Re: [Catalyst] Re: CSRF

2008-10-01 Thread Ashley
On Sep 30, 2008, at 11:13 PM, Aristotle Pagaltzis wrote: * Ashley [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2008-09-30 19:30]: If scripting is involved that makes it a XSS attack instead, though. No? No. Yeah, that was unclear. I was talking about our own sites and Cat apps, not the web at large. It was in that

Re: [Catalyst] Re: CSRF

2008-10-01 Thread Ashley
Nope. On Sep 30, 2008, at 11:57 PM, Ashley wrote: Might be pretty simple in Cat stuff. The crux of the POST issue seems that the target site's cookies are still safe from the attacking site's POST. ... Form template: form action=[% c.request.uri() %] method=post [% USE Digest.SHA1 -%] input

Re: [Catalyst] Re: CSRF

2008-10-01 Thread Moritz Onken
Am 01.10.2008 um 08:57 schrieb Ashley: On Sep 30, 2008, at 11:13 PM, Aristotle Pagaltzis wrote: * Ashley [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2008-09-30 19:30]: If scripting is involved that makes it a XSS attack instead, though. No? No. Yeah, that was unclear. I was talking about our own sites and Cat

Re: [Catalyst] Re: CSRF

2008-10-01 Thread Tatsuhiko Miyagawa
On Wed, Oct 1, 2008 at 12:19 AM, Ashley [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Form template: form action=[% c.request.uri() %] method=post [% USE Digest.SHA1 -%] input type=hidden value=csrf_check value=[% c.sessionid | sha1_hex %] / /form On my personal site I do similar to this, but using jQuery to

Re: [Catalyst] Re: CSRF

2008-10-01 Thread Moritz Onken
Am 01.10.2008 um 12:20 schrieb Aristotle Pagaltzis: * Moritz Onken [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2008-10-01 09:25]: The best way is to include a random string which has to be stored somewhere for comparison on the server side. Doesn’t have to be stored. Send a random string as well as a HMAC digest of

Re: [Catalyst] Re: CSRF

2008-10-01 Thread Jonathan Rockway
* On Wed, Oct 01 2008, Moritz Onken wrote: I imagine a case where the attacker's site opens a iframe to your site which exploits a XSS issue and can send the hole form information back to the attacker's site. He has now the HMAC and the random string. I was under the impression that you could

Re: [Catalyst] Re: CSRF

2008-10-01 Thread Moritz Onken
Am 01.10.2008 um 14:20 schrieb Jonathan Rockway: * On Wed, Oct 01 2008, Moritz Onken wrote: I imagine a case where the attacker's site opens a iframe to your site which exploits a XSS issue and can send the hole form information back to the attacker's site. He has now the HMAC and the random

Re: [Catalyst] Re: CSRF

2008-10-01 Thread Moritz Onken
Am 01.10.2008 um 16:23 schrieb Aristotle Pagaltzis: * Moritz Onken [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2008-10-01 12:55]: but this does still rely on the fact that there is no XSS issue on your page, doesn't it? So what? If your site has an XSS hole, it’s already game over. The attacker can inject

Re: [Catalyst] Re: CSRF (plus session security)

2008-10-01 Thread Bill Moseley
On Wed, Oct 01, 2008 at 12:20:04PM +0200, Aristotle Pagaltzis wrote: * Moritz Onken [EMAIL PROTECTED] [2008-10-01 09:25]: The best way is to include a random string which has to be stored somewhere for comparison on the server side. Doesn’t have to be stored. Send a random string as well