quote:
[...]
> On 4/24/14, Chris Pacia wrote:
> > It would work but it's an ugly hack IMO. What do people do if they don't
> > have extra to pay when making a purchase? I have 200 mbtc and want to buy a
> > 200 mbtc phone but I can't because I need 400 mbtc. Sucks for me.
> >
> > I would much pref
On 25/04/14 20:19, Mike Hearn wrote:
> You don't get any money back, but you do get an angry shopkeeper chasing
> you down the street / calling the police / blacklisting you from the
> store.
>
>
> If they could do that they'd just take the stolen property back and you
> would have f
>
> You don't get any money back, but you do get an angry shopkeeper chasing
> you down the street / calling the police / blacklisting you from the
> store.
>
If they could do that they'd just take the stolen property back and you
would have failed to spend your money twice. So this is by definiti
On 24/04/14 22:07, Chris Pacia wrote:
> It would work but it's an ugly hack IMO. What do people do if they don't
> have extra to pay when making a purchase? I have 200 mbtc and want to
> buy a 200 mbtc phone but I can't because I need 400 mbtc. Sucks for me.
I don't see why it couldn't work with j
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On 24.04.2014 14:15, Mike Hearn wrote:
> Beyond needing to double balances, what if the shop is selling me a
> phone on contract? So the actual cost of the phone is lower than
> the real price on the assumption of future revenue. Alice double
> spends
>
> Of course if we're not comparing this with Bitcoin today and we're
> comparing it to some theoretical mechanism for instant p2p
> serialization without requiring proof of work then, yes, this concept
> is not very interesting.
>
Bitcoin's competition is not some theoretical perfect p2p system
On 4/24/14, Mike Hearn wrote:
>>
>> This scheme would discourage people from attempting a Finney attack
>> because they would end up worse off if they did.
>>
> Phrased another way, it simply makes every block a Finney attack that
> charges the maximum double spending fee possible. This doesn't so
On 4/24/14, Peter Todd wrote:
> ...
> With replace-by-fee scorched-earth the success rate of such
> double-spends would be significantly reduced as the attacker would need
> to get lucky with bad propagation not just once, but twice in a row.
Interesting.
>> Replace-by-fee and child-pays-for par
On Thu, Apr 24, 2014 at 12:48:54PM +0200, Jorge Timón wrote:
> Here is a solution to the problem of having 0 confirmation
> transactions
FWIW I'm running an experiment right now to detect how easy it is to
doublespend 0-conf transactions I need to collect more data, but initial
results indicate th
>
> This scheme would discourage people from attempting a Finney attack
> because they would end up worse off if they did.
>
Phrased another way, it simply makes every block a Finney attack that
charges the maximum double spending fee possible. This doesn't solve the
problem.
Beyond needing to dou
This scheme would discourage people from attempting a Finney attack because
they would end up worse off if they did.
It would work but it's an ugly hack IMO. What do people do if they don't
have extra to pay when making a purchase? I have 200 mbtc and want to buy a
200 mbtc phone but I can't becau
>
> Am I missing something?
The scheme you described does nothing about Finney attacks, which is the
issue presently faced.
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Here is a solution to the problem of having 0 confirmation
transactions that relies on game
theory and most miners implementing replace-by-fee and child-pays-for-parent.
This has been proposed before
http://sourceforge.net/p/bitcoin/mailman/message/30876033/
I'm just going to describe the general
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