On 20 December 2014 at 14:48, Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org wrote:
We need the following primitives operating on message m, pubkey p, and a
valid signature sig1 for m, p:
AntiReplaySign(m, p, sig1) - sig2
VerifyAntiReplaySig(m, p, sig2) - True or False
Additionally once
On Dec 20, 2014 8:49 AM, Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org wrote:
However the converse is not possible: anti-replay cannot be used to
implement proof-of-publication. Knowing that no conflicting message exists
says nothing about who be in posession of that message, or indeed, any
message at all. Thus
On Sun, Dec 21, 2014 at 07:49:17AM -0600, paul snow wrote:
On Dec 20, 2014 8:49 AM, Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org wrote:
However the converse is not possible: anti-replay cannot be used to
implement proof-of-publication. Knowing that no conflicting message exists
says nothing about who be
On Sun, Dec 21, 2014 at 10:01:37AM +, Adam Back wrote:
On 20 December 2014 at 14:48, Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org wrote:
We need the following primitives operating on message m, pubkey p, and a
valid signature sig1 for m, p:
AntiReplaySign(m, p, sig1) - sig2
On Sun, Dec 21, 2014 at 03:11:32PM +0800, Mark Friedenbach wrote:
On Sun, Dec 21, 2014 at 3:01 PM, Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org wrote:
Right, so Freimarkets is deliberately insecure.
Please define your terms, particularly what your security requirements are
here. In the architecture we
I could play the game where I say, You don't understand, and, like you,
not address any of your points.
First, there is no dependence on implementation in my arguments. If a
system can prevent replay by some set of rules, it necessarily must be able
to answer the question if a message is
On Sun, Dec 21, 2014 at 12:25:36PM +0100, Jorge Timón wrote:
So let's go through an example to see in which ways
non-proof-of-publication orders are insecure.
Alice the seller wants to sell 1 unit of A for 100 units of B.
Bob is willing to pay up to 200 Bs for 1 A.
Let's assume a proof of
On Sun, Dec 21, 2014 at 06:10:47PM +, Adam Back wrote:
Yes you could for example define a new rule that two signatures
(double-spend) authorises something - eg miners to take funds. (And
this would work with existing ECDSA addresses unrestricted R-value
choices).
I wasnt really making
On Sun, Dec 21, 2014 at 5:07 PM, Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org wrote:
On Sun, Dec 21, 2014 at 12:25:36PM +0100, Jorge Timón wrote:
So let's go through an example to see in which ways
non-proof-of-publication orders are insecure.
Alice the seller wants to sell 1 unit of A for 100 units of B.
On Sat, Dec 20, 2014 at 09:48:01AM -0500, Peter Todd wrote:
Andrew Miller asked me to publish the following to the mailing list on his
behalf: (https://twitter.com/socrates1024/status/546819355565391872)
One of the main points in this note is that you can use a
proof-of-publication system to
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