The prior (and seemingly this) assurance contract proposals pay the
miners who mines a chain supportive of your interests and miners whom
mine against your interests identically.
The same is true today - via inflation I pay for blocks regardless of
whether they contain or double spend my
I wrote an article that explains the hashing assurance contract concept:
https://medium.com/@octskyward/hashing-7d04a887acc8
(it doesn't contain an in depth protocol description)
--
On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 9:59 PM, Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net wrote:
I wrote an article that explains the hashing assurance contract concept:
https://medium.com/@octskyward/hashing-7d04a887acc8
(it doesn't contain an in depth protocol description)
The prior (and seemingly this) assurance
Hello Mike,
Are you aware of my proposal for network assurance contracts?
Yes I am aware of that; sorry for not mentioning it. I think it is an
interesting proposal, but I would not rely on it today, because it
includes a large share of unproven social experiment.
(Bitcoin too is a social
Hi Thomas,
My problem is that this seems to lacks a vision.
Are you aware of my proposal for network assurance contracts?
There is a discussion here:
https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg07552.html
But I agree with Gavin that attempting to plan for 20
I think the basic reality is that a) an arbitrarily elevated level of
hashing is fundamental to a truly decentralised, autonomous network,
and is an essential cost to maintaining Bitcoin, b) there are no signs
that this fact will change, c) there must be some replacement to the
current system of
On 05/13/2015 09:31 PM, Aaron Voisine wrote:
by people and businesses deciding to not use on-chain settlement.
I completely agree. Increasing fees will cause people voluntary
economize on blockspace by finding alternatives, i.e. not bitcoin.
This strikes me as a leap. There are alternatives
On Sat, May 16, 2015 at 1:35 PM, Owen Gunden ogun...@phauna.org wrote:
This strikes me as a leap. There are alternatives that still use bitcoin
as the unit of value, such as sidechains, offchain, etc. To say that
these are not bitcoin is misleading.
The only options available today and in
On 5/16/2015 1:35 PM, Owen Gunden wrote:
There are alternatives that still use bitcoin as the unit of value,
such as sidechains, offchain, etc. To say that these are not bitcoin
is misleading.
Is it? Nobody thinks euro accepted implies Visa is ok, even though
Visa is just a bunch of extra
On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 10:49 AM, Thomas Voegtlin thom...@electrum.org
wrote:
The reason I am asking that is, there seems to be no consensus among
core developers on how Bitcoin can work without miner subsidy. How it
*will* work is another question.
The position seems to be that it will
On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 11:31 AM, Alex Mizrahi alex.mizr...@gmail.com
wrote:
But this matters if a new node has access to the globally strongest chain.
A node only needs a path of honest nodes to the network.
If a node is connected to 99 dishonest nodes and 1 honest node, it can
still sync
Le 12/05/2015 18:10, Gavin Andresen a écrit :
Added back the list, I didn't mean to reply privately:
Fair enough, I'll try to find time in the next month or three to write up
four plausible future scenarios for how mining incentives might work:
1) Fee-supported with very large blocks
With POW, a new node only needs to know the genesis block (and network
rules) to fully determine which of two chains is the strongest.
But this matters if a new node has access to the globally strongest chain.
If attacker is able to block connections to legitimate nodes, a new node
will
Let's consider a concrete example:
1. User wants to accept Bitcoin payments, as his customers want this.
2. He downloads a recent version of Bitcoin Core, checks hashes and so on.
(Maybe even builds from source.)
3. Let's it to sync for several hours or days.
4. After wallet is synced, he gives
On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 1:26 PM, Alex Mizrahi alex.mizr...@gmail.com
wrote:
He tries to investigate, and after some time discovers that his router (or
his ISP's router) was hijacked. His Bitcoin node couldn't connect to any of
the legitimate nodes, and thus got a complete fake chain from the
Checkpoints will be replaced by compiled-in 'at THIS timestamp the main chain
had THIS much proof of work.'
That is enough information to prevent attacks and still allow optimizations
like skipping signature checking for ancient transactions.
I don't think anybody is proposing replacing
I don't really see how you can protect against total isolation of a node
(POS or POW). You would need to find an alternative route for the
information.
Alternative route for the information is the whole point of weak
subjectivity, no?
PoS depends on weak subjectivity to prevent long term
Thank you for your response, that does make sense. It's going to be
interesting to follow what is going to happen!
