tx1, then tx2 will still pay them.
 
  I've written about how wallets can use RBF and FSS-RBF to more
  efficiently use the blockchain on the bitcoin-development mailing list:
 
 
 http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg07813.html
 
 http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg07829.html
 
  Basically, for the purpose of increasing fees, RBF is something like %50
  cheaper than CPFP, and FSS-RBF is something like %25 cheaper.
 
  In addition, for ease of implementation, my new FSS-RBF has a number of
  other restrictions. For instance, you can't replace multiple
  transactions with one, you can't replace a transaction whose outputs
  have already been spent, you can't replace a transaction with one that
  spends additional unconfirmed inputs, etc. These restrictions aren't
  set in stone, but they do make the code simpler and less likely to
  have bugs.
 
  In comparison my previous standard RBF patch can replace multiple
  transactions with one, can replace long chains of transactions, etc.
  It's willing to do more computation before deciding if a transaction
  should be replaced, with more complex logic; it probably has a higher
  chance of having a bug or DoS attack.
 
  You've probably seen the huge controversy around zeroconf with regard to
  standard replace-by-fee. While FSS RBF doesn't make zeroconf any safer,
  it also doesn't make it any more dangerous, so politically with regard
  to zeroconf it makes no difference. You *can* still use it doublespend
  by taking advantage of how different transactions are accepted
  differently, but that's true of *every* change we've ever made to
  Bitcoin Core - by upgrading to v0.10 from v0.9 you've also broken
  zeroconf in the same way.
 
 
  Having said that... honestly, zeroconf is pretty broken already. Only
  with pretty heroic measures like connecting to a significant fraction of
  the Bitcoin network at once, as well as connecting to getblocktemplate
  supporting miners to figure out what transactions are being mined, are
  services having any hope of avoiding getting ripped off. For the average
  user their wallets do a terrible job of showing whether or not an
  unconfirmed transaction will go through. For example, Schildbach's
  Bitcoin wallet for Android has no code at all to detect double-spends
  until they get mined, and I've been able to trick it into showing
  completely invalid transactions. In fact, currently Bitcoin XT will
  relay invalid transactions that are doublepsends, and Schildbach's
  wallet displays them as valid, unconfirmed, payments. It's really no
  surprise to me that nearly no-one in the Bitcoin ecosystem accepts
  unconfirmed transactions without some kind of protection that doesn't
  rely on first-seen-safe mempool behavior. For instance, many ATM's these
  days know who their customers are due to AML requirements, so while you
  can deposit Bitcoins and get your funds instantly, the protection for
  the ATM operator is that they can go to the police if you rip them off;
  I've spoken to ATM operators who didn't do this who've lost hundreds or
  even thousands of dollars before giving up on zeroconf.
 
  My big worry with zeroconf is a service like Coinbase or Shapeshift
  coming to rely on it, and then attempting to secure it by gaining
  control of a majority of hashing power. For instance, if Coinbase had
  contracts with 80% of the Bitcoin hashing power to guarantee their
  transactions would get mined, but 20% of the hashing power didn't sign
  up, then the only way to guarantee their 

Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Eric Lombrozo
OK, a few things here:

The Bitcoin network was designed (or should be designed) with the requirement 
that it can withstand deliberate double-spend attacks that can come from 
anywhere at any time…and relaxing this assumption without adequately assessing 
the risk (i.e. I’ve never been hacked before so I can assume it’s safe) is 
extremely dangerous at best and just horrid security practice at worst. Your 
users might not thank you for not getting hacked - but they surely will not 
like it when you DO get hacked…and lack a proper recovery plan.

Furthermore, the protocol itself makes no assumptions regarding the intentions 
behind someone signing two conflicting transactions. There are many potential 
use cases where doing so could make a lot of sense. Had the protocol been 
designed along the lines of, say, tendermint…where signing multiple conflicting 
blocks results in loss of one’s funds…then the protocol itself disincentivizes 
the behavior without requiring any sort of altruistic, moralistic assumptions. 
That would also mean we’d need a different mechanism for the use cases that 
things like RBF address.

Thirdly, taken to the extreme, the viewpoint of “signing a conflicting 
transaction is fraud and vandalism” means that if for whatever reason you 
attempt to propagate a transaction and nobody mines it for a very long time, 
you’re not entitled to immediately reclaim those funds…they must remain in 
limbo forever.


- Eric Lombrozo


 On Jun 19, 2015, at 8:11 AM, Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org wrote:
 
 On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 03:00:57PM +, justusranv...@riseup.net wrote:
 On 2015-06-19 10:39, Peter Todd wrote:
 
 Yesterday F2Pool, currently the largest pool with 21% of the hashing
 power, enabled full replace-by-fee (RBF) support after discussions
 with
 me. This means that transactions that F2Pool has will be replaced if
 a
 conflicting transaction pays a higher fee. There are no requirements
 for
 the replacement transaction to pay addresses that were paid by the
 previous transaction.
 
 
 Intentional fraud is a bad thing to add to a financial protocol.
 
 A user who creates conflicting transactions, one that pays someone else
 and another which does not pay them, and broadcasts both of them, has
 just self-incriminated themselves by producing prima facie evidence of
 fraud.
 
 Depends.
 
 If you ask me to pay you 1BTC at address A and I create tx1 that pays
 1BTC to A1 and 2BTC of chain to C, what's wrong with me creating tx2
 that still pays 1BTC to A, but now only pays 1.999BTC to C? I'm not
 defrauding you, I'm just reducing the value of my change address to pay
 a higher fee. Similarly if I now need to pay Bob 0.5BTC, I can create
 tx3 paying 1BTC to A, 0.5BTC to B, and 1.498BTC to C.
 
 Yet from the point of view of an external observer they have no idea why
 the transaction outputs reduced in size, nor any way of knowing if fraud
 did or did not occur.
 
 Equally, maybe you tell me Actually, just give me 0.5BTC to cancel out
 that debt, in which case I'm not breaking any contract at all by giving
 you less money than I first promised - the contract has changed.
 
 Again, none of this can or should be observable to anyone other than the
 parties directly involved.
 
 It may be the case that since Bitcoin spans multiple legal jurisdictions
 and can be use anonymously that the victims of such fraud can not rely
 on legal recourse, and it may also be the case that proof of work is how
 Bitcoin deals with the aforementioned factors, but regardless
 un-prosecutable fraud is still fraud and anyone who encourages it should
 be recognied as a bad actors.
 
 Committing vandalism and encouraging fraud to prove a point may be
 something the network can't stop on a technical level, but there's no
 reason not to call it out for what it is.
 
 What do you think of Bitcoin XT then? It relays double-spends, which
 makes it much easier to get double-spends to miners than before. In
 particular you see a lot of zero-fee transactions being replaced by
 fee-paying transactions, relayed through Bitcoin XT nodes and then
 mined. Is that encouraging fraud?
 
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Peter Todd
On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 03:00:57PM +, justusranv...@riseup.net wrote:
 On 2015-06-19 10:39, Peter Todd wrote:
 
  Yesterday F2Pool, currently the largest pool with 21% of the hashing
  power, enabled full replace-by-fee (RBF) support after discussions 
 with
  me. This means that transactions that F2Pool has will be replaced if 
 a
  conflicting transaction pays a higher fee. There are no requirements 
 for
  the replacement transaction to pay addresses that were paid by the
  previous transaction.
 
