On Tue, May 14, 2013 at 12:50:27PM -0400, Jeff Garzik wrote:
>> Well if it is a later transaction, not an integral part of the reward
>> transaction (that is definitionally mined by being serialized into the
>> coinbase), the user may elect to withhold the promised transaction
>> give-to-miner, so
> I've been thinking about a decentralized way to create an anonymous
> identity
This is the fidelity bond/anonymous passport idea that has been kicked
around in the forums quite a few times. I mentioned it on the tor-talk once
as a solution to the problem that you cannot create Google accounts v
On Tue, May 14, 2013 at 5:25 AM, Adam Back wrote:
> On Mon, May 13, 2013 at 06:00:27PM -0400, Jeff Garzik wrote:
>>
>> When a transaction's input value exceeds its output value, the
>> remainder is the transaction fee. The miner's reward for processing
>> transactions is the 25 BTC initial curren
On Mon, May 13, 2013 at 06:00:27PM -0400, Jeff Garzik wrote:
>When a transaction's input value exceeds its output value, the
>remainder is the transaction fee. The miner's reward for processing
>transactions is the 25 BTC initial currency distribution + the sum of
>all per-transaction fees. A des
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> - what about if a pool could lock the reward (rather than receive it or
> destroy it) eg some kind of merkle root instead of a public key hash in
> the reward recipient address field in the coinbase.
Sorry I don't have time for a full reply du
On Mon, May 13, 2013 at 5:12 PM, Adam Back wrote:
> When you said destroy-via-miner-fee:
>
>
>> Don't forget: 4. destroy-via-miner-fee, which is useful because it
>> provides funding for a public service (bitcoin transaction
>> verification).
>
>
> Is that directly possible? Because the reward t
Some musings about the differences between Peter's proof-of-sacrifice (you
did the work but elected to make the small reward chance unclaimable), vs
conventional actually doing the work but then destroying the bitcoin!
- proof-of-sacrifice seems similiar to hashcash except its difficulty is
tim
On Mon, May 13, 2013 at 6:54 AM, Adam Back wrote:
> On Mon, May 13, 2013 at 07:31:21AM +, John Dillon wrote:
>>[with] merge-mining [you get] more value from just one unit of work.
>
> correct.
>
>>But Peter's coinbase hashcash protocol carefully ensures [...] the amount
>>of value the miner wo
On Mon, May 13, 2013 at 07:31:21AM +, John Dillon wrote:
>[with] merge-mining [you get] more value from just one unit of work.
correct.
>But Peter's coinbase hashcash protocol carefully ensures [...] the amount
>of value the miner would have then given away in a "anyone-can-spend"
>output.
I
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On Sat, May 11, 2013 at 10:22 AM, Adam Back wrote:
> I didnt quite understand the writeup and the references were ambiguous.
No you didn't. :)
What is special about what Peter is proposing is that it is *not* merge-mining.
You see, merge-mining is
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