[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Perhaps I don't see your point. How is this more secure than StackGuard?
StackGuard protection system has an extremaly grave bug
with the terminator and null canaries. In certain circumstances (not rare) this bug
can be exploited
preventing StackGuard to detect
On Tue, 31 Aug 1999, "CC" = Crispin Cowan wrote:
+ So, why would one use the approach of saving the return address on
+ another stack, instead of patching the stack itself, like StackGuard?
+ The only reason I can imagine, is that one does not want to change the
+ stack layout. The
This would seem to protect against precisely the same class of attacks
as StackGuard: those that use buffer overflows to corrupt the return
address in an activation record. The response to attack is subtly
differet:
* StackGuard: assumes the program is hopelessly corrupted, syslog's
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Stack Shield is a new tool that add protection form "stack
smashing" attacks at compile time without changing a line of
code.
The home page is http://www.angelfire.com/sk/stackshield
It is still in beta.
The home page say "Stack Shield uses a more secure protection
