> Seems like a good deal, what am I missing?
The disruption caused to every other user or the bitcoin network.
Transactions unconfirmed, history is rewritten, the poor Byzantine General
who sent his soldiers off to battle finds out that his scouts have been
paid to change their reports.
Neil
On
So let's play this out a little.. Let's call it "Solomon's spend[1]"
Exchange gets hacked, bitcoins move.
The exchange has a contract with an insurance company and miners for
'scorched earth' theft response that creates a double-spend of the
original transaction.
So now there's a 10,000 bitcoi
Bitcoin was/is a disruptive technology for credit card payment processors,
and replace-by-fee/stag-hunt is a disruptive technology for Bitcoin payment
processors.
I think whether you call it scorched earth is a bit more of a reflection of
whether you stand to make money, or lose money from the dis
On Sun, Feb 22, 2015 at 6:29 PM, Eric Lombrozo wrote:
> As for 0-conf security, there are instances where 0-conf transactions make a
> lot of sense - i.e. paying for utilities, ISP, web hosting, or other such
> services which could be immediately shut off upon detection of a
> double-spend.
Indee
On Sunday, February 22, 2015, Peter Todd wrote:
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>
>
> On 22 February 2015 08:41:56 GMT-05:00, Eric Lombrozo > wrote:
> >In case it wasn't clear in my earlier post, there's of course a third
> >possibility - namely, some outputs are kept but n
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Not that issue - that's both easily avoidable, and has nothing to do with the
replace-by-fee patch. I'm talking about something in the specific patch - good
test to see if you've fully reviewed it.
On 22 February 2015 14:25:24 GMT-05:00, Tom Hard
On 2/22/2015 9:12 AM, Peter Todd wrote:
> Did you notice the even more obvious way to defeat ANYONECANPAY
> scorched earth with that patch?
Let's see. I could pay 10 people 1 BTC each with one tx, then
double-spend it with fees of 2BTC. Now at least three of the 10 have to
work together if t
On Sun, Feb 22, 2015 at 08:36:01AM -0800, Tom Harding wrote:
> On 2/11/2015 10:47 PM, Peter Todd wrote:
> >My replace-by-fee patch is now available for the v0.10.0rc4 release:
> >
> > https://github.com/petertodd/bitcoin/tree/replace-by-fee-v0.10.0rc4
> >
>
> This patch immediately simplifies
On 2/11/2015 10:47 PM, Peter Todd wrote:
> My replace-by-fee patch is now available for the v0.10.0rc4 release:
>
> https://github.com/petertodd/bitcoin/tree/replace-by-fee-v0.10.0rc4
>
This patch immediately simplifies successful double-spends of
unconfirmed transactions. But the idea that
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On 22 February 2015 08:41:56 GMT-05:00, Eric Lombrozo
wrote:
>In case it wasn't clear in my earlier post, there's of course a third
>possibility - namely, some outputs are kept but not all. Here, it is
>generally impossible to tell whether the mo
In case it wasn't clear in my earlier post, there's of course a third
possibility - namely, some outputs are kept but not all. Here, it is
generally impossible to tell whether the motivation was fee replacement,
output replacement, or both. My proposal is to always treat these instances
as output r
I should note that my proposal does require a change to the consensus
rules...but getting bitcoin to scale will require this no matter what.
- Eric Lombrozo
On Feb 22, 2015 3:41 AM, "Eric Lombrozo" wrote:
> It seems to me we're confusing two completely different motivations for
> double-spending
It seems to me we're confusing two completely different motivations for
double-spending. One is the ability to replace a fee, the other is the
ability to replace outputs.
If the double-spend were to merely add or remove inputs (but keep at least
one input in common, of course), it seems fairly saf
On Sat, Feb 21, 2015 at 10:25 PM, Jorge Timón wrote:
> On Sat, Feb 21, 2015 at 11:47 PM, Jeff Garzik wrote:
>> This isn't some theoretical exercise. Like it or not many use
>> insecure 0-conf transactions for rapid payments. Deploying something
>> that makes 0-conf transactions unusable would h
On Sat, Feb 21, 2015 at 11:47 PM, Jeff Garzik wrote:
> "scorched earth" refers to the _real world_ impact such policies would
> have on present-day 0-conf usage within the bitcoin community.
