Re: [Bitcoin-development] Lets discuss what to do if SHA256d is actually broken

2014-06-03 Thread Rusty Russell
Luke Dashjr l...@dashjr.org writes: On Tuesday, June 03, 2014 4:29:55 AM xor wrote: Hi, I thought a lot about the worst case scenario of SHA256d being broken in a way which could be abused to A) reduce the work of mining a block by some significant amount B) reduce the work of mining a

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Lets discuss what to do if SHA256d is actually broken

2014-06-05 Thread Rusty Russell
Charlie 'Charles' Shrem csh...@gmail.com writes: Hey Rusty, This is intriguing, do you have a writeup somewhere I can read more about ? OK, ignore the FIXMEs, but I rehashed my stupid sim code, added some graphs to the (clearly unfinished) paper and uploaded it to github:

[Bitcoin-development] Increasing regularity of block times?

2014-10-30 Thread Rusty Russell
Hi all, I've been toying with an algorithm to place a ceiling on confirmation latency by allowing weaker blocks after a certain time. Hope this isn't noise, but thought someone must have considered this before, or know of flaws in the scheme? Gory details:

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Increasing regularity of block times?

2014-10-30 Thread Rusty Russell
Gregory Maxwell gmaxw...@gmail.com writes: On Thu, Oct 30, 2014 at 11:18 PM, Rusty Russell ru...@rustcorp.com.au wrote: Hi all, I've been toying with an algorithm to place a ceiling on confirmation latency by allowing weaker blocks after a certain time. Hope this isn't noise

Re: [Bitcoin-development] [softfork proposal] Strict DER signatures

2015-01-21 Thread Rusty Russell
Pieter Wuille pieter.wui...@gmail.com writes: Hello everyone, We've been aware of the risk of depending on OpenSSL for consensus rules for a while, and were trying to get rid of this as part of BIP 62 (malleability protection), which was however postponed due to unforeseen complexities. The

Re: [Bitcoin-development] [softfork proposal] Strict DER signatures

2015-01-20 Thread Rusty Russell
Pieter Wuille pieter.wui...@gmail.com writes: Hello everyone, We've been aware of the risk of depending on OpenSSL for consensus rules for a while, and were trying to get rid of this as part of BIP 62 (malleability protection), which was however postponed due to unforeseen complexities. The

Re: [Bitcoin-development] CLTV opcode allocation; long-term plans?

2015-05-07 Thread Rusty Russell
Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org writes: That said, if people have strong feelings about this, I would be willing to make OP_CLTV work as follows: nLockTime 1 OP_CLTV Where the 1 selects absolute mode, and all others act as OP_NOP's. A future relative CLTV could then be a future soft-fork

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposed alternatives to the 20MB step function

2015-05-15 Thread Rusty Russell
Tier Nolan tier.no...@gmail.com writes: On Sat, May 9, 2015 at 4:36 AM, Gregory Maxwell gmaxw...@gmail.com wrote: An example would be tx_size = MAX( real_size 1, real_size + 4*utxo_created_size - 3*utxo_consumed_size). This could be implemented as a soft fork too. * 1MB hard size limit

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposed alternatives to the 20MB step function

2015-05-18 Thread Rusty Russell
Tier Nolan tier.no...@gmail.com writes: On Sat, May 16, 2015 at 1:22 AM, Rusty Russell ru...@rustcorp.com.au wrote: 3) ... or maybe not, if any consumed UTXO was generated before the soft fork (reducing Tier's perverse incentive). The incentive problem can be fixed by excluding UTXOs from

Re: [Bitcoin-development] [RFC] Canonical input and output ordering in transactions

2015-06-06 Thread Rusty Russell
Mark Friedenbach m...@friedenbach.org writes: Rusty, this doesn't play well with SIGHASH_SINGLE which is used in assurance contracts among other things. Sometimes the ordering is set by the signing logic itself... Ah, I forgot about that particular wart. Yech. Implies that you can order

[Bitcoin-development] [RFC] Canonical input and output ordering in transactions

2015-06-05 Thread Rusty Russell
Title: Canonical Input and Output Ordering Author: Rusty Russell ru...@rustcorp.com.au Discussions-To: Bitcoin Dev bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net Status: Draft Type: Standards Track Created: 2015-06-06 Abstract This BIP provides a canonical ordering of inputs and outputs when creating

Re: [Bitcoin-development] Consensus-enforced transaction replacement via sequence numbers

2015-06-09 Thread Rusty Russell
Tier Nolan tier.no...@gmail.com writes: What are the use cases for relative lock time verify? I have 1 and I think that is the kind of thing it is useful for. I think that most cases are just to guarantee that the other party has a chance to react. This means that 8191 blocks should be more