Re: [Bitcoin-development] Miners MiTM

2014-08-09 Thread Sergio Lerner
Since the information exchanged between the pool and the miner is public, all that's needed is a mutual private MAC key that authenticates messages. This requires a registration step, that can be done only once using a simple web interface over https to the miner website. But the miner website is

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Miners MiTM

2014-08-09 Thread Troy Benjegerdes
On Thu, Aug 07, 2014 at 11:45:44PM +, Luke Dashjr wrote: On Thursday, August 07, 2014 11:02:21 PM Pedro Worcel wrote: Hi there, I was wondering if you guys have come across this article: http://www.wired.com/2014/08/isp-bitcoin-theft/ The TL;DR is that somebody is abusing the

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Miners MiTM

2014-08-09 Thread Troy Benjegerdes
On Fri, Aug 08, 2014 at 11:42:52AM +0200, Mike Hearn wrote: AFAIK the only protection is SSL + certificate validation on client side. However certificate revocation and updates in miners are pain in the ass, that's why majority of pools (mine including) don't want to play with that...

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Miners MiTM

2014-08-08 Thread Mike Hearn
AFAIK the only protection is SSL + certificate validation on client side. However certificate revocation and updates in miners are pain in the ass, that's why majority of pools (mine including) don't want to play with that... Why would miners need updates? If they implement the standard SSL

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Miners MiTM

2014-08-08 Thread Mike Hearn
Certificate validation isn't needed unless the attacker can do a direct MITM at connection time, which is a lot harder to maintain than injecting a client.reconnect. Surely the TCP connection will be reset once the route reconfiguration is completed, either by the MITM server or by the

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Miners MiTM

2014-08-08 Thread Jeff Garzik
gmaxwell noted on IRC that enabling TLS could be functionally, if not literally, a DoS on the pool servers. Hence the thought towards a more lightweight method that simply prevents client payout redirection + server impersonation. On Fri, Aug 8, 2014 at 5:53 AM, Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Miners MiTM

2014-08-08 Thread Luke Dashjr
On Friday, August 08, 2014 6:21:18 PM Jeff Garzik wrote: gmaxwell noted on IRC that enabling TLS could be functionally, if not literally, a DoS on the pool servers. Hence the thought towards a more lightweight method that simply prevents client payout redirection + server impersonation. My

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Miners MiTM

2014-08-08 Thread Laszlo Hanyecz
Mutual CHAP could work. This is commonly done in PPP and iSCSI. The idea is simply that both sides authenticate. The server expects the client to provide a password, and the client expects the server to provide a (different) password. If you masquerade as the server, you won't be able to

[Bitcoin-development] Miners MiTM

2014-08-07 Thread Pedro Worcel
Hi there, I was wondering if you guys have come across this article: http://www.wired.com/2014/08/isp-bitcoin-theft/ The TL;DR is that somebody is abusing the BGP protocol to be in a position where they can intercept the miner traffic. The concerning point is that they seem to be having some

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Miners MiTM

2014-08-07 Thread Luke Dashjr
On Thursday, August 07, 2014 11:02:21 PM Pedro Worcel wrote: Hi there, I was wondering if you guys have come across this article: http://www.wired.com/2014/08/isp-bitcoin-theft/ The TL;DR is that somebody is abusing the BGP protocol to be in a position where they can intercept the miner

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Miners MiTM

2014-08-07 Thread slush
AFAIK the only protection is SSL + certificate validation on client side. However certificate revocation and updates in miners are pain in the ass, that's why majority of pools (mine including) don't want to play with that... slush On Fri, Aug 8, 2014 at 1:45 AM, Luke Dashjr l...@dashjr.org

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Miners MiTM

2014-08-07 Thread Christopher Franko
What exactly makes bitcoin less of a target than a scamcoin which I suspect means anything that != bitcoin? On 7 August 2014 20:29, slush sl...@centrum.cz wrote: AFAIK the only protection is SSL + certificate validation on client side. However certificate revocation and updates in miners are

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Miners MiTM

2014-08-07 Thread Luke Dashjr
On Friday, August 08, 2014 12:29:31 AM slush wrote: AFAIK the only protection is SSL + certificate validation on client side. However certificate revocation and updates in miners are pain in the ass, that's why majority of pools (mine including) don't want to play with that... Certificate

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Miners MiTM

2014-08-07 Thread Pedro Worcel
the only protection is SSL + certificate validation on client side. However certificate revocation and updates in miners are pain in the ass, that's why majority of pools (mine including) don't want to play with that... Another solution which would have less overhead would be to implement

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Miners MiTM

2014-08-07 Thread slush
Although 140 BTC sounds scary, actually it was very minor issue and most of miners aren't even aware about it. TLS would probably make the attack harder, that's correct. However if somebody controls ISP routers, then MITM with TLS is harder, yet possible. slush On Fri, Aug 8, 2014 at 3:07 AM,

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Miners MiTM

2014-08-07 Thread Jeff Garzik
You don't necessarily need the heavy weight of SSL. You only need digitally signed envelopes between miner and pool[1]. [1] Unless the pool is royally stupid and will somehow credit miner B, if miner B provides to the pool a copy of miner A's work. On Thu, Aug 7, 2014 at 8:29 PM, slush