When I posted this: http://sourceforge.net/p/bitcoin/mailman/message/32263765/
Peter Todd clarified that t
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On 21 February 2015 17:47:28 GMT-05:00, Jeff Garzik wrote:
>"scorched earth" refers to the _real world_ impact such policies would
>have on present-day 0-conf usage within the bitcoin community.
I think you guys are reading too much into the name
"scorched earth" refers to the _real world_ impact such policies would
have on present-day 0-conf usage within the bitcoin community.
All payment processors AFAIK process transactions through some scoring
system, then accept 0-conf transactions for payments.
This isn't some theoretical exercise.
Thank you Jorge for the contribution of the Stag Hunt terminology. It is
much better than a politically charged "scorched earth".
On Feb 21, 2015 11:10 AM, "Jorge Timón" wrote:
> I agree "scorched hearth" is a really bad name for the 0 conf protocol
> based on game theory. I would have preferred
I agree "scorched hearth" is a really bad name for the 0 conf protocol
based on game theory. I would have preferred "stag hunt" since that's
basically what it's using (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stag_hunt)
but I like the protocol and I think it would be interesting to
integrate it in the pay
On Sun, Feb 15, 2015 at 11:40:24PM +0200, Adam Gibson wrote:
>
>
> On 02/15/2015 11:25 PM, Troy Benjegerdes wrote:
> >
> > Most money/payment systems include some method to reverse or undo
> > payments made in error. In these systems, the longer settlement
> > times you mention below are a feat
On 02/15/2015 11:25 PM, Troy Benjegerdes wrote:
>
> Most money/payment systems include some method to reverse or undo
> payments made in error. In these systems, the longer settlement
> times you mention below are a feature, not a bug, and give more
> time for a human to react to errors and sys
On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 09:27:22AM +0100, Tamas Blummer wrote:
>
>
> On Feb 12, 2015, at 9:16 AM, Alex Mizrahi wrote:
> > Why don't you use getrawmempool RPC call to synchronize mempool contents?
>
>
>
> Since RPC interface does not scale to serve a multi user service.
> In absence of better
On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 10:27:53AM -0500, Jeff Garzik wrote:
> Repeating past statements, it is acknowledged that Peter's scorched
> earth replace-by-fee proposal is aptly named, and would be widely
> anti-social on the current network.
>
> At a high level, we can see that this thread is contentiou
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Arriving slightly late to the discussion, apologies.
Personally I wouldn't have written that patch, but I know development of
hostile patches happens out of sight, and if it can be written, we have
to presume it will be written eventually. I'd have p
>
> > history. Lots of miners have dropped out due to hardware obsolescence,
> yet
> > massive double spending hasn't happened.
>
> How many thousands of BTC must be stolen by miners before you'd agree
> that it has, in fact, happened?
> (https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=321630.0)
>
Hmm. I
On 2/12/2015 6:25 AM, Tamas Blummer wrote:
>
> Miner will see a mixed picture and will struggle to act “honestly” on
> a statistical measure.
The statistics come from the aggregate actions of all nodes, especially
those miners who watch p2p transactions and assemble blocks.
Any one node makes d
Probably out of my league, but I will respond here anyway.
I am in favor of replace-by-fee, but only if it were to be applied to a very
limited subset of transactions: namely, transactions that seek to supplement,
not replace, the original transaction.
In other words, a replacement transaction
You keep making moral judgements. Reality is, if you live in a world with
arsonists, you need to have a building that won't catch on fire, or has
fire extinguishers in place. Do not depend on arsonists ignoring you
forever as your security model. Penetration testing to know what
weaknesses exist
On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 07:49:29PM +, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
> One challenge is that without rather smart child-pays-for-parent logic
> the positive argument for replace by fee doesn't really work.