 
 Intentional fraud is a bad thing to add to a financial protocol.
 
 A user who creates conflicting transactions, one that pays someone else 
 and another which does not pay them, and broadcasts both of them, has 
 just self-incriminated themselves by producing prima facie evidence of 
 fraud.

Depends.

If you ask me to pay you 1BTC at address A and I create tx1 that pays
1BTC to A1 and 2BTC of chain to C, what's wrong with me creating tx2
that still pays 1BTC to A, but now only pays 1.999BTC to C? I'm not
defrauding you, I'm just reducing the value of my change address to pay
a higher fee. Similarly if I now need to pay Bob 0.5BTC, I can create
tx3 paying 1BTC to A, 0.5BTC to B, and 1.498BTC to C.

Yet from the point of view of an external observer they have no idea why
the transaction outputs reduced in size, nor any way of knowing if fraud
did or did not occur.

Equally, maybe you tell me Actually, just give me 0.5BTC to cancel out
that debt, in which case I'm not breaking any contract at all by giving
you less money than I first promised - the contract has changed.

Again, none of this can or should be observable to anyone other than the
parties directly involved.

 It may be the case that since Bitcoin spans multiple legal jurisdictions 
 and can be use anonymously that the victims of such fraud can not rely 
 on legal recourse, and it may also be the case that proof of work is how 
 Bitcoin deals with the aforementioned factors, but regardless 
 un-prosecutable fraud is still fraud and anyone who encourages it should 
 be recognied as a bad actors.
 
 Committing vandalism and encouraging fraud to prove a point may be 
 something the network can't stop on a technical level, but there's no 
 reason not to call it out for what it is.

What do you think of Bitcoin XT then? It relays double-spends, which
makes it much easier to get double-spends to miners than before. In
particular you see a lot of zero-fee transactions being replaced by
fee-paying transactions, relayed through Bitcoin XT nodes and then
mined. Is that encouraging fraud?

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Adrian Macneil

 Unless you're sybil attacking the network and miners, consuming valuable
 resources and creating systemic risks of failure like we saw with
 Chainalysis, I don't see how you're getting very small double-spend
 probabilities.


So connecting to many nodes just because we can and it's not technically
prevented is bad for the network and creating systemic risks of failure,
but relaying harmful double spend transactions just because you can and
it's not technically prevented, is good for everyone?


 You know, you're creating an interesting bit of game theory here: if I'm
 a miner who doesn't already have a mining contract, why not implement
 full-RBF to force Coinbase to offer me one? One reason might be because
 other miners with such a contract - a majority - are going to be asked
 by Coinbase to reorg you out of the blockchain, but then we have a
 situation where a single entity has control of the blockchain.


If someone did enter into contracts with miners to mine certain
transactions, and had a guarantee that the miners would not build on
previous blocks which included double spends, then they would only need
contracts with 51% of the network anyway. So it wouldn't really matter if
you were a small time miner and wanted to run full-RBF.


 For the good of Bitcoin, and your own company, you'd do well to firmly
 state that under no condition will Coinbase ever enter into mining
 contracts.


I don't personally see what good this does for bitcoin. Now you are
suggesting that we should prevent a 51% attack by using policy and
promises, rather than a technical solution. How is this any better than us
relying on existing double spend rules which are based on policy and
promises?
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Jeff Garzik
On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 6:44 AM, Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org wrote:

 Having said that... honestly, zeroconf is pretty broken already. Only
 with pretty heroic measures like connecting to a significant fraction of
 the Bitcoin network at once, as well as connecting to getblocktemplate
 supporting miners to figure out what transactions are being mined, are
 services having any hope of avoiding getting ripped off. For the average
 user their wallets do a terrible job of showing whether or not an


This is no excuse for further degrading the overall network security.

There are many issues to address in the bitcoin ecosystem.  It negatively
impacts users to roll out scorched earth replace-by-fee given today's
ecosystem.

Yes, zero conf security is poor.  An outright attack on zero conf degrades
user security even more.

-- 
Jeff Garzik
Bitcoin core developer and open source evangelist
BitPay, Inc.  https://bitpay.com/
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread justusranvier
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

On 2015-06-19 10:39, Peter Todd wrote:

 Yesterday F2Pool, currently the largest pool with 21% of the hashing
 power, enabled full replace-by-fee (RBF) support after discussions 
with
 me. This means that transactions that F2Pool has will be replaced if 
a
 conflicting transaction pays a higher fee. There are no requirements 
for
 the replacement transaction to pay addresses that were paid by the
 previous transaction.


Intentional fraud is a bad thing to add to a financial protocol.

A user who creates conflicting transactions, one that pays someone else 
and another which does not pay them, and broadcasts both of them, has 
just self-incriminated themselves by producing prima facie evidence of 
fraud.

It may be the case that since Bitcoin spans multiple legal jurisdictions 
and can be use anonymously that the victims of such fraud can not rely 
on legal recourse, and it may also be the case that proof of work is how 
Bitcoin deals with the aforementioned factors, but regardless 
un-prosecutable fraud is still fraud and anyone who encourages it should 
be recognied as a bad actors.

Committing vandalism and encouraging fraud to prove a point may be 
something the network can't stop on a technical level, but there's no 
reason not to call it out for what it is.

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Peter Todd
On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 07:30:17AM -0700, Adrian Macneil wrote:
  In that case would you enter into such contracts?
 
 
 We take it as it comes.
 
 Currently, it's perfectly possible to accept zeroconf transactions with
 only a very small chance of double spend. As long as it's only possible to
 double spend a small fraction of the time, it's an acceptable cost to us in
 exchange for being able to provide a fast checkout experience to customers
 and merchants.

Unless you're sybil attacking the network and miners, consuming valuable
resources and creating systemic risks of failure like we saw with
Chainalysis, I don't see how you're getting very small double-spend
probabilities.

You realise how the fact that F2Pool is using full-RBF right now does
strongly suggest that the chances of a double-spend are not only low,
but more importantly, vary greatly? Any small change in relaying policy
or even network conditions creates opportunities to double-spend.

 If the status quo changes, then we will need to investigate alternatives
 (which realistically would include mining contracts, or only accepting
 instant payments from other trusted hosted wallets, which would be a net
 loss for decentralization).

You know, you're creating an interesting bit of game theory here: if I'm
a miner who doesn't already have a mining contract, why not implement
full-RBF to force Coinbase to offer me one? One reason might be because
other miners with such a contract - a majority - are going to be asked
by Coinbase to reorg you out of the blockchain, but then we have a
situation where a single entity has control of the blockchain.

For the good of Bitcoin, and your own company, you'd do well to firmly
state that under no condition will Coinbase ever enter into mining
contracts.

-- 
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Adrian Macneil
Great. Thank you for this!

Adrian

On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 7:40 AM, Chun Wang 1240...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 10:00 PM, Adrian Macneil adr...@coinbase.com
 wrote:
  However, we do rely pretty heavily on zeroconf transactions for merchant
  processing, so if any significant portion of the mining pools started
  running your unsafe RBF patch, then we would probably need to look into
 this
  as a way to prevent fraud.

