From: "Mario Profaca" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: July 22, 2008 1:54:38 AM PDT
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [SPY NEWS] A CIA lesson from the field: Never trust another
spy
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/07/20/asia/spy.php
A CIA lesson from the field: Never trust another spy
By Mark Mazzetti
Sunday, July 20, 2008
WASHINGTON: As they complete their training at "The Farm," the CIA's
base in the Virginia Tidewater, young agency recruits are taught a
lesson they are expected never to forget during assignments overseas:
There is no such thing as a friendly intelligence service.
Foreign spy services, even those of America's closest allies, will try
to manipulate you. So you had better learn how to manipulate them
back.
But most CIA veterans agree that no relationship between the spy
agency and a foreign intelligence service is quite as byzantine, or as
maddening, as that between the CIA and the Pakistani Directorate for
Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI.
It is like a bad marriage in which both spouses have long stopped
trusting each other but would never think of breaking up because they
have become so mutually dependent.
Without the ISI's help, U.S. spies in Pakistan would be incapable of
carrying out their primary mission in the country: hunting Islamic
militants, including top members of Al Qaeda. Without the millions of
covert U.S. dollars sent annually to Pakistan, the ISI would have
trouble competing with the spy service of its archrival, India.
But the relationship is complicated by a web of competing interests.
First off, the top U.S. goal in the region is to shore up the Afghan
government and security services to better fight the ISI's traditional
proxies, the Taliban, there.
Inside Pakistan, the primary U.S. interest is to dismantle a Taliban
and Qaeda haven in the mountainous tribal lands.
Throughout the 1990s, Pakistan, and especially the ISI, used the
Taliban and militants from those areas to exert power in Afghanistan
and block India from gaining influence there. The ISI has also
supported other militant groups that carried out operations against
Indian troops in Kashmir, something that complicates Washington's
efforts to stabilize the region.
Of course, there are few examples in history of spy services really
trusting one another. After all, people who earn their salaries by
lying and assuming false identities probably don't make the most
reliable business partners. Moreover, spies know that the best way to
steal secrets is to penetrate the ranks of another spy service.
But circumstances have for years forced successful, if ephemeral,
partnerships among spies. The Office of Strategic Services, the
predecessor to the CIA, worked with the predecessors of the KGB to
hunt Nazis during World War II, even as the United States and the
Soviet Union were quickly becoming adversaries.
These days, the relationship between Moscow and Washington is turning
frosty again, over a number of issues. But, quietly, U.S. and Russian
spies continue to collaborate to combat drug trafficking and organized
crime, and to secure nuclear arsenals.
The relationship between the CIA and the ISI was far less complicated
when the United States and Pakistan were intently focused on one
common goal: kicking the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. For years in
the 1980s, the CIA used the ISI as the conduit to funnel arms and
money to Afghan rebels fighting Soviet forces in Afghanistan.
But even in those good old days, the two spy services were far from
trusting of each other - in particular over the Pakistani quest for
nuclear weapons. In his book "Ghost Wars," the journalist Steve Coll
recounts how the ISI chief in the early 1980s, General Akhtar Abdur
Rahman, banned all social contact between his ISI officers and CIA
operatives in Pakistan. He was also convinced that the CIA had set up
an elaborate bugging network, so he had his officers speak in code on
the telephone.
When the general and his aides were invited by the CIA to visit agency
training sites in the United States, the Pakistanis were forced to
wear blindfolds on the flights into the facilities.
Since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, CIA officers have arrived in
Islamabad knowing that they will probably depend on the ISI at least
as much as they have depended on any liaison spy service in the past.
Unlike spying in the capitals of Europe, where agency operatives can
blend in to develop a network of informants, only a tiny fraction of
CIA officers can walk the streets of Peshawar unnoticed.
And an even smaller fraction could move freely through the tribal
areas to scoop up useful information about militant networks there.
Even the powerful ISI, which is dominated by Punjabis, the largest
ethnic group in Pakistan, has difficulties collecting information in
the tribal lands, the home of fiercely independent Pashtun tribes. For
this reason, the ISI has long been forced to rely on Pashtun tribal
leaders - and in some cases Pashtun militants - as key informants.
Given the natural disadvantages, CIA officers try to get any edge they
can through technology, the one advantage they have over the local
spies.
For example, the Pakistani government has long restricted where the
CIA can fly Predator surveillance drones inside Pakistan, limiting
flight paths to approved "boxes" on a grid map.
The CIA's answer to that restriction? It deliberately flies Predators
beyond the approved areas, just to test Pakistani radars. According to
one former agency officer, the Pakistanis usually notice.
As U.S. and allied casualty rates in Afghanistan have grown in the
last two years, the ISI has become a subject of fierce debate within
the CIA. Many in the spy agency - particularly those stationed in
Afghanistan - accuse their agency colleagues at the Islamabad station
of actually being too cozy with their ISI counterparts. There have
been bitter fights between the CIA station chiefs in Kabul and
Islamabad, particularly about the significance of the militant threat
in the tribal areas.
Veterans of the CIA station in Islamabad point to the capture of a
number of senior Qaeda leaders in Pakistan in recent years as proof
that the Pakistani intelligence service has often shown a serious
commitment to roll up terrorist networks.
And, they point out, the ISI has just as much reason to distrust the
Americans as the CIA has to distrust the ISI. The CIA largely pulled
up stakes in the region after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan
in 1989, rather than staying to resist the chaos and bloody civil war
that led ultimately to the Taliban ascendance in the 1990s.
After the withdrawal, the U.S. tools to understand the complexity of
relationships in Central and South Asia became rusty. The ISI operates
in a neighborhood of constantly shifting alliances, where
double-dealing is an accepted rule of the game, a phenomenon many in
Washington still have problems accepting.
Until late last year, when he was elevated to the command of the
entire army, the Pakistani spymaster who had been running the ISI was
General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. U.S. officials describe Kayani as at
once engaging and inscrutable, an avid golfer with some odd
affectations. He will spend several minutes carefully hand-rolling a
cigarette, then, after taking one puff, he stubs it out.
The grumbling at the CIA about the ISI comes with a certain grudging
reverence for the spy service's Machiavellian qualities. Some former
spies even talk about the Pakistani agency with a mix of awe and
professional jealousy.
One retired senior CIA official said that of all the foreign
spymasters the CIA had dealt with, Kayani was the most formidable and
may have earned the most respect at CIA headquarters in Langley,
Virginia. The soft-spoken general, he said, is a master manipulator.
"We admire those traits," he said.
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