Hi,
It seems that 3Com does not pay much atention how its SNMP is
implemented. In 3Com SuperStack II hubs MIB there's an OID:
.1.3.6.1.4.1.43.10.4.2. Its name decodes to
.iso.org.dod.internet.private.enterprises.a3Com.generic.security.securityUserTable.
What You need to know that's read-only
At 04:24 PM 8/29/99 -0400, SysAdmin wrote:
Now watch as I modify this to destroy Regedit 32
That's only if the user has write permissions to regedt32. In terms of
causing the OS to crash, NT won't let you overwrite system binaries that it
is using at the moment. Something else smart to do (at
On Mon, 30 Aug 1999, Nic Bellamy wrote:
tracked this problem to an sprintf() into a buffer on the stack
in the log_xfer() routine in src/log.c. Gotta love it. Sigh.
What's interesting to note is that I notified the contact at ProFTPd of
this exact overflow back during the last ftpd
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED],
Gregory A Lundberg writes:
Which is WHY you should report bugs to the developers first. We know
enough about the code to build a correct patch. We'll probably even test
it against a couple machines before releasing it. Heck, we might even fix
more than the
On Friday, August 27, 1999, Jose Luis Martinez Arranz wrote:
*** libtermcap xterm exploit***
***by m0f0 1999 ***
*** ***
***
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If you subscribed through the HP Electronic
After further research into David LeBlanc's debunking of my posting I have
discovered (rather remembered) that ntoskrnl is loaded from the system
folder into memory where it is accessed exclusively, this frees it from the
write restriction due to system use. I think he must administrate Windows
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
- -
Red Hat, Inc. Security Advisory
Synopsis: Buffer overrun in amd
Advisory ID:RHSA-1999:032-01
Issue date: 1999-08-30
Keywords:
8.2. A denial of service attack can be launched by flooding an update
forwarder with TCP sessions containing updates that the primary
master server will ultimately refuse due to permission problems.
This arises due to the requirement that an update forwarder receiving
a
-Original Message-
From: Aleph One [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Saturday, August 28, 1999 11:31 AM
On Fri, Aug 27, 1999 at 07:04:53PM -0700, Paul Leach (Exchange) wrote:
The server gets to say, in the WWW-Authenticate challenge
header field, for which "realm" it wants
Sorry, hit enter in the first one thinking it would tab
down.
Here it is:
Currently most inplementations of Dynamic DNS or "DDNS" rely
upon only client IP addresses in an access list for
authentication. The impact is that anyone can spoof update
packets from a false source address and the
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
- -
Red Hat, Inc. Security Advisory
Synopsis: Buffer overflow in proftpd
Advisory ID:RHSA-1999:034-01
Issue date: 1999-08-31
Keywords:
On Sun, Aug 29, 1999 at 11:27:48AM -0300, dumped wrote:
Here goes the fix.
dumped
Sekure SDI
Or not.
@@ -181,7 +186,7 @@
/* otherwise everthing is good */
p = mod_privdata_alloc(cmd,"stor_filename",strlen(dir)+1);
- strcpy(p-value.str_val,dir);
+ strncpy(p-value.str_val,
The following is a Security Bulletin from the Microsoft Product Security
Notification Service.
Please do not reply to this message, as it was sent from an unattended
mailbox.
Microsoft Security Bulletin (MS99-032)
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