This happened to one of the merchants at the Bitcoin 2013 conference in
San Jose. They sold some T-shirts and accepted zero-confirmation
transactions. The transactions depended on other unconfirmed transactions,
which never confirmed, so this merchant never got their money.
Beyond the fact
On Sun, Feb 22, 2015 at 08:02:03AM +, Adam Back wrote:
FWIW I've been advocating this kind of thing in various forms for
literally years, including to hold fidelity bonded banks honest - what
you now call 'federated sidechains' - and most recently Feb 12th on
#bitcoin-dev:
19:56 petertodd
Den 22 feb 2015 13:36 skrev Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org:
Implementing it as a general purpose scripting language improvement has
a lot of advantages, not least of which is that you no longer need to
rely entirely on inherently unreliable P2P networking: Promise to never
create two signatures
On Sunday, 22 February 2015, at 2:29 pm, Natanael wrote:
In other words, you are unprotected and potentially at greater risk if you
create a transaction depending on another zero-confirmation transaction.
This happened to one of the merchants at the Bitcoin 2013 conference in San
Jose. They
On Sun, Feb 22, 2015 at 8:11 AM, Adam Back a...@cypherspace.org wrote:
away from that too) is how about we explore ways to improve practical
security of fast confirmation transactions, and if we find something
better, then we can help people migrate to that before deprecating the
current
On Sun, Feb 22, 2015 at 02:11:31PM +, Adam Back wrote:
My actual point outside of the emotive stuff (and I should've stayed
away from that too) is how about we explore ways to improve practical
security of fast confirmation transactions, and if we find something
better, then we can help
Den 22 feb 2015 14:29 skrev Natanael natanae...@gmail.com:
Den 22 feb 2015 13:36 skrev Peter Todd p...@petertodd.org:
Implementing it as a general purpose scripting language improvement has
a lot of advantages, not least of which is that you no longer need to
rely entirely on inherently
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On 22 February 2015 08:50:30 GMT-05:00, Matt Whitlock b...@mattwhitlock.name
wrote:
On Sunday, 22 February 2015, at 2:29 pm, Natanael wrote:
In other words, you are unprotected and potentially at greater risk
if you
create a transaction
On 2015-02-22 14:33, Peter Todd wrote:
On Sun, Feb 22, 2015 at 02:11:31PM +, Adam Back wrote:
My actual point outside of the emotive stuff (and I should've stayed
away from that too) is how about we explore ways to improve practical
security of fast confirmation transactions, and if we
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On 02/22/2015 10:17 AM, Natanael wrote:
The problem with this approach is that it is worthless as a
predictor. We aren't dealing with traffic safety and road design -
we are dealing with adaptive attackers and malicious miners and
pools.
Den 22 feb 2015 17:00 skrev Justus Ranvier justusranv...@riseup.net:
On 02/22/2015 07:50 AM, Matt Whitlock wrote:
This happened to one of the merchants at the Bitcoin 2013
conference in San Jose. They sold some T-shirts and accepted
zero-confirmation transactions. The transactions depended
- Sent from my tablet
Den 22 feb 2015 17:25 skrev Justus Ranvier justusranv...@riseup.net:
You just disproved your own argument.
It is possible to predict risk, and therefore to price the risk.
Your fault is that you assume the predictions can be reliable and
trustable.
They can not be.
The
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