What, exactly, do we hope to achieve from having end-to-end encryption?
Even if it worked perfectly, it wouldn't be very useful.
But it won't work perfectly, because we don't have any method of
authentication. The bitcoin network is trivially MITMable. It's designed to
work even in the face of
On Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 8:14 PM, Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org wrote:
Don't let perfect be the enemy of good.
I'm not. I don't think this proposal is even good.
You realize that by your own definition even the NSA is mostly a weak
passive attacker They do *not* have the ability to attack
On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 10:39 PM, Gregory Maxwell gmaxw...@gmail.com
wrote:
Is breadwallet tamper resistant zero on tamper hardware? otherwise
this sounds like security theater I attach a debugger to the
process (or modify the program) and ignore the block sourced time.
It's an iOS
and PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512 2^16 to 2^21).
Will
On Mon, Apr 21, 2014 at 7:05 PM, William Yager will.ya...@gmail.com wrote:
The idea is that more powerful devices (mobile phones, laptops, etc.) can
do all the key-stretching on their own, whereas weaker devices with access
to another device
This spec offers a lot of benefits over BIP 0038:
* Multiple KDFs (I think the chosen list is reasonable and fits all
required use cases)
* Multiple seed lengths
* Explicit BIP 0032 support
* Creation date field
* Plausible deniability (via the multiple-password mechanism)
I don't think it makes
On Wed, Mar 12, 2014 at 2:39 PM, Pavol Rusnak st...@gk2.sk wrote:
On 03/12/2014 08:26 PM, Jean-Paul Kogelman wrote:
So upon entering a password with a typo, the user will not be notified
of an
error, but be presented with a wallet balance of 0, after the blockchain
has
been scanned. I'm
On Wed, Mar 12, 2014 at 3:04 PM, Pavol Rusnak st...@gk2.sk wrote:
On 03/12/2014 08:55 PM, William Yager wrote:
The proposed BIP uses a bloom filter, so it has both plausible
deniability *and
*typo checking. The bloom filter is optimized for two elements and will
catch something like
On Wed, Mar 12, 2014 at 3:24 PM, Pavol Rusnak st...@gk2.sk wrote:
On 03/12/2014 09:10 PM, William Yager wrote:
implement this is to allow semi-trusted devices (like desktop PCs) to do
all the heavy lifting. The way the spec is defined, it is easy to have
a
more powerful device do all
On Wed, Mar 12, 2014 at 3:42 PM, Pavol Rusnak st...@gk2.sk wrote:
On 03/12/2014 09:37 PM, William Yager wrote:
(that group of people includes me), PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512 is very easy to
implement even on devices that only have a few kB of RAM, and even though
our number of rounds is very
On Wed, Mar 12, 2014 at 4:08 PM, Jean-Paul Kogelman jeanpaulkogel...@me.com
wrote:
Agreed, this is a valid concern. This could possibly allow a 3rd party to
crack the password, but then again, they would not gain access to any key
material. So yes, you could expose your password, but your
On Mar 2, 2014, at 21:34, Kevin kevinsisco61...@gmail.com wrote:
Hello. I am a developer and I wish to contribute to bitcoin. Where is
the best place to start?
--
Kevin
Reading and learning the reference client’s source code, or doing the same for
any number of non-reference-client
Running the network part of the core as a system service might make sense for
server implementations, but it’s a pain in the rear for most users.
That said, I think segregating the two processes is a great idea. Let’s just
try to avoid some complicated scheme that involves necessarily running
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