That's actually incorrect now, as a mechanism for implementing
scorched-earth without child-pays
On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 08:15:01PM +0100, Alan Reiner wrote:
> The Bitcoin network achieves something that we didnt' think was possible
> 10 years ago: a totally trustless, decentralized ledger. The cost? It
> takes time for the decentralized network to reach consensus that
> transactions "happe
On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 8:52 PM, Justus Ranvier
wrote:
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> On 02/12/2015 07:47 PM, Allen Piscitello wrote:
>> Nothing will stop that. Bitcoin needs to deal with those issues,
>> not stick our heads in the sand and pretend they don't exist out of
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On 02/12/2015 07:47 PM, Allen Piscitello wrote:
> Nothing will stop that. Bitcoin needs to deal with those issues,
> not stick our heads in the sand and pretend they don't exist out of
> benevolence. This isn't a pet solution, but the rules of the
>
On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 1:18 PM, Mike Hearn wrote:
> history. Lots of miners have dropped out due to hardware obsolescence, yet
> massive double spending hasn't happened.
How many thousands of BTC must be stolen by miners before you'd agree
that it has, in fact, happened?
(https://bitcointalk.org
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On 02/12/2015 07:45 PM, Peter Todd wrote:
> None of those solutions are compatible with decentralized networks
> for a lot of reasons. Given the inability to prevent sybil attacks
> your suggestions lead to people being unfairly punished for poor
> c
Nothing will stop that. Bitcoin needs to deal with those issues, not stick
our heads in the sand and pretend they don't exist out of benevolence.
This isn't a pet solution, but the rules of the protocol and what is
realistically possible given the nature of distributed consensus. Relying
on altru
On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 07:34:22PM +, Justus Ranvier wrote:
> In addition, I'll add that there is an assumption that honest actors
> can not alter their behavior in response to changing conditions.
>
> Since scorched-earth solutions to problems are apparently acceptable
> now, what would stop
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On 02/12/2015 07:15 PM, Alan Reiner wrote:
> I'll add fuel to the fire here, and express that I believe that
> replace-by-fee is good in the long-term. Peter is not breaking
> the zero-conf, it was already broken, and not admitting it creates
> a f
I'll add fuel to the fire here, and express that I believe that
replace-by-fee is good in the long-term. Peter is not breaking the
zero-conf, it was already broken, and not admitting it creates a false
sense of security. I don't want to see systems that are built on the
assumption that zero-conf
You cannot close Pandora's box. Whether or not this type of patch should
exist is irrelevant. It does, and there are incentives to use it by
miners. These are the bounds we have to deal with and the world we must
adapt to.
On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 12:11 PM, Justus Ranvier
wrote:
> -BEGIN P
On 2/11/2015 10:47 PM, Peter Todd wrote:
> ... replace-by-fee ...
Replace-by-fee creates the power to repudiate an entire tree of
payments, and hands this power individually to the owner of each input
to the top transaction. Presumably this is why the original replacement
code at least require
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On 02/12/2015 05:24 PM, Oleg Andreev wrote:
>
>> I think that is a misdirection on your part. The point of
>> replace-by-fee is to make 0-confirms reliably unreliable.
>> Currently people can "get away" with 0-confirms but it's only
>> because most
> I think that is a misdirection on your part. The point of replace-by-fee is
> to make 0-confirms reliably unreliable. Currently people can "get away" with
> 0-confirms but it's only because most people arent actively double spending,
> and when they do it is for higher value targets. Double s
On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 3:15 PM, Mike Hearn wrote:
> Peter argues that this is stable and makes unconfirmed transactions safe
>> because a fraudster can buy something, walk out of the shop, and broadcast
>> a double spend with a higher fee. But then the merchant can re-spend the
>> original payme
Mike Hearn plan99.net> writes:
>
>
> I know you will ignore this as usual, but the entire replace-by-fee folly
is based on your fundamental misunderstanding of miner incentives.
I disagree, I think it is inevitable (but then of course I'm probably biased
and why wouldn't I disagree given I r
Den 12 feb 2015 16:42 skrev "Mike Hearn" :
> Remember that you aren't paying the bad pool, the bad pool is paying you.
Whichever pool benefits from the scorched earth protocol can simply pick an
address out of the transaction it perceived as starting the protocol, and
pay that.