 This might be useful to you: https://www.f2pool.com/api/mempool


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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Jeff Garzik
This is very disappointing.  scorched earth replace-by-fee implemented
first at a pool, without updating wallets and merchants, is very
anti-social and increases the ability to perform Finney attacks and
double-spends.

The community is progressing more towards a safer replace-by-fee model, as
indicated by the following code change:
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/6176


On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 3:39 AM, Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org wrote:

 Yesterday F2Pool, currently the largest pool with 21% of the hashing
 power, enabled full replace-by-fee (RBF) support after discussions with
 me. This means that transactions that F2Pool has will be replaced if a
 conflicting transaction pays a higher fee. There are no requirements for
 the replacement transaction to pay addresses that were paid by the
 previous transaction.


 I'm a user. What does this mean for me?
 ---

 In the short term, very little. Wallet software aimed at average users
 has no ability to reliably detect conditions where an unconfirmed
 transaction may be double-spent by the sender. For example, Schildbach's
 Bitcoin Wallet for Android doesn't even detect double-spends of
 unconfirmed transactions when connected to a RBF or Bitcoin XT nodes
 that propagate them. The least sophisticated double-spend attack
 possibly - simply broadcasting two conflicting transactions at the same
 time - has about 50% probability of success against these wallets.

 Additionally, SPV wallets based on bitcoinj can't even detect invalid
 transactions reliably, instead trusting the full node(s) it is connected
 too over the unauthenticated, unencrypted, P2P protocol to do validation
 for them. For instance due to a unfixed bug¹ Bitcoin XT nodes will relay
 double-spends that spend the output of the conflicting transaction. I've
 personally tested this with Schildbach's Bitcoin Wallet for Android,
 which shows such invalid transactions as standard, unconfirmed,
 transactions.

 Users should continue to assume that unconfirmed transactions could be
 trivially reversed by the sender until the first confirmation. In
 general, only the sender can reverse a transaction, so if you do trust
 the sender feel free to assume an unconfirmed transaction will
 eventually confirm. However, if you do not trust the sender and/or have
 no other recourse if they double-spend you, wait until at least the
 first confirmation before assuming the transaction will go through.

 In the long term, miner support of full RBF has a number of advantages
 to users, allowing you to more efficiently make transactions, paying
 lower fees. However you'll need a wallet supporting these features; none
 exist yet.


 I'm a business. What does this mean for me?
 ---

 If you use your own node to verify transactions, you probably are in a
 similar situation as average users, so again, this means very little to
 you.

 If you use a payment processor/transaction API such as BitPay, Coinbase,
 BlockCypher, etc. you may or may not be accepting unconfirmed
 transactions, and they may or may not be guaranteed by your payment
 processor even if double-spent. If like most merchants you're using the
 API such that confirmations are required prior to accepting orders (e.g.
 taking a meaningful loss such as shipping a product if the tx is
 reversed) nothing changes for you. If not I recommend you contact your
 payment processor.


 I'm a miner. Why should I support replace-by-fee?
 -

 Whether full or first-seen-safe⁵ RBF support (along with
 child-pays-for-parent) is an important step towards a fully functioning
 transaction fee market that doesn't lead to users' transactions getting
 mysteriously stuck, particularly during network flooding
 events/attacks. A better functioning fee market will help reduce
 pressure to increase the blocksize, particularly from the users creating
 the most valuable transactions.

 Full RBF also helps make use of the limited blockchain space more
 efficiently, with up to 90%+ transaction size savings possible in some
 transaction patterns. (e.g. long payment chains⁶) More users in less
 blockchain space will lead to higher overall fees per block.

 Finally as we'll discuss below full RBF prevents a number of serious
 threats to the existing level playing field that miners operate in.


 Why can't we make accepting unconfirmed txs from untrusted people safe?
 ---

 For a decentralized wallet, the situation is pretty bleak. These wallets
 only have a handful of connections to the network, with no way of
 knowing if those connections give an accurate view of what transactions
 miners actually know about.

 The only serious attempt to fix this problem for decentralized wallets
 that has been actually deployed is Andresen/Harding's double-spend
 relaying, implemented in Bitcoin XT. It relays up 

Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Adrian Macneil

  We have no contracts in place or plans to do this that I am aware of.
 
  However, we do rely pretty heavily on zeroconf transactions for merchant
  processing, so if any significant portion of the mining pools started
  running your unsafe RBF patch, then we would probably need to look into
  this as a way to prevent fraud.

 What happens if the mining pools who are mining double-spends aren't
 doing it delibrately? Sybil attacking pools appears to have been done
 before to get double-spends though, equally there are many other changes
 the reduce the reliability of transaction confirmations. For instance
 the higher demands on bandwidth of a higher blocksize will inevitably
 reduce the syncronicity of mempools, resulting in double-spend
 opportunities. Similarly many proposals to limit mempool size allow
 zeroconf double-spends.

 In that case would you enter into such contracts?


We take it as it comes.

Currently, it's perfectly possible to accept zeroconf transactions with
only a very small chance of double spend. As long as it's only possible to
double spend a small fraction of the time, it's an acceptable cost to us in
exchange for being able to provide a fast checkout experience to customers
and merchants.

If the status quo changes, then we will need to investigate alternatives
(which realistically would include mining contracts, or only accepting
instant payments from other trusted hosted wallets, which would be a net
loss for decentralization).

Long term we would prefer to see an open, decentralized solution, such as
payment channels / green addresses / lightening networks. However, I think
as a community we are a long way away from choosing a standard here and
implementing it across all popular wallet software and merchant processors.

Adrian
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Peter Todd
On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 09:44:08AM -0400, Peter Todd wrote:
 On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 09:33:05AM -0400, Stephen Morse wrote:
  It is disappointing that F2Pool would enable full RBF when the safe
  alternative, first-seen-safe RBF, is also available, especially since the
  fees they would gain by supporting full RBF over FSS RBF would likely be
  negligible. Did they consider using FSS RBF instead?
 
 Specifically the following is what I told them:

Incidentally, because someone asked that message was sent two weeks ago.


Also, a shout-out to Marshal Long of FinalHash for his help with
(FSS)-RBF deployment and for getting F2Pool and myself in touch, as well
as his work in talking getting pools on board with BIP66.

-- 
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread justusranvier
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

On 2015-06-19 16:36, Matt Whitlock wrote:
 On Friday, 19 June 2015, at 3:53 pm, justusranv...@riseup.net wrote:
 I'd also like to note that prima facie doesn't mean always, it 
 means
 that the default assumption, unless proven otherwise.
 
 Why would you automatically assume fraud by default? Shouldn't the
 null hypothesis be the default? Without any information one way or
 another, you ought to make *no assumption* about the fraudulence or
 non-fraudulence of any given double-spend.

If we have ECDSA proof that an entity intentionally made and publicly 
announced incompatible promises regarding the disposition of particular 
Bitcoins under their control, then why shouldn't that be assumed to be a 
fraud attempt unless shown otherwise?

There are ways of achiving transaction fee adjustment after broadcast 
that do not present the appearance of, or opportunity for, fraud. If 
those options are available and the user chooses not to use them in 
favor of the option that does, that makes bad intentions even more 
probable.

