Fortunately or unfortunately, in the long run, we cannot survive well
without advances in technology which will enable us to substitute
sustainable for non-sustainable energy sources, to avoid excess
climate changes, to provide enough drinkable water, and the like.

We need to be able to "do rightly" rather than "do wrongly" or "not
do" at all.

However, as Joel Mokyr says in `The Gifts of Athena' [1],

     Technological progress inevitably involves losers, and those
     losers ... tend to be concentrated and usually find it easty to
     organize.  The potential gains, on the other hand, are diffuse
     ... [page 253]

Moreover, as Mokyr points out,

     The struggle [between those for and those against technological
     progress] ... will always take the form of a non-market process,
     because relying on market forces alone would ... lead to the
     triumph of the new technology. [page 254]

Consequently, we need a social mechanism that successfully tells us
what we "can do" without falsely thinking we "cannot do" or acting
erroneously and "wrongly doing".

For politics, we need to be able to persuade people that one judgement
is more suggestive than another.  For decent survival, we need that
judgement to fit reality often enough, lest it lead to "wrongly do"
or "cannot do".

As far as I can see, a successful social mechanism must have several
parts:

  1. It must enable an investigator to recreate another's experience
     and do so transculturally, lest the investigator simply deny or
     misunderstand the reasoning, observation, or experiment.

     This enables the judgement to match reality often enough.  This
     fits the "decent survival" criterion.

     I talk about different cultures because people within a single
     culture may all think sufficiently alike and adopt an irreality.
     (Obviously, some people will be open minded; the goal here is to
     be socially robust.)

  2. However, since most people lack time, interest, or resources,
     they can learn only by listening to authority.

     Children cannot choose which authority to believe, but in free
     societies, adults can choose.  For serious issues, adults prefer
     those they trust over those they do not.

     The good news is that the Internet offers new and less expensive
     ways to establish trust than the older techniques of solid
     buildings and dignified directors:  append tags that tell you how
     a randomly chosen group of others judge a bit of information; and
     provide MD5 sums or the equivalent to prevent spoofing.

     In my experience, these methods do not work all the time, but
     they work well enough.  For social success, they need to be
     extended.

  3. Since political persuasion must depend, ultimately, on successful
     transcultural reasoning, observation, and experiment, mediated by
     trustworthy institutions, Aristotle's traditional three branches
     of oratory are dangerous.

     Aristotle's three branches are for a traditional society and
     involve different forms of persuasion.  Thus, to learn by
     listening to authority included trusting rumors, oaths, and the
     supernatural.

     A modern society must use the new, fourth branch of oratory for
     persuasion, the `determinative' branch, so we can "do rightly"
     rather than "do wrongly" or "not do" at all.

Although the social mechanism should be robust enough to suffer those
who insist on the unreal, for an individual, misrepresentation is a
moral failing.

Thus, according to James Hansen, Michael Crichton misrepresented
Hansen's testimony to the US Congress in 1988.

In a message on Fri, 30 Sep 2005, I suggested that

     ... Michael Crighton is Aristotlian and obsolete.  In this
     case, it is doubtful that Crighton sees his misrepresentation of
     others' determinative works as a misapplication of his talents
     and as a moral failing.  Rather, it is more likely that he sees
     his actions as an application of `deliberative' oratory, an
     attempt to influence.

While I still think it doubtful that Crighton sees his
misrepresentation as a moral failing, that is the case.  
His use of deliberative oratory is not safe.  We must 
``do rightly'' rather than ``do wrongly'' or ``not do'' 
at all.


[1] `The Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy',
Joel Mokyr, 2002, Princeton University Press, ISBN 0-691-09482-7

-- 
    Robert J. Chassell                         
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    http://www.rattlesnake.com                  http://www.teak.cc
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