My counterargument:
>
> I see no fundamental difference in outcome from miner collusion in
> scorched-fee (which isn't guaranteed to pay the "right" pool!) and miner
> collusion in knowingly mining a doublespend transaction.
>
Well, they're the same thing. Replace-by-fee *is* miner collusion in
knowingly mining a doub
Den 12 feb 2015 16:15 skrev "Mike Hearn" :
>
> The first is that this setup means miners can steal arbitrary payments if
they work together with the sender of the money. The model assumes this
collaboration won't happen, but it will. Because no existing wallet has a
"double spend this" button, to m
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On 02/12/2015 03:20 PM, Natanael wrote:
> Multisignature notaries need to convince people to select them.
> They want to know that even with collateral, their funds won't be
> temporarily locked up and unspendable for days at a time.
>
> What servic
Repeating past statements, it is acknowledged that Peter's scorched
earth replace-by-fee proposal is aptly named, and would be widely
anti-social on the current network.
At a high level, we can see that this thread is contentious because
this covers _what we want bitcoin to be_, and that is an opi
Den 12 feb 2015 15:53 skrev "Mike Hearn" :
>>
>> > So you're just arguing that a notary is different to a miner, without
spelling out exactly why.
>
> I'm afraid I still don't understand why you think notaries would build
long term businesses but miners wouldn't, in this model.
>
> I think you are
>
> So anyway, in my opinion, it is actually great that Bitcoin is still
> relatively small: we have an opportunity to analyze and improve things.
> But you seem to be hostile to people who do that (and who do not share
> your opinion), which is kinda uncool.
>
To clarify once more, I'm all for pe
>
> > So you're just arguing that a notary is different to a miner, without
> spelling out exactly why.
>
I'm afraid I still don't understand why you think notaries would build long
term businesses but miners wouldn't, in this model.
I think you are saying because notaries have identity, brand awa
> Your "scorched earth" plan is aptly named, as it's guaranteed to make
> unconfirmed payments useless.
>
"Scorched earth" makes no sense by itself. However, it can be a part of a
bigger picture. Imagine an insurance service which will make sure that
merchants are compensated for every scorched-ea
Den 12 feb 2015 14:44 skrev "Mike Hearn" :
>>
>> You can prove a doublespend instantly by showing two conflicting
transactions both signed by thar party. This pair can be distributed as a
proof of malice globally in seconds via a push messaging mechanism.
>
> There have been lots of e-cash schemes
> "The approach" is how Bitcoin has always worked.
>
Mike, you're making "it worked before, and thus it will work in future"
kind of an argument.
It is an extremely shitty kind of an argument. And it can be used to
justify any kind of bullshit.
E.g. any scamcoin which haven't yet collapsed will wo
On Feb 12, 2015, at 3:16 PM, Mike Hearn wrote:
> You can not consider the outcome resulting by replace-by-fee fraudulent, as
> it could be the world as observed by some.
>
> Fraudulent in what sense?
Assume a wallet that sends double spend of the coin spent for services with
higher fees to so
>
> You can not consider the outcome resulting by replace-by-fee fraudulent,
> as it could be the world as observed by some.
>
Fraudulent in what sense?
If you mean the legal term, then you'd use the legal "beyond reasonable
doubt" test. You mined a double spend that ~everyone thinks came 5 minut
Mike,
You can not consider the outcome resulting by replace-by-fee fraudulent, as it
could be the world as observed by some.
Some other’s might have seen the replaced transaction, but that only indicates
for sure that the signer is fraudulent.
What should a node do that really cares of good re
>
> 1. They won't be attacking Bitcoin, they will attack merchants who accept
> payments with 0 confirmations.
>
Which is basically all of them other than exchanges. Any merchant that uses
BitPay or Coinbase, for instance, or any physical shop.
If you want to play word games and redefine "Bitcoin
> Yes, like any P2P network Bitcoin cannot work if a sufficiently large
> number of miners decide to attack it.