2015-05-14 3:41 GMT+12:00 Gavin Andresen gavinandre...@gmail.com:
On Tue, May 12, 2015 at 7:48 PM, Adam Back a...@cypherspace.org wrote:
I think its fair to say no one knows how
On Mon, May 11, 2015 at 7:29 PM, Gavin Andresen gavinandre...@gmail.com wrote:
I think long-term the chain will not be secured purely by proof-of-work. I
think when the Bitcoin network was tiny running solely on people's home
computers proof-of-work was the right way to secure the chain, and
On Tue, May 12, 2015 at 7:48 PM, Adam Back a...@cypherspace.org wrote:
I think its fair to say no one knows how to make a consensus that
works in a decentralised fashion that doesnt weaken the bitcoin
security model without proof-of-work for now.
Yes.
I am presuming Gavin is just saying
On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 5:48 PM, Aaron Voisine vois...@gmail.com wrote:
We have $3billion plus of value in this system to defend. The safe,
conservative course is to increase the block size. Miners already have an
incentive to find ways to encourage higher fees and we can help them with
by people and businesses deciding to not use on-chain settlement.
I completely agree. Increasing fees will cause people voluntary economize
on blockspace by finding alternatives, i.e. not bitcoin. A fee however is a
known, upfront cost... unpredictable transaction failure in most cases will
be a
On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 12:31 PM, Alex Mizrahi alex.mizr...@gmail.com wrote:
But this matters if a new node has access to the globally strongest chain.
If attacker is able to block connections to legitimate nodes, a new node
will happily accept attacker's chain.
If you get isolated from the
increasing the block size is simply not a solution, it's just kicking
the can down the road (while reducing the incentives to deploy real
solutions like payment channels).
Placing hard limits on blocksize is not the right solution. There are still
plenty of options to be explored to increase
Conservative is a relative term. Dropping transactions in a way that is
unpredictable to the sender sounds incredibly drastic to me. I'm suggesting
increasing the blocksize, drastic as it is, is the more conservative
choice. I would recommend that the fork take effect when some specific
large
On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Aaron Voisine vois...@gmail.com wrote:
Conservative is a relative term. Dropping transactions in a way that is
unpredictable to the sender sounds incredibly drastic to me. I'm suggesting
increasing the blocksize, drastic as it is, is the more conservative
I concede the point. Perhaps a flag date based on previous observation of
network upgrade rates with a conservative additional margin in addition to
supermajority of mining power.
It occurs to me that this would allow for a relatively small percentage of
miners to stop the upgrade if the flag
On 11 May 2015 at 18:28, Thomas Voegtlin thom...@electrum.org wrote:
The discussion on block size increase has brought some attention to the
other elephant in the room: Long-term mining incentives.
Bitcoin derives its current market value from the assumption that a
stable, steady-state
: Thomas Voegtlin thom...@electrum.org
To: Gavin Andresen gavinandre...@gmail.com, Bitcoin Dev
bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc:
Date: Wed, 13 May 2015 11:49:13 +0200
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Long-term mining incentives
Le 12/05/2015 18:10, Gavin Andresen a écrit
Added back the list, I didn't mean to reply privately:
Fair enough, I'll try to find time in the next month or three to write up
four plausible future scenarios for how mining incentives might work:
1) Fee-supported with very large blocks containing lots of tiny-fee
transactions
2) Proof-of-idle
I think proof-of-idle had a potentially serious problem when I last looked at
it. The risk is that a largish miner can use everyone else's idle time to
construct a very long chain; it's also easy enough for them to make it appear
to be the work of a large number of distinct miners. Given that
Disclaimer: I don't know anything about Bitcoin.
2) Proof-of-idle supported (I wish Tadge Dryja would publish his
proof-of-idle idea)
3) Fees purely as transaction-spam-prevention measure, chain security via
alternative consensus algorithm (in this scenario there is very little
mining).
I
I think its fair to say no one knows how to make a consensus that
works in a decentralised fashion that doesnt weaken the bitcoin
security model without proof-of-work for now.
I am presuming Gavin is just saying in the context of not pre-judging
the future that maybe in the far future another
Thank you for your answer.
I agree that a lot of things will change, and I am not asking for a
prediction of technological developments; prediction is certainly
impossible. What I would like to have is some sort of reference scenario
for the future of Bitcoin. Something a bit like the Standard
On 2015-05-11 16:28, Thomas Voegtlin wrote:
My problem is that this seems to lacks a vision. If the maximal block
size is increased only to buy time, or because some people think that 7
tps is not enough to compete with VISA, then I guess it would be
healthier to try and develop off-chain
I think long-term the chain will not be secured purely by proof-of-work. I
think when the Bitcoin network was tiny running solely on people's home
computers proof-of-work was the right way to secure the chain, and the only
fair way to both secure the chain and distribute the coins.
See
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