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Milly Bitcoin
prima facie generally means that in a court case the burden of proof 
shifts from one party to another. For instance, if you have a federal 
trademark registration that is prima fascia evidence of those rights 
even though they could still be challenged.  To say a prosecutor would 
have prima fascia evidence of a crime because double spend was detected 
is quite a stretch.



On 6/19/2015 12:36 PM, Matt Whitlock wrote:
 On Friday, 19 June 2015, at 3:53 pm, justusranv...@riseup.net wrote:
 I'd also like to note that prima facie doesn't mean always, it means
 that the default assumption, unless proven otherwise.
 Why would you automatically assume fraud by default? Shouldn't the null 
 hypothesis be the default? Without any information one way or another, you 
 ought to make *no assumption* about the fraudulence or non-fraudulence of any 
 given double-spend.

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Matt Whitlock
On Friday, 19 June 2015, at 3:53 pm, justusranv...@riseup.net wrote:
 I'd also like to note that prima facie doesn't mean always, it means
 that the default assumption, unless proven otherwise.

Why would you automatically assume fraud by default? Shouldn't the null 
hypothesis be the default? Without any information one way or another, you 
ought to make *no assumption* about the fraudulence or non-fraudulence of any 
given double-spend.

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread justusranvier
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

On 2015-06-19 16:42, Eric Lombrozo wrote:
 If we want a non-repudiation mechanism in the protocol, we should
 explicitly define one rather than relying on “prima facie”
 assumptions. Otherwise, I would recommend not relying on the existence
 of a signed transaction as proof of intent to pay…

Again, I'm not talking about any changes to the protocol. The mining 
mechanism in the Bitcoin protocol is the fallback method of resolving 
fraud that isn't prevented or resolved via other mechanisms.

There are plenty of other ways economic actors resolve their 
disagreements other than blockchain adjudication. Sometimes when both 
parties are identified and reside in the same legal jurisdiction, 
contract violations and fraud can be adjudicated in courts. In some 
situations, the parties involved may have access to private dispute 
resolution techniques.

Sometimes the stakeholders in the network act to preserve the long term 
value of their investments, even if it means passing short-term profits. 
The more of those stakeholders there are in Bitcoin, the more effective 
it is to make the case for choices that are long-term beneficial.

The degree to which anyone should rely on a signed transaction as 
assurance of future payment is not a question with a universal answer. 
It depends on the particular details of the situation, and the parties 
involved, and their own risk tolerances and time preferences. There's no 
right answer for everyone, which is why let's break zeroconf because 
*I* don't think it's safe enough is a kind of vandalism.
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread justusranvier
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

On 2015-06-19 15:37, Eric Lombrozo wrote:
 OK, a few things here:
 
 The Bitcoin network was designed (or should be designed) with the
 requirement that it can withstand deliberate double-spend attacks that
 can come from anywhere at any time…and relaxing this assumption
 without adequately assessing the risk (i.e. I’ve never been hacked
 before so I can assume it’s safe) is extremely dangerous at best and
 just horrid security practice at worst. Your users might not thank you
 for not getting hacked - but they surely will not like it when you DO
 get hacked…and lack a proper recovery plan.
 
 Furthermore, the protocol itself makes no assumptions regarding the
 intentions behind someone signing two conflicting transactions. There
 are many potential use cases where doing so could make a lot of sense.
 Had the protocol been designed along the lines of, say,
 tendermint…where signing multiple conflicting blocks results in loss
 of one’s funds…then the protocol itself disincentivizes the behavior
 without requiring any sort of altruistic, moralistic assumptions. That
 would also mean we’d need a different mechanism for the use cases that
 things like RBF address.
 
 Thirdly, taken to the extreme, the viewpoint of “signing a conflicting
 transaction is fraud and vandalism” means that if for whatever reason
 you attempt to propagate a transaction and nobody mines it for a very
 long time, you’re not entitled to immediately reclaim those funds…they
 must remain in limbo forever.

I'm not talking about changing the protocol - I'm talking about the 
business relationships between users of Bitcoin.

I would expect a payment processor to inform the merchants of relevant 
double spends that it observes on the network, even if the payment is 
actually successful, so that the merchant can decide for themselves 
whether or not to pursue it out of band.

Mining is a kind of technical fallback that allows the network to 
resolve human misbehavior without human intervention. If nobody ever 
attempted to make a fraudulent payment, we wouldn't need mining at all 
because the signed transaction itself is proof of intention to pay. That 
it exists doesn't suddenly make fraud less fraudulent and mean that 
users who are in a position to pursue out of band recourse shouldn't do 
so.

I agree that there are valid reasons for replacing transactions in the 
mempool, I just think they should be implemented in a way that doesn't 
facilitate fraud.

I'd also like to note that prima facie doesn't mean always, it means 
that the default assumption, unless proven otherwise.

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Peter Todd
On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 09:18:54AM -0700, Adrian Macneil wrote:
 
   So connecting to many nodes just because we can and it's not technically
   prevented is bad for the network and creating systemic risks of failure,
 
  Well it is actually; that's why myself, Wladimir van der Laan, and
  Gregory Maxwell all specifically¹ called Chainalysis's actions a sybil
  attack.
 
  The Bitcoin P2P network is resilliant to failure when the chance of any
  one node going down is uncorrelated with others. For instance if you
  accidentally introduced a bug in your nodes that failed to relay
  transactions/blocks properly, you'd simultaneously be disrupting a large
  portion of the network all at once.
 
 
 This is exactly what your RBF patch is doing. By your own logic, nodes on
 the network should be allowed to relay (or not relay) whatever they wish.

Ah, seems you misunderstand the problem.

By properly we're concerned that things do get relayed, not that they do
not. In particularl with blocks a fairly to relay valid blocks will
quickly lead to a loss of consensus.

  How many nodes is Coinbase connecting too? What software are they
  running? What subnets are they using? In particular, are they all on one
  subnet or multiple?
 
 
 We're running about a dozen nodes running regular Bitcoin Core in various
 subnets. We aren't doing anything particularly out of the ordinary here.
 Nothing that would fall under your definition of a sybil attack or harmful
 to the network.

Right, so those dozen nodes, how many outgoing connections are they
making?

  But of course, you'd never 51% the network right? After all it's not
  possible to guarantee that your miner won't mine double-spends, as there
  is no single consensus definition of which transaction came first, nor
  can there be.
 
  Or do you see things differently? If I'm a small miner should I be
  worried my blocks might be rejected by the majority with hashing power
  contracts because I'm unable to predict which transactions Coinbase
  believes should go in the blockchain?
 
 
 You seem so concerned that we are actively trying to harm or control the
 network. We're simply trying to drive bitcoin adoption by making it easy
 for people to spend their bitcoin with merchants online. The problems we
 face are no different from other merchant processors, or small independent
 merchants accepting online or point-of-sale payments.

 We've historically had relatively little interest in what miners were doing
 (until RBF came out) - for the most part it didn't affect our business.
 However, most large merchants would be simply uninterested in accepting
 bitcoin if we forced their customers to wait 10-60 minutes for their
 payments to confirm. Many have inventory management systems which can not
 even place items on hold that long.

