I hear that. But I don't see why mainstream wallets and wallets
designed for crypto research should not share a common core.
I think there was some misunderstanding. I was saying they *could and
should* share common cores, so we are in agreement without realising it :)
I also didn't mean to
Hi there,
some thoughts in-line:
Finally, distributors of consumer wallets can use this research in
order to distribute their wallet with policies which may be less prone
to Tor-specific attacks. Or leave this out altogether if their
audience has different expectations for connecting to
[...]
I'm confused by this, I run quite a few nodes exclusively on tor and
chart their connectivity and have seen no such connection dropping
behaviour.
In my experience the problem has always been getting bootstrapped.
Most nodes hardly give any hidden service nodes in their getaddr.
[...]
And, on the flip side if the host is persistently behind tor, even
with some watermarkable behaviour, their privacy is protected. So
making sure that hosts can continually use tor (or similar systems)
should be the higher priority. (And, of course, not reimplementing
tor leverages
[As an aside I agree that there are lots of things to improve here,
but the fact that users can in theory be forced off of tor via DOS
attacks is not immediately concerning to me because its a conscious
choice users would make to abandon their privacy
Bitcoin already has a large
Finally, distributors of consumer wallets can use this research in
order to distribute their wallet with policies which may be less prone
to Tor-specific attacks. Or leave this out altogether if their
audience has different expectations for connecting to Bitcoin.
Sure. I guess there will be
Hi Gregory,
response below quote:
Since this attack vector has been discussed, I started making some
measurements on how effective it is to connect to Bitcoin using Tor,
and I found that the number of connections dropping to near-zero is
a situation which occurs rather frequently, which
[As an aside I agree that there are lots of things to improve here,
but the fact that users can in theory be forced off of tor via DOS
attacks is not immediately concerning to me because its a conscious
choice users would make to abandon their privacy
Bitcoin already has a large population
On Thu, Nov 27, 2014 at 2:22 AM, Gregory Maxwell gmaxw...@gmail.com wrote:
Since this attack vector has been discussed, I started making some
measurements on how effective it is to connect to Bitcoin using Tor,
and I found that the number of connections dropping to near-zero is
a situation
I might be mistaken, but it seems to me this paper discusses unintended
ways of obtaining the IP addresses of clients involved in transactions on
the core Bitcoin network.
Tor was mentioned only insofar as it might be one's first thought of how to
mitigate this risk, yet Bitcoin over Tor has its
On Thu, Nov 27, 2014 at 5:44 PM, Mistr Bigs mister...@gmail.com wrote:
I might be mistaken, but it seems to me this paper discusses unintended ways
of obtaining the IP addresses of clients involved in transactions on the
core Bitcoin network.
You're mistaken. :)
If a node is used exclusively
That's what I was trying to say... The researchers are deanonymizing
transactions from non-Tor connected hosts. So why are we talking about Tor
limitations in response to this? Shouldn't we be discussing how to address
the issues in Bitcoin proper?
M
On 11/27/2014 9:30 PM, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
On Fri, Nov 28, 2014 at 12:45 AM, Mistr Bigs mister...@gmail.com wrote:
That's what I was trying to say... The researchers are deanonymizing
transactions from non-Tor connected hosts. So why are we talking about Tor
limitations in response to this? Shouldn't we be discussing how to address
the
I don't recall being contacted directly, but the attack has been
discussed. It relies on a number of conditions. For example, if you are
over Tor, they try to kick the machine off Tor, _assuming_ that it will
fall back to non-Tor. That's only true for dual stack nodes, which are not
really 100%
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Please see also the following:
https://cpunks.org//pipermail/cypherpunks/2014-November/005971.html
Respect,
- -Odinn
Jeff Garzik:
I don't recall being contacted directly, but the attack has been
discussed. It relies on a number of
Hello there,
quote:
Please see also the following:
https://cpunks.org//pipermail/cypherpunks/2014-November/005971.html
I agree about the severity of the Tor/Bitcoin issue, but I see no
point in bashing Bitcoin's financial privacy characteristics as
the linked pages seem to do.
Bitcoin can
Since this attack vector has been discussed, I started making some
measurements on how effective it is to connect to Bitcoin using Tor,
and I found that the number of connections dropping to near-zero is
a situation which occurs rather frequently, which suggests that there
is still room to
This paper was just posted on reddit that describes how an attacker can
de-anonymize clients on the bitcoin network. It mentions that the core devs
were contacted prior to publication. I was just wondering, how many of these
issues have already been addressed?
Paper (University of
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