The Pentagon's Scariest Thoughts
By ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN
WASHINGTON — Watching television images of American
soldiers in the Kuwaiti desert, chemical-protection
suits strapped to their belts, it's hard not to worry
about what Saddam Hussein may have in store for them.
Still, one needs to be careful in talking about
worst-case scenarios: most "worst cases" will not
happen.
Consider one of the possibilities Pentagon planners
have most feared — an Iraqi infliction of smallpox,
which can kill 30 percent of those infected. The fact
is, there is no evidence that Iraq has smallpox — we
know for certain only that it is one of the last
countries where an outbreak occurred. Most allied
soldiers have been vaccinated, and the rest can
quickly be inoculated. Thus the serious threat would
be to civilian workers at our ports and military
bases. It could hamper our logistics while we immunize
these people, but smallpox doesn't seem likely to go
undetected or spread so widely that it could not be
contained.
As for other methods of chemical or biological attack,
all weapons of mass destruction are not created equal.
Though VX nerve gas is very lethal, chemical weapons
and toxins still must be delivered in large amounts to
produce large casualties. Saddam Hussein relies
primarily on large rockets and missiles with
relatively simple unitary warheads and contact fuses,
which cannot disseminate agents effectively over a
wide area.
Iraq also still seems to rely on "wet" versions of
biological agents like anthrax, which lose
effectiveness in sunlight and in hot weather. The
story will be very different, however, if Iraq has
developed anthrax in the form of dry micropowders that
are coated for wide dissemination and resistance to
the sun, and that have been re-sized to increase their
infectiveness.
This is possible, but we don't have enough evidence to
say it is probable. This danger would be compounded if
Iraq has built a covert delivery system, or has more
sophisticated chemical and biological warheads and
bombs. The discovery by weapons inspectors this month
of warheads fitted with cluster bomblets that could
spread chemical or biological agents, and of large
unmanned drones, is worrisome. With improved delivery,
the lethality of these agents could be 10 to 100 times
higher.
The pilotless drone shown to reporters outside Baghdad
last week may have looked like a flimsy toy, but Iraq
may have developed more sophisticated craft, and they
can be very dangerous. The most efficient way to use
chemical and biological agents is a low-flying,
slow-flying system that releases just the right amount
of an agent in a long line over a target area or that
circles in a spiral. Iraq has been working on sprayers
for its unmanned vehicles for two decades. Iraqi
soldiers could also fly helicopters or aircraft laden
with agents in suicide missions, disguising them as
reconnaissance or conventional attack missions.
What can our troops do? They have Patriot missile
defense systems that are vastly improved from the
Persian Gulf war — but the new Patriots, which could
work on drones and aircraft as well as missiles, are
untested in real combat. And they are not designed to
deal with shorter-range artillery rockets and shells
that might be fired at our troops in Iraq or at
close-range targets in Kuwait.
The effectiveness of any missile or artillery attack
by Iraq's army depends on its being able to fire large
numbers of chemical rounds at relatively static
targets. Thus the biggest concern would be when our
forces concentrate, particularly on the edges of Iraqi
cities and military bases. However, British and
American forces have armored vehicles with filters and
systems that increase the air pressure in the cabin,
an extremely effective defense against chemical and
biological agents. Further, they will carry out their
major regroupings and maneuvers at night, when Iraq's
army is blind.
Those factors usually get lost in press coverage,
which tends to look at the chemical protection suit as
the first and last line of defense from a chemical
attack. Yes, even a false alarm could force our
soldiers to suit up — the protective gear is
unpleasant and being forced to use it could delay our
soldiers' advance. But it is important to keep the
risk of chemical or biological warfare in perspective.
As for other unorthodox threats, there is speculation
that retreating Iraqi troops may be ordered to set the
oil fields ablaze. The Iraqi military rationale is
that the oil smoke would paralyze American operations.
But this seems off the mark. Our missiles do not rely
on lasers anymore — oil smoke does not affect
satellite positioning technology. Our planes and
helicopters can fly above and around such smoke. Most
wells are in remote areas and thus the fires would
have little tactical impact. In fact, setting the
fields ablaze might do more to inhibit Iraq's military
operations.
Iraq could also use its dams and waterways to create a
limited flood plain in the south and around Baghdad.
Still, it really isn't clear that this would have more
than a temporary effect. American and British forces
could maneuver around most flood barriers by circling
to the west through the desert; the standing water in
most places wouldn't likely last more than a few days.
Again, any flooding might well more seriously impair
Iraqi land movement, as Saddam Hussein's troops will
have no helicopter or air support.
The most likely "worst case" is extended urban
warfare. Baghdad is being ringed with earth mounds and
trenches. Militias are being trained and stiffened
with security personnel and Republican Guard cadres.
Iraqi forces may try to fight from dug-in positions
some distance outside Baghdad, and then retreat into
the city — blowing up bridges and possibly using
chemical weapons.
Yet again the concern may be overwrought. It is far
from clear that Saddam Hussein can count on his people
to defend their cities street by street. Our Special
Forces may be able to work in some places with local
uprisings to create urban warfare against the regime's
loyalists. Iraqis may know the ground, but they are
ill equipped and have little training or experience in
urban warfare. Most Iraqi government facilities and
key strong points aren't in cities, anyway: they are
in large, exposed compounds. They can be destroyed
from the air with little fear of civilian casualties.
The bad news is that all of these risks are real. The
good news is that Iraq doesn't have the equipment or
military sophistication to pose the kind of serious
threat that it might in a few years — or that North
Korea is capable of posing now. War is never a
cakewalk and the unexpected is a certainty. But most
"worst cases" in Iraq are ones our troops are well
trained and well equipped to handle.
Anthony H. Cordesman is a senior fellow at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies.
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John D. Giorgis - [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Tonight I have a message for the brave and oppressed people of Iraq:
Your enemy is not surrounding your country — your enemy is ruling your
country. And the day he and his regime are removed from power will be
the day of your liberation." -George W. Bush 1/29/03
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