While your goals may be reasonable, again, the question is how are you
going to achieve them? Do you accept that you may be in a position where
you can't guarantee confirmations? Again, what's your plan to deal with
this? For instance, I know Coinbase is contractually obliged to accept
zeroconf payments with at least some of your customers - how strong are
those agreements?

What we're worried about is your plan appears to include nothing
concrete beyond the possibility of getting contracts with hashing power,
maybe even just a majority of hashing power. This is something that
should concern everyone in the Bitcoin ecosystem, and it'd help if you
clearly stated what your intentions are.

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Peter Todd
On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 09:42:33AM -0700, Eric Lombrozo wrote:
 If we want a non-repudiation mechanism in the protocol, we should explicitly 
 define one rather than relying on “prima facie” assumptions. Otherwise, I 
 would recommend not relying on the existence of a signed transaction as proof 
 of intent to pay…

Indeed.

For instance, one of the ideas behind my Proofchains work is that you
could hind all details of a smartcontract-whatchamacallit protocol
behind single-use-seals in a consensus blockchain. Closing those seals,
that is spending the appropriate txouts, represents things in the
protocol which are absolutely unobservable to anyone without the data
behind those hashes, an extreme version of the above.


Incidentally, some patent prior-art exposure:

https://github.com/proofchains/python-proofchains

:)

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] improving development model (Re: Concerns Regarding Threats by a Developer to Remove Commit Access from Other Developers

2015-06-19 Thread Milly Bitcoin
 - Did you accept payment from companies to lobby for 20MB blocks? Do 
you consider that something appropriate to publicly disclose if so? Do 
you consider that user rights should come above or below company 
interests in Bitcoin? FWIW on pondering that last question should user 
rights come above or below company interests I think my view of the 
guiding principle is starkly clear to me: that user rights should be the 
primary thing to optimise for. Businesses are providing service to 
users, their interests are secondary in so far as if they are enabled to 
provide better service thats good. Bitcoin is a user p2p currency, with 
a social contract and a strong user ethos. Importing and forcing company 
interests would likely be the start of a slippery slope towards an end 
to Bitcoin.

I always thought is was the exact opposite.  I thought it was expected 
that the only incentive for developers (other than increasing the value 
of coins they hold) is to lobby for changes that will benefit the 
companies that fund them.  That is the only way you are going to get 
more full time developers on board.  It focuses their efforts on  
products and services people want rather than some sort philosophical 
agenda that may be unrealistic.  The notion that large numbers of 
volunteers will do all this work at little or no pay to improve user 
experience is not a realistic long term plan.  I also think it is 
incorrect to assume some kind of social contract and strong user 
ethos.  While many early users are like that I think most potential 
users of Bitcoin don't think that way.

Russ




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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Adrian Macneil

  So connecting to many nodes just because we can and it's not technically
  prevented is bad for the network and creating systemic risks of failure,

 Well it is actually; that's why myself, Wladimir van der Laan, and
 Gregory Maxwell all specifically¹ called Chainalysis's actions a sybil
 attack.

 The Bitcoin P2P network is resilliant to failure when the chance of any
 one node going down is uncorrelated with others. For instance if you
 accidentally introduced a bug in your nodes that failed to relay
 transactions/blocks properly, you'd simultaneously be disrupting a large
 portion of the network all at once.


This is exactly what your RBF patch is doing. By your own logic, nodes on
the network should be allowed to relay (or not relay) whatever they wish.


 How many nodes is Coinbase connecting too? What software are they
 running? What subnets are they using? In particular, are they all on one
 subnet or multiple?


We're running about a dozen nodes running regular Bitcoin Core in various
subnets. We aren't doing anything particularly out of the ordinary here.
Nothing that would fall under your definition of a sybil attack or harmful
to the network.

  You know, you're creating an interesting bit of game theory here: if I'm
   a miner who doesn't already have a mining contract, why not implement
   full-RBF to force Coinbase to offer me one? One reason might be because
   other miners with such a contract - a majority - are going to be asked
   by Coinbase to reorg you out of the blockchain, but then we have a
   situation where a single entity has control of the blockchain.
  
 
  If someone did enter into contracts with miners to mine certain
  transactions, and had a guarantee that the miners would not build on
  previous blocks which included double spends, then they would only need
  contracts with 51% of the network anyway. So it wouldn't really matter if
  you were a small time miner and wanted to run full-RBF.

 But of course, you'd never 51% the network right? After all it's not
 possible to guarantee that your miner won't mine double-spends, as there
 is no single consensus definition of which transaction came first, nor
 can there be.

 Or do you see things differently? If I'm a small miner should I be
 worried my blocks might be rejected by the majority with hashing power
 contracts because I'm unable to predict which transactions Coinbase
 believes should go in the blockchain?


You seem so concerned that we are actively trying to harm or control the
network. We're simply trying to drive bitcoin adoption by making it easy
for people to spend their bitcoin with merchants online. The problems we
face are no different from other merchant processors, or small independent
merchants accepting online or point-of-sale payments.

We've historically had relatively little interest in what miners were doing
(until RBF came out) - for the most part it didn't affect our business.
However, most large merchants would be simply uninterested in accepting
bitcoin if we forced their customers to wait 10-60 minutes for their
payments to confirm. Many have inventory management systems which can not
even place items on hold that long.

If full-RBF sees any significant adoption by miners, then it will actively
harm bitcoin adoption by reducing or removing the ability for online or POS
merchants to accept bitcoin payments at all. I do not see a single benefit
to running full-RBF.

FWIW, I'm fine with the first-seen-safe RBF, that seems like a sensible
addition and a good way to allow fees to be added or increased on existing
transactions, without harming existing applications of bitcoin.

Adrian
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Eric Lombrozo
If we want a non-repudiation mechanism in the protocol, we should explicitly 
define one rather than relying on “prima facie” assumptions. Otherwise, I would 
recommend not relying on the existence of a signed transaction as proof of 
intent to pay…


 On Jun 19, 2015, at 9:36 AM, Matt Whitlock b...@mattwhitlock.name wrote:
 
 On Friday, 19 June 2015, at 3:53 pm, justusranv...@riseup.net wrote:
 I'd also like to note that prima facie doesn't mean always, it means
 that the default assumption, unless proven otherwise.
 
 Why would you automatically assume fraud by default? Shouldn't the null 
 hypothesis be the default? Without any information one way or another, you 
 ought to make *no assumption* about the fraudulence or non-fraudulence of any 
 given double-spend.



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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Matt Whitlock
Even if you could prove intent to pay, this would be almost useless. I can 
sincerely intend to do a lot of things, but this doesn't mean I'll ever 
actually do them.

I am in favor of more zero-confirmation transactions being reversed / 
double-spent. Bitcoin users largely still believe that accepting zero-conf 
transactions is safe, and evidently it's going to take some harsh lessons in 
reality to correct this belief.


On Friday, 19 June 2015, at 9:42 am, Eric Lombrozo wrote:
 If we want a non-repudiation mechanism in the protocol, we should explicitly 
 define one rather than relying on “prima facie” assumptions. Otherwise, I 
 would recommend not relying on the existence of a signed transaction as proof 
 of intent to pay…
 
 
  On Jun 19, 2015, at 9:36 AM, Matt Whitlock b...@mattwhitlock.name wrote:
  
  On Friday, 19 June 2015, at 3:53 pm, justusranv...@riseup.net wrote:
  I'd also like to note that prima facie doesn't mean always, it means
  that the default assumption, unless proven otherwise.
  
