Not really - what I am not doing is trying to beat up a firmware
problem that whilst being quite bad can be mitigated by using native
features of Solaris. Too bad if OpenBSD cannot do the same - I am not
really sure about the benefits of OpenBSD on that scale of hardware
anyway considering
* Theo de Raadt:
Oh I get it. You can use a trust relationship with your
administrators to get around the fact that Sun sold a piece of
hardware which does not provide the isolation they promised in their
white papers and documentation.
Quoting from
On the other hand, I generally prefer a trust me, I know what I'm
doing switch on the systems I deal with. It's really frustrating if a
system tries to protect itself from me, and consequently fails to comply
with the actual requirements in this situation.
As well, note that a power-off of
* Theo de Raadt:
On the other hand, I generally prefer a trust me, I know what I'm
doing switch on the systems I deal with. It's really frustrating if a
system tries to protect itself from me, and consequently fails to comply
with the actual requirements in this situation.
As well, note
and apparently you cannot read the whole message - I said too bad if
OpenBSD cannot do this...
If you put someone running OpenBSD into a zone, and that zone locks up
completely and cannot be reset because of a flaw Sun has now admitted,
then if you NEED that zone back, you have to power
On Sun, Sep 28, 2008 at 08:14:16AM -0600, Theo de Raadt wrote:
the only workaround is to buy a seperate machine for the other uses.
No.
So you buy a machine that can be split up into different machines, and
guess what, you still have to buy extra ones because it doesn't
work.
On Sun, Sep 28, 2008 at 08:14:16AM -0600, Theo de Raadt wrote:
the only workaround is to buy a seperate machine for the other uses.
No.
So you buy a machine that can be split up into different machines, and
guess what, you still have to buy extra ones because it doesn't
work.
Unless
On Sun, Sep 28, 2008 at 08:14:35PM -0600, Theo de Raadt wrote:
OpenBSD of course cannot run in a Solaris zone.
Right. Glad that is clear.
OpenBSD can run in a hardware zone, and when something it does (which
we don't know yet) locks up that hardware zone, the only way to get
Oh I get it.
No you don't.
You can use a trust relationship with your
administrators to get around the fact that Sun sold a piece of
hardware which does not provide the isolation they promised in their
white papers and documentation.
It is a bug. What you seem to be unable
On Sun, Sep 28, 2008 at 07:53:11PM -0600, Theo de Raadt wrote:
Apparently you just plain can't understand simple english.
and apparently you cannot read the whole message - I said too bad if
OpenBSD cannot do this...
If you put someone running OpenBSD into a zone, and that zone locks up
On Sun, Sep 28, 2008 at 08:14:35PM -0600, Theo de Raadt wrote:
OpenBSD of course cannot run in a Solaris zone.
Right. Glad that is clear.
OpenBSD can run in a hardware zone, and when something it does (which
we don't know yet) locks up that hardware zone, the only way to get
the
On Sun, Sep 28, 2008 at 08:36:17PM -0600, Theo de Raadt wrote:
Oh I get it.
No you don't.
You can use a trust relationship with your
administrators to get around the fact that Sun sold a piece of
hardware which does not provide the isolation they promised in their
white papers and
On Sun, Sep 28, 2008 at 08:53:10PM -0600, Theo de Raadt wrote:
Oh you can avoid the problem by using only the vendor recommended
configurations!
Yes.
Or so you think. A Solaris kernel module could trigger exactly the
same bug.
Uh duh. You need to read a bit closer - you realise that
How absolutely bizzare. Basically you spend half a million dollars on
Sun hardware, and it isn't required to do this better than VMWare?
I think you've got it exactly backwards: you don't let non-trusted
people run code on these machines because they are so expensive.
Right,
From: Theo de Raadt [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, 09 September, 2008 17:28
To: B 650
Cc: bugtraq@securityfocus.com
I apologise if I'm misunderstanding you, but it seems to me that
this
issue can only be initiated by a privileged user on a domain.
If one domain can be
- Original Message -
From: Theo de Raadt [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: B 650 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Sent: Tuesday, September 09, 2008 4:27 PM
Subject: Re: Sun M-class hardware denial of service
snip
You stated in your original message that this is a high-end
* Theo de Raadt:
That is WRONG. The long-term uptime of all other domains on the
machine are eventually impacted because the entire physical machine
must, after a service call to Sun, eventually be powered down.
Management eventually has to decide to impact the SLA's of all domains.
That
... ciao:
: on 9-9-2008 B 650 writ:
: I think it's a bit of a leap to call this a DoS vulnerability.
: The power cycle of the remainder of the frame can be done at your leisure
which, convenient if nothing else, still has to be done. so, at some
point, all 'mission critical applications',
Sun/Fujitsu M4000-M9000 machines are very expensive multicpu sparc64
architecture machines, scaling all the way up to 64 processors, 256
cores, and 512 threads. They use the Fujitsu SPARC64 VI (and more
recently VII) processors. The smallest models are large (6U 84kg),
and the larger models are
I think it's a bit of a leap to call this a DoS vulnerability.
While having to power cycle the remainder of the frame may be a pain,
the fact it isolates the fault to only power off the affected domain
suggests to me that it is working as designed (the relative virtue of
the design not up for
While having to power cycle the remainder of the frame may be a pain, the
fact it isolates the fault to only power off the affected domain suggests to
me that it is working as designed (the relative virtue of the design not up
for debate). The power cycle of the remainder of the frame can be
On Tue, Sep 9, 2008 at 8:42 PM, Theo de Raadt [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
While having to power cycle the remainder of the frame may be a pain, the
fact it isolates the fault to only power off the affected domain suggests to
me that it is working as designed (the relative virtue of the design not
I apologise if I'm misunderstanding you, but it seems to me that this
issue can only be initiated by a privileged user on a domain.
If one domain can be broken into, and a Solaris kernel module is
loaded which then crashes that one domain, the entire machine
eventually has to be powered off to
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