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Intelligence Brief: Iraq
Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein http://www.pinr.com Beginning in earnest on June 23, with an appearance before a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers, commander of coalition troops in Iraq General George Casey and chief of the U.S. Central Command General John Abizaid, the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush mounted a major effort to explain and defend its policies in Iraq that culminated in a speech by Bush at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina that was carried on prime-time television. The Bush public relations offensive was occasioned by recent public opinion polls showing that a majority of the U.S. public no longer approves of the conduct of the Iraq occupation and no longer gives Bush a favorable overall approval rating. The slippage in poll numbers places the administration's policies in jeopardy, carrying the possibility that pressure will mount for the administration to declare a timetable for withdrawal of U.S. forces or even to withdraw them immediately. Seizing upon Bush's fall in popularity, Congressional Democrats have been emboldened to question the course of the occupation and to broach the issue of withdrawal. They have been joined by some Republicans in Congress who desire to retain their seats in the 2006 elections and have concluded that the occupation is a hindrance to realizing their aims. Policy Paralysis With the Sunni-dominated insurgency in Iraq unchecked and marked by a continuous stream of suicide bombings aimed at Iraqi security forces, kidnappings of foreign workers and diplomats, attacks on coalition troops, sabotage of public services, and, most importantly, assassinations of Shi'a leaders, the Bush administration has been challenged by its critics to come up with new policies that might turn the situation in Washington's favor. The administration chose instead to reaffirm its current policy of counting upon the constitution-drafting process in Baghdad to lead to the formation of a legitimate government, and of encouraging the strengthening of Iraqi security forces to the point at which they will be capable of resisting the insurgency successfully on their own account. The most significant result of the Congressional pressure for policy revision was the revelation of cracks in support within the administration for its official positions. Before the Senate hearings, Vice President Richard Cheney had asserted that the insurgency was in its "last throes," providing ammunition for senators to question the administration's strategy. Under intense interrogation, Rumsfeld drew back from Cheney's optimistic statement, acknowledging that the occupation is "a tough business" and predicting that, although the insurgency might still continue in an attenuated form even after the coalition withdrew, it would eventually be defeated by Iraqi forces. The most severe break with the administration came in the testimony of General Abizaid who said that increasing numbers of foreign jihadis were entering Iraq and that the insurgency had not diminished, despite coalition operations in Anbar Province aimed at sealing Iraq's border with Syria, over which the foreign fighters are crossing. Abizaid also warned that U.S. troop morale has been threatened by declining public support for the occupation: "When my soldiers say to me and ask me the question of whether or not they've got the support of the American people, that worries me. And they're starting to do that." Reflecting widespread Congressional sentiment, South Carolina Republican Senator Lindsay Graham remarked that people in his state, which has been a bulwark of support for the administration, have begun to question the occupation: "And I don't think it's a blip on the radar screen. We have a chronic problem on our hands." Massachusetts Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy went as far as to call the occupation a "quagmire," provoking strong denials from Rumsfeld. Far from smoothing the way for Bush's June 28 speech, the Senate hearing intensified public and Congressional doubts about the occupation and generated demands and expectations for new policy directions that were disseminated and reinforced by the media. Reiterating the administration's policies, the speech failed to satisfy the president's critics and his wavering supporters, and did nothing to mobilize public opinion to his side. Bush refused to set a timetable for withdrawal, arguing that if he did so, the insurgents would simply dig in and wait out the occupation. He also rejected the option of substantially increasing the number of U.S. troops in Iraq, arguing that such a move would retard the progress toward having Iraqi forces take over the counter-insurgency. Finally, he did not take up Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari's request for a "Marshall Plan" to rebuild the country. Failure to address reconstruction was the most important gap in administration policy, given that polls show that the Iraqi public ranks security fourth, after basic public services, employment and health care, as their major concerns. With Abizaid saying that "there is a lot of work to be done against the insurgency," the Bush administration's optimistic spin on its current policies is losing effectiveness, revealing a policy paralysis behind the rhetoric. The only factor saving the administration from a crisis of confidence over Iraq is the risk and cost of alternative policies, and the unwillingness of most Congressional critics to embrace any of those alternatives. The Bottom Line The Bush administration is now in its weakest power position since it undertook the Iraq intervention. The administration is internally divided on the prospects of the occupation, Congress is defecting from the administration's policies with partisanship re-emerging and doubts on both sides of the aisle, public support for the occupation and for the president is eroding in both the U.S. and Iraqi publics, and the insurgency continues unabated. Look for the U.S. position in Iraq to continue to weaken and for adoption of a new withdrawal policy to become more likely, despite the danger of a civil war in Iraq if coalition forces pull out. Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein Complete archives at http://www.sitbot.net/ Please let us stay on topic and be civil. OM YAHOO! GROUPS LINKS
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