  Why would you automatically assume fraud by default? Shouldn't the null 
  hypothesis be the default? Without any information one way or another, you 
  ought to make *no assumption* about the fraudulence or non-fraudulence of 
  any given double-spend.
 

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Tier Nolan
On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 5:42 PM, Eric Lombrozo elombr...@gmail.com wrote:

 If we want a non-repudiation mechanism in the protocol, we should
 explicitly define one rather than relying on “prima facie” assumptions.
 Otherwise, I would recommend not relying on the existence of a signed
 transaction as proof of intent to pay…


Outputs could be marked as locked.  If you are performing a zero
confirmation spend, then the recipient could insist that you flag the
output for them as non-reducible.

This reduces privacy since it would be obvious which output was change.  If
both are locked, then the fee can't be increased.

This would be information that miners could ignore though.

Creating the right incentives is hard though.  Blocks could be
discouraged if they have a double spend that is known about for a while
which reduces payment for a locked output.
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[Bitcoin-development] Remove Us Please

2015-06-19 Thread Gigas Gaming Inc.
This is no longer a mailing list, this is a chatroom.
Please remove this email from your list, you are now interfering with 
official company business.

Thanks

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread justusranvier
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

On 2015-06-19 17:50, Jeff Garzik wrote:
 No.  You cannot know which is the 'right' or wrong transaction.  One tx 
 has
 obvious nSequence adjustments, the other - the refund transaction - may 
 not.

I'm still not seeing a case where a node could see conflicting 
transactions on the network as part of a micropayment channel, and not 
know it was observing the resolution of a channel rather than a likely 
retail double spend.

If both transactions have been broadcast, then one of the conflicting 
members of the set will have nSequence adjustments.

Maybe a clever griefer could try to make their retail double spend look 
like a micropayment channel, but it seems like they'd be missing the 
other identifiable markers of that protocol.

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Jeff Garzik
On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 9:44 AM, justusranv...@riseup.net wrote:

 If we have ECDSA proof that an entity intentionally made and publicly
 announced incompatible promises regarding the disposition of particular
 Bitcoins under their control, then why shouldn't that be assumed to be a
 fraud attempt unless shown otherwise?


Making multiple incompatible versions of a spend is a -requirement- of
various refund contract protocols.

-- 
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Bitcoin core developer and open source evangelist
BitPay, Inc.  https://bitpay.com/
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee

2015-06-19 Thread Jeff Garzik
On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 10:48 AM, justusranv...@riseup.net wrote:

 On 2015-06-19 17:40, Jeff Garzik wrote:

 Making multiple incompatible versions of a spend is a -requirement- of
 various refund contract protocols.


 Is there not a dedicated field in a transaction (nSequence) for express
 purpose of indicating when a protocol like this is in use?


No.  You cannot know which is the 'right' or wrong transaction.  One tx has
obvious nSequence adjustments, the other - the refund transaction - may not.

-- 
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Bitcoin core developer and open source evangelist
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Remove Us Please

2015-06-19 Thread John Bodeen
from their website, humorous bits highlighted


 *October 14, 2014 *In latest Hiatus new, the company has taken on yet
 another crazy project but this one is going to benefit the world in which
 it entered not long ago.  The company had done a lot of research on crypto
 currencies, built one for itself, for testing purposes (GigasCorpCoin) and
 found the underlaying problem of Bitcoin and was poised to solve it.
 Company execs decided it would be a good investment to launch its own coin
 and back it itself.
 The company is currently in motion and will hire an expert to do some of
 the coding by October 14, 2015.  Company President refused to be
 interviewed due to too much work that needs done for this secret and
 upcoming project.


On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 10:34 AM, Jameson Lopp jameson.l...@gmail.com
wrote:

 You are free to remove yourself; the URL is at the bottom of every email:
 https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development

 On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 12:41 PM, Gigas Gaming Inc. 
 corpor...@gigasgaming.com wrote:

 This is no longer a mailing list, this is a chatroom.
 Please remove this email from your list, you are now interfering with
 official company business.

 Thanks


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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Remove Us Please

2015-06-19 Thread Jameson Lopp
You are free to remove yourself; the URL is at the bottom of every email:
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development

On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 12:41 PM, Gigas Gaming Inc. 
corpor...@gigasgaming.com wrote:

 This is no longer a mailing list, this is a chatroom.
 Please remove this email from your list, you are now interfering with
 official company business.

 Thanks


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[Bitcoin-development] Video summarizations of blocksize issues?

2015-06-18 Thread grarpamp
On Thu, Jun 18, 2015 at 4:54 AM, odinn odinn.cyberguerri...@riseup.net wrote:
 Recently I saw the following video:
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8JmvkyQyD8wt=47m58s

For those loosely following the technical issues from outside development
circles, but who may be pressed into a voting/adoption type position (miners,
users, investors)... is there a parallel presentation of the concepts and
arguments from the other side (both, or the various, sides) that they
can refer to?
Someplace where they are collated and presented? A wiki perhaps?
Are these even valid or necessary questions?

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Concerns Regarding Threats by a Developer to Remove Commit Access from Other Developers

2015-06-18 Thread Mike Hearn

 And allegations that the project is run like wikipedia or an edit war
 are verifyably untrue.
 Check the commit history.


This was a reference to a post by Gregory on Reddit where he said if Gavin
were to do a pull request for the block size change and then merge it, he
would revert it. And I fully believe he would do so!
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Concerns Regarding Threats by a Developer to Remove Commit Access from Other Developers

2015-06-18 Thread Mike Hearn

 If you think it's not clear enough, which may explain why you did not even
 attempt to follow it for your block size increase, feel free to make
 improvements.


As the outcome of a block size BIP would be a code change to Bitcoin Core,
I cannot make improvements, only ask for them. Which is what I'm doing.

I agree that BIP 1 is not clear enough. Gavin is writing a BIP to accompany
his patch, because BIPs are best when they describe working code, and BIP 1
*is* at least clear about that. Otherwise it can turn out during
implementation that something was different to what was anticipated. I'm
sure you agree with this.

So a BIP is coming. However, BIP 1 also says this:

Vetting an idea publicly before going as far as writing a BIP is meant to
 save the potential author time


and

BIP authors are responsible for collecting community feedback on a BIP
 before submitting it for review


OK. Gavin has been vetting the idea publicly and collecting community
feedback. Note that the entire Bitcoin community is not on this list, so he
published a series of blog posts to get wider feedback, and then was
criticised for not doing it all here instead.

But anyway - so far, so good.  The procedure is being followed.

What happens once a BIP is written? The process says:

For a BIP to be accepted it must meet certain minimum criteria. It must be
 a clear and complete description of the proposed enhancement. The
 enhancement must represent a net improvement. The proposed implementation,
 if applicable, must be solid and must not complicate the protocol unduly.



  Once a BIP has been accepted, the reference implementation must be
 completed.


This is where the problem starts.

