On Tue, May 14, 2013 at 5:25 AM, Adam Back a...@cypherspace.org wrote:
On Mon, May 13, 2013 at 06:00:27PM -0400, Jeff Garzik wrote:
When a transaction's input value exceeds its output value, the
remainder is the transaction fee. The miner's reward for processing
transactions is the 25 BTC
On Tue, May 14, 2013 at 12:50:27PM -0400, Jeff Garzik wrote:
Well if it is a later transaction, not an integral part of the reward
transaction (that is definitionally mined by being serialized into the
coinbase), the user may elect to withhold the promised transaction
give-to-miner, so thats
On Mon, May 13, 2013 at 07:31:21AM +, John Dillon wrote:
[with] merge-mining [you get] more value from just one unit of work.
correct.
But Peter's coinbase hashcash protocol carefully ensures [...] the amount
of value the miner would have then given away in a anyone-can-spend
output.
I
Some musings about the differences between Peter's proof-of-sacrifice (you
did the work but elected to make the small reward chance unclaimable), vs
conventional actually doing the work but then destroying the bitcoin!
- proof-of-sacrifice seems similiar to hashcash except its difficulty is
On Mon, May 13, 2013 at 5:12 PM, Adam Back a...@cypherspace.org wrote:
When you said destroy-via-miner-fee:
Don't forget: 4. destroy-via-miner-fee, which is useful because it
provides funding for a public service (bitcoin transaction
verification).
Is that directly possible? Because the
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
- what about if a pool could lock the reward (rather than receive it or
destroy it) eg some kind of merkle root instead of a public key hash in
the reward recipient address field in the coinbase.
Sorry I don't have time for a full reply due
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