>
1. They won't be attacking Bitcoin, they will attack merchants who accept
payments with 0 confirmations. This attack has nothing to do with Bitcoin
consensus mechanism (as Bitcoin prot
>
> You can prove a doublespend instantly by showing two conflicting
> transactions both signed by thar party. This pair can be distributed as a
> proof of malice globally in seconds via a push messaging mechanism.
>
There have been lots of e-cash schemes proposed in the academic literature
that wo
> On 12 Feb 2015, at 13:49, Mike Hearn wrote:
> If unconfirmed payments become flaky enough that people stop using them, then
> a portion of the Bitcoin community will find workarounds like trusted third
> parties, trusted hardware, whatever and will just struggle one. Other people
> will look
>
> But, let's say, 5 years from now, some faction of miners who own
> soon-to-be-obsolete equipment will decide to boost their profits with a
> replace-by-fee pool and a corresponding wallet. They can market it as "1 of
> 10 hamburgers are free" if they have 10% of the total hashpower.
>
Yes, lik
Den 12 feb 2015 13:49 skrev "Mike Hearn" :
>>
>> Are you not counting collateralized multisignature notaries? Its an
extended version of the Greenaddress.it model.
>
> It makes unconfirmed transactions useless in the classical Bitcoin model.
Obviously if you introduce a trusted third party you can
Mike,
Peter’s pull request might be a foot gun, but we are here to find out. One
can’t claim Bitcoin core code is there to fork and then be disappointed if some
really do it.
I am not sure protecting unconfirmed transactions ranks higher than fostering
innovation not to depend on the same.
T
> Miners are *not* incentivised to earn the most money in the next block
> possible. They are incentivised to maximise their return on investment.
>
This would be right if you assume that all Bitcoin miners act as a single
entity. In that case it is true that that entity's goal is to maximize
over
>
> Are you not counting collateralized multisignature notaries? Its an
> extended version of the Greenaddress.it model.
>
It makes unconfirmed transactions useless in the classical Bitcoin model.
Obviously if you introduce a trusted third party you can fix things, but
then you're back to having th
Den 12 feb 2015 12:58 skrev "Mike Hearn" :
[...]
> Your "scorched earth" plan is aptly named, as it's guaranteed to make
unconfirmed payments useless.
Are you not counting collateralized multisignature notaries? Its an
extended version of the Greenaddress.it model.
NoRiskWallet: https://github.c
I know you will ignore this as usual, but the entire replace-by-fee folly
is based on your fundamental misunderstanding of miner incentives.
Miners are *not* incentivised to earn the most money in the next block
possible. They are incentivised to maximise their return on investment.
Making Bitcoin
On Feb 12, 2015, at 9:49 AM, Peter Todd wrote:
>
> How does my replace-by-fee patch *not* do that?
Does it broadcast a double spend only if it IS replacing an earlier? If yes, I
am fine with it.
Tamas Blummer
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On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 09:27:22AM +0100, Tamas Blummer wrote:
> On Feb 12, 2015, at 8:45 AM, Peter Todd wrote:
> > IOW, assume every transaction your "border router" gives you is now the
> > one and only true transaction, and everything conflicting with it must
> > go.
>
>
> You are right that
On Feb 12, 2015, at 9:16 AM, Alex Mizrahi wrote:
> Why don't you use getrawmempool RPC call to synchronize mempool contents?
Since RPC interface does not scale to serve a multi user service.
In absence of better alternative, the interfaces used by a proprietary
extension are usually the same
> To remain useful as border router, the replace-by-fee patched core should
> only relay double spend if it actually replaces an earlier transaction, as
> otherwise the replace logic that is according to your commit more than just
> fee comparison, would have to be replicated in the proprietary sta
On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 08:23:29AM +0100, Tamas Blummer wrote:
> Peter,
>
> An important use of the core is being border router to proprietary software,
> that is usually indexing the block chain and mempool. That software is also
> assuming that double spends are not relayed by the core.
>
> T
Peter,
An important use of the core is being border router to proprietary software,
that is usually indexing the block chain and mempool. That software is also
assuming that double spends are not relayed by the core.
To remain useful as border router, the replace-by-fee patched core should only
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