The BIP process you refer to *does not state how acceptance will happen*.
It merely sets out a few minimum requirements like making some sort of
sense, having code. It's also full of extremely vague descriptions like
must represent a net improvement. Improvement according to who? That's
left unexplained.

And then it says what happens once a BIP is accepted.

The middle bit is missing. When there is disagreement over a consensus BIP,
how are decisions made?
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Concerns Regarding Threats by a Developer to Remove Commit Access from Other Developers

2015-06-18 Thread Bryan Bishop
On Thu, Jun 18, 2015 at 5:00 AM, Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net wrote:

 Dude, calm down.


Well hold on, his concerns are real and he seems perfectly calm to me and
others apparently.


 and Gavin already said long ago he wouldn't just commit something, even
 though he has the ability to do so.


Nobody is worried about Gavin or anyone else making commits to git
repositories. You'll notice that this wasn't even mentioned in the original
email you were replying to. Instead, the email was talking about commit
access, which is a property of GitHub's repositories.

So why did I say it? Because it's consistent with what I've always said:


(That's not a good reason.)

you cannot run a codebase like Wikipedia


Wikipedia is a top-down centralized authority-based hierarchy. That's
pretty close to what you're proposing. That's what everyone else is
disagreeing with. You seem to have switched your position mid-flight...?

This is not a radical position. That's how nearly all coding projects work.
 I have been involved with open source for 15 years and the 'single
 maintainer who makes decisions' model is normal, even if in some large
 codebases  subsystems have delegated submaintainers.


There are a number of reasons why that perspective is broken; throughout
our conversations others have repeatedly reminded you (such as in -wizards)
that forking an open-source repository is not at all like a hard-fork of
the blockchain. Anyone can be glorious leader of any repository they want,
that's how open-source works. However, it's critical that bitcoin users are
never convinced to trust BDFLs or anything else that can be compromised.
Should all bitcoin users suddenly start using software with BDFLs, even
multiple implementations with separate BDFLs, then those users can be
trivially compromised through their trust in those individuals and projects.

The alternative is that every developer and every user is personally
responsible for self-validation of the rules, checking for correctness and
validity. Happy coincidence that this seems to match the strategy of
operating the bitcoin network itself, which is to run a node that sees
everything and validates all the transactions. Anyone is able to find an
error in logic or flaw in the system rules, and they should make it known
as widely as possible so that others may evaluate the evidence and consider
which solutions preserve the important properties of the system. This is
not a matter of majorities or minorities; these arguments should be true
for anyone independent of who or what they are, or what level of
unpopularity they may have.

Anything other than this is somewhat radical, and I am confused as to why
others have been talking about developer consensus. I suspect that the
reason why they have been saying developer consensus is because they are
talking about the Bitcoin Core project on GitHub at the moment. But the
topic switched to contentious hard-forks already, which is not a topic of
repositories but a topic of the blockchain and network; and in the context
of contentious hard-forks it is clear why everyone individually must
evaluate the rules and decide whether they the software is correct, or
whether changes can trivially cause catastrophic broken hard-forks. These
lines of reasoning should be true for everyone, and not merely true for one
person but not another. Users, companies and developers must be aware of
this, even though it's different from their usual expectations of how
systems operate and are maintained. And it is important to be careful to
not misconstrue this to others because it is entirely possible to
unintentionally convince others that traditional and centralized models are
safely applicable here.

I realise some people think this anti-process leads to better decision
 making. I disagree. It leads to no decision making, which is not the same
 thing at all.


Well, if you're talking about the recent disputes regarding a certain patch
to hard-fork the blockchain, a decision to not include such a patch seems
like the very definition of a decision.

Gavin and I say - there is a process, and that process is a hard fork of
 the block chain.


I doubt that other bitcoin software maintainers would agree with that sort
of toxic reasoning; contentious hard-forks are basically a weapon of war
that you can use against any other collaborator on any bitcoin project. Why
would anyone want to collaborate on such a hostile project? How would they
even trust each other?

- Bryan
http://heybryan.org/
1 512 203 0507
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Ninki Wallet view on blocksize debate

2015-06-18 Thread Stephen Morse
Ben,

How does your wallet calculate the fee that should be paid to miners? Do
they automatically adjust when transactions take a long time to be
confirmed? And how does it respond when transactions are not mined
successfully, such as when blocks are full?

I strongly urge Gavin to withdraw from this standoff and work with the
 bitcoin core devs via the existing and successful bip process.


The BIP process has not resulted in any hard forks, so this is a little
different. While I don't like MG's proposed solution of convincing miners
and services to switch to Bitcoin-XT, I recognize that it is done out of a
sense of urgency. These types of changes take a long time to roll out, and
we should start them before it is too late.

This whole debate comes down to: what is more risky, a consensus hard fork
or letting bitcoin exceed its imposed capacity limits? The former could
result in many services not being compatible and even loss of funds. The
latter could result in software failures, instability, and inability to
transact: essentially, what bitcoin is supposed to be good at. Both are
dangerous and could result in a significant loss of public confidence.

Something needs to be done, that's for sure. In the short term, I think we
need to do one of two things:

   1. All miners and wallet developers need to upgrade to support
   first-safe RBF, to allow for double spending one's own transactions when
   they lack sufficient fees to merit confirmations. Wallets also need to
   randomly request transactions from blocks to see what kind of fees are
   being paid to get confirmations, so that fees can be paid dynamically
   instead of with hard-coded values.
   2. We can implement either Gavin's or Jeff Garzik's proposal to change
   the consensus parameters around the block size limit.

So Ben, if really don't think that going with #2 is the right way to go
(even though everyone agrees that we will need to increase the block size
limit eventually anyway, why not now?), then I hope you start to work hard
on implementing #1 so that your wallet software can handle hitting capacity
limits gracefully.

Best,
Stephen
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Concerns Regarding Threats by a Developer to Remove Commit Access from Other Developers

2015-06-18 Thread Milly Bitcoin
 So I'm *not* the decider for anything that concerns the behavior of 
the global consensus, and I cannot be, as I have explained in the 
previous post.

The person who decides if a pull request is accepted is a decider and 
significantly affects the behavior of the global consensus.  The only 
option for someone who doesn't agree is to hard fork.  There is no way 
around that and you should just accept that fact and move on.

Russ


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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Concerns Regarding Threats by a Developer to Remove Commit Access from Other Developers

2015-06-18 Thread Mark Friedenbach
On Thu, Jun 18, 2015 at 6:31 AM, Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net wrote:

 The first issue is how are decisions made in Bitcoin Core? I struggle to
 explain this to others because I don't understand it myself. Is it a vote
 of people with commit access? Is it a 100% agreement of core developers
 and if so, who are these people? Is it whoever reverts the change last?
 Could I write down in a document a precise description of how decisions are
 made? No, and that's been a fairly frustrating problem for a long time.


There is a quote from United States Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart to
describe his threshold test for obscenity which is relevant here: I know
it when I see it.

It is hard certainly, and perhaps even impossible to write down a system of
rules that is used to resolve every dispute among core developers. But that
doesn't mean it isn't obvious to all the participants what is going on. If
a contentious change is proposed, and if after sufficient debate there are
still members of the technical community with reasoned, comprehensible
objections who are not merely being obstinate in the views -- a neutral
observer would agree that their concerns have not been met -- then there is
a lack of consensus.

