Related to Russia's Tor bounty?
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/25/russia-research-identify-users-tor
On 28 Jul 2014 04:45, Gregory Maxwell gmaxw...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sun, Jul 27, 2014 at 7:54 PM, m...@bitwatch.co m...@bitwatch.co
wrote:
These website list Tor nodes by bandwidth:
Good to see that it has been discussed, but I see the idea has been postponed.
I agree our proposals don’t differ substantially. Besides naming, I think the
differences are the algorithms that are used for signing the extended
certificate / mandate by the merchant and the way backwards
As I pointed out above, — it isn't really. Without the exit flag, I
believe no tor node will select it to exit 8333 unless manually
configured. (someone following tor more closely than I could correct
if I'm wrong here)
The exit flag doesn't mean what you would expect it to mean. The reason
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On 7/28/2014 6:44 AM, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
On Sun, Jul 27, 2014 at 7:54 PM, m...@bitwatch.co
m...@bitwatch.co wrote:
These website list Tor nodes by bandwidth:
http://torstatus.blutmagie.de/index.php
On Mon, 28 Jul 2014 07:28:15 -0400, Peter Todd wrote:
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I've got a bitcoin-only exit running myself and right now there is
absolutely no traffic leaving it. If the traffic coming from that
node
was legit I'd expect some to be exiting my node
On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 11:01 AM, Mark van Cuijk m...@coinqy.com wrote:
Good to see that it has been discussed, but I see the idea has been
postponed.
I'm not sure postponed is the right word. It wasn't in v1, but many useful
things weren't. It's more like, a bunch of people have to do work
On 28 Jul 2014, at 14:46 , Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net wrote:
I do like the idea coined by Mike that a PP can issue non-SSL certificates
for the purpose of merchant identification, as long as a customer is free to
determine whether he trusts the PP for this purpose.
I don't think I
I referred to your idea in
https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development%40lists.sourceforge.net/msg04076.html
https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg04076.html
which
is indeed not the proposal itself.
Right, gotcha. Had forgotten about that.
Indeed
On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 5:31 AM, Robert McKay rob...@mckay.com wrote:
I don't think Sybil attack is the right term for this.. there is only
one IP address.. one identity.
The bitcoin protocol is more or less identityless. It's using up lots
of network capacity, number of sockets is as pretty
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On 7/28/2014 5:08 PM, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 5:31 AM, Robert McKay rob...@mckay.com
wrote:
I don't think Sybil attack is the right term for this.. there is
only one IP address.. one identity.
The bitcoin protocol is more
On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 12:30:11PM +0200, Mike Hearn wrote:
Ok... 'time' on the blockchain could be 'gamed' ... but with great
difficulty.
Unfortunately not: miners have in the past routinely gamed the timestamp in
order to use it as an extra nonce and squeeze some more gigahashes out
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