[chromium-dev] Re: OS X Sandboxing design

2008-11-24 Thread Mike Pinkerton
It's hard to say how much of the scheme-like language is supported. There are some provided examples, but they all say things like "this is an example, don't try to use it". In addition, several modules of the TrustedBSD code aren't present (Apple hand-rolled several of their own) so it's not like

[chromium-dev] Re: OS X Sandboxing design

2008-11-21 Thread Adam Langley
> Definitely we would need a way to give more resources to the renderer > after the process has been locked down. In windows we also have the > fonts issue but we do a neat trick to get them working. That is to say > that we should try hard to use the most restrictive setting ('pure > computation'

[chromium-dev] Re: OS X Sandboxing design

2008-11-21 Thread cpu
Very interesting. Definitely we would need a way to give more resources to the renderer after the process has been locked down. In windows we also have the fonts issue but we do a neat trick to get them working. That is to say that we should try hard to use the most restrictive setting ('pure com

[chromium-dev] Re: OS X Sandboxing design

2008-11-10 Thread Darin Fisher
Very interesting! > As a result, this shouldn't impose any additional requirements or drastically alter our IPC designs. I'd actually be surprised if this didn't have a bearing on our IPC choice. Afterall, the Windows IPC deals in DuplicateHandle, which is all about exposing new resources to the