If there was some sort of formal process however, the system wouldn't work.
Rules can be gamed, and if you add rules to a process then that process can
be gamed. Instead we all have a reasonable understanding of what technical
consensus is, and we all know it when we see it. Where we do not see it,
we do not proceed.
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Concerns Regarding Threats by a Developer to Remove Commit Access from Other Developers

2015-06-18 Thread Wladimir J. van der Laan
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512


 This kind of thing always happens as projects become larger and more
 diverse.  Something that was once a small group turns into a big
 group of diverse stakeholders.  When it gets too big for the
 informal processes then some people get upset and defensive. Happens
 all the time but it is not really a good excuse to keep doing things
 in an inefficient manner.  The old ways just don't scale and if you
 ever worked on massive projects then you know these formal processes
 work better.

So then: make a proposal for a better process, post it to this list.

In practice there has been zero interest in improving the BIP process.

E.g. the BIP process was adapted from the Python Enhancement Proposals by Amir 
Taaki (in 2009 or so?). It hasn't really changed since then, apart from some 
spelling and grammar corrections. It is not specifically adapted to Bitcoin, 
and doesn't make a distinction between for example, consensus changes and 
non-consensus changes.

So that's up to someone to do. You seem to be enthousiastic about it, so go 
ahead.

Wladimir
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Concerns Regarding Threats by a Developer to Remove Commit Access from Other Developers

2015-06-18 Thread Mike Hearn

 So then: make a proposal for a better process, post it to this list.


Alright. Here is a first cut of my proposal. It can be inserted into an
amended BIP 1 after What belongs in a successful BIP?. Let me know what
you think.



The following section applies to BIPs that affect the block chain consensus
rules or the peer to peer protocol and thus require changes to Bitcoin
Core.

Once a draft BIP has been submitted to bitcoin-development for
consideration, the Bitcoin Core maintainer will deliver a preliminary
yes/no verdict within three weeks. This verdict may be informed by the
debate that has taken part in the previous three weeks. If more time is
required, the maintainer is required to request an extension from the BIP
author, who may then elect to force an immediate decision (risking a no),
or choosing to allow more time.

The verdict will meet the following criteria:

   - It will address the latest version of the BIP at the time the verdict
   is rendered.

   - In case of a rejection, it will spell out and describe the technical
   rationale for this decision. Opinions held by other people are not
   considered technical rationales: if the maintainer agrees with a technical
   point made during discussion, he must own that opinion for himself.
   Therefore no BIP will be rejected on grounds of controversy, disagreement,
   lack of consensus or otherwise.

   - In case of rejection, the maintainer will provide a clear, specific
   list of actionable steps the BIP author can take next. For example, a list
   of what changes would address the technical objections raised. In case the
   maintainer believes no change could ever make the BIP acceptable, the list
   must consist of instructions for how to create a patch set and, in the case
   of changes to the consensus rules, how to initiate a hard fork.

A BIP, even once rejected, may live on in the BIPS repository, though its
entry in the index may be sorted below others. The BIP author may update
the BIP with a summary of any resulting discussion. As such a summary may
be inherently contentious in case of a dispute, the authors wording of that
summary is final and may not be subject to meta-debate.
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Concerns Regarding Threats by a Developer to Remove Commit Access from Other Developers

2015-06-18 Thread Milly Bitcoin
You misunderstand what I am saying.  I am not saying I have a specific 
process that should be followed, I am saying that whatever the process 
is then it should be formalized or at least written down.  That way the 
stakeholders have something to work with and keeps people on track.  
Since some people are saying they don't really know what the process is 
the first step would be to describe the current process.  I don't fully 
understand the current process but I can see it is not formalized and 
nobody can even give me a clear description of what it is.  Once you 
have it written down then changes/improvements can be proposed.

The first baby step was already done by the Foundation in developing 
that risk study.   A NIST guide for developing such a document is at 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-30-rev1/sp800_30_r1.pdf. 
No one person can come up with this and it would take buy in from 
several different people who have expertise in specific technical areas 
as well as experts in coming up with test plans.  I recently suggested 
to the people running the MIT lab that they look into developing a 
program along those lines.  Gavin also recently suggested that list of 
Bitcoin metrics be developed to help resolve the current disputes.  I 
can help develop this process if there is interest.

Russ




On 6/18/2015 11:46 AM, Wladimir J. van der Laan wrote:
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA512


 This kind of thing always happens as projects become larger and more
 diverse.  Something that was once a small group turns into a big
 group of diverse stakeholders.  When it gets too big for the
 informal processes then some people get upset and defensive. Happens
 all the time but it is not really a good excuse to keep doing things
 in an inefficient manner.  The old ways just don't scale and if you
 ever worked on massive projects then you know these formal processes
 work better.
 So then: make a proposal for a better process, post it to this list.

 In practice there has been zero interest in improving the BIP process.

 E.g. the BIP process was adapted from the Python Enhancement Proposals by 
 Amir Taaki (in 2009 or so?). It hasn't really changed since then, apart from 
 some spelling and grammar corrections. It is not specifically adapted to 
 Bitcoin, and doesn't make a distinction between for example, consensus 
 changes and non-consensus changes.

 So that's up to someone to do. You seem to be enthousiastic about it, so go 
 ahead.

 Wladimir
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 Version: GnuPG v1

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Concerns Regarding Threats by a Developer to Remove Commit Access from Other Developers

2015-06-18 Thread Jeff Garzik
On Thu, Jun 18, 2015 at 9:07 AM, justusranv...@riseup.net wrote:

 On 2015-06-18 14:53, Jeff Garzik wrote:

 Consensus changes - worded another way - change Bitcoin's Constitution -
 The Rules that everyone in the system is -forced- to follow, or be ignored
 by the system.


 Bitcoin does not and can not function as a set of rules imposed by some
 people onto other people.


This is an engineering list.  The quote precisely describes how the bitcoin
consensus system functions.

Users' choice is largely binary:  Follow the rules, or bitcoin software
ignores you.

-- 
Jeff Garzik
Bitcoin core developer and open source evangelist
BitPay, Inc.  https://bitpay.com/
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] Concerns Regarding Threats by a Developer to Remove Commit Access from Other Developers

2015-06-18 Thread Wladimir J. van der Laan
On Thu, Jun 18, 2015 at 06:05:58PM +0200, Mike Hearn wrote:

 Once a draft BIP has been submitted to bitcoin-development for
 consideration, the Bitcoin Core maintainer will deliver a preliminary
 yes/no verdict within three weeks. This verdict may be informed by the
 debate that has taken part in the previous three weeks. If more time is
 required, the maintainer is required to request an extension from the BIP
 author, who may then elect to force an immediate decision (risking a no),
 or choosing to allow more time.

Again, for the last time: Bitcoin Core maintainer does not decide about 
protocol or consensus level changes.

This is not a role for me. Find someone else, if you think you need an arbiter. 
There was an idea about a Bitcoin Standards Body once, but as far as I know 
that's not actively being worked on.

BTW: for more exposure a proposal is better posted as a new thread, not as a 
deep reply to an existing topic.

Wladimir


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