Hiding Bodies by Patrick J. Sloyan  

On February 25 1991 the war correspondent Leon Daniel arrived at a 
battlefield at the tip of the neutral zone between Iraq and Saudi 
Arabia. 
Daniel was one of a pool of journalists who had been held back from 
witnessing action the previous day, when Desert Storm's ground war 
had been launched. 


There, right where he was standing,8,400 soldiers of the US First 
Infantry Division - known as the Big Red One - had attacked an 
estimated 8,000 Iraqis with 3,000 Abrams main battle tanks, Bradley 
fighting vehicles, Humvees and armoured personnel carriers. 


Daniel had seen the aftermath of modest firefights in Vietnam. "The 
bodies would be stacked up like cordwood," he recalled. Yet this 
ferocious attack had not produced a single visible body. It was a 
battlefield without the stench of urine, faeces, blood and bits of 
flesh. Daniel wondered what happened to the estimated 6,000 Iraqi 
defenders who had vanished. "Where are the bodies?" he finally asked 
the First Division's public affairs officer, an army major. "What 
bodies?" the major replied. 


Months later, Daniel and the world would learn why the dead had 
eluded eyewitnesses, cameras and video footage. Thousands of Iraqi 
soldiers, some of them firing their weapons from first world war-
style trenches, had been buried by ploughs mounted on Abrams tanks. 
The tanks had flanked the lines so that tons of sand from the plough 
spoil had funnelled into the trenches. Just behind the tanks, 
straddling the trench line, came Bradleys pumping machine-gun bullets 
into Iraqi troops. 


"I came through right after the lead company," said Colonel Anthony 
Moreno. "What you saw was a bunch of buried trenches with people's 
arms and legs sticking out of them. For all I know, we could have 
killed thousands." 


Two other brigades used the same tank-mounted ploughs and Bradleys to 
obliterate an estimated 70 miles of defensive trenches. They moved 
swiftly. The operation had been rehearsed repeatedly, weeks before, 
on a mile-long trench line built according to satellite photographs. 
The finishing touches were made by armoured combat earth-movers 
(ACEs). These massive bulldozers, with armoured cockpits impervious 
to small-arms fire, smoothed away any hint of the carnage. "A lot of 
guys were scared, but I enjoyed it," said PFC Joe Queen, an ACE 
driver awarded a Bronze Star for his performance in the battle. 


What happened in the neutral zone that day is a metaphor for the art 
of war in an era when domestic politics is often more important than 
the predictable outcome on the field of battle. In 1991 American 
voters rallied behind President George Bush Sr for the seemingly 
bloodless confrontation with Saddam Hussein. Neatly hidden from a 
small army of journalists was the reality of war - a reality that can 
make these very same voters recoil in disapproval. 


His son is likely to use the same sort of tactics to blind one of the 
world's freest and most influential media establishments. Running the 
show for President George Bush is the man who manipulated global 
perceptions of the first Gulf war for Bush Sr: Dick Cheney. Then 
defence secretary and now vice-president, Cheney is likely to buffalo 
the New York Times, the Associated Press, CNN and others ready to 
bend to US government censorship. 


According to White House officials, no final decisions have been made 
by Bush, Cheney and current defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld. "We're 
still negotiating with the media," said one administration official. 
But Bush has already implemented ground rules that require 
journalists to give up their mobile and satellite phones to military 
commanders who would control the movements of these so-called pool 
reporters during Desert Storm II. If the final rules, organised by 
the Pentagon, are anything like the pool system designed by Bush Sr 
and Cheney in 1991, the world will be given a cloudy mixture of video 
footage and misinformation that will fog the reality of war. 


Daniel, the wire service veteran, was part of the 1991 pool system. 
About 150 American journalists, photographers and film crews were 
scattered among attacking units. Their reports were supposed to be 
fed to a rear headquarters and then shared by hundreds of journalists 
from around the world. "They wouldn't let us see anything," said 
Daniel, who has seen just about everything there is to see in war. 
Not a single eyewitness account, photograph or strip of video of 
combat between 400,000 soldiers in the desert was produced by this 
battalion of professional observers. 


Most of the grisly photos from Desert Storm seen today were the work 
of independent journalists who raced to the "Highway of Death" north 
of Kuwait, where war planes had destroyed thousands of vehicles in 
which Iraqi soldiers had fled after the start of the ground war. The 
area was free of the military handlers who routinely interrupted 
interviews to chastise soldiers into changing their statements while 
reporters stood back, or forcibly removed film from cameras that 
captured images deemed offensive by an Army public affairs officer. 


Cheney, brimming with contempt and hostility for the press, saw 
journalists as critics of the military who must be 
contained. "Frankly, I looked on it as a problem to be managed," he 
said after the war. "The information function was extraordinarily 
important. I did not have a lot of confidence that I could leave that 
to the press." 


Since being brought into government as an intern by Donald Rumsfeld, 
then a congressman, Cheney has spent most of his adult life fencing 
with the media and learning its strengths and weaknesses. A stunning 
victory in 1991 was the media's agreement to permit the Pentagon to 
censor journalists' reports before they were printed or broadcast. In 
the past the Pentagon had left censorship up to individual reporters. 
During 10 years of war in Vietnam, not one journalist violated self-
imposed rules against reporting, for example, specific locations of 
attacks. 


As a result, the conventional wisdom was that the government was not 
violating the First Amendment to the Constitution: that 
Congress "will make no law to abridge [. . .] freedom of the press". 
Only a handful of journalists went to federal court to challenge the 
government censorship imposed by Bush, Cheney and Colin Powell, 
chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. The court ruled the suit moot -
 the war was over - but invited the press to try again so that the 
issue might be settled. It never was. 


The media was more duped than cowed. Cheney won over some people with 
the promise that places in the pool would give them an advantage over 
competitors. For instance, a Washington Post pool reporter kept to 
himself all details of a US Marine operation for exclusive use by the 
Post and, later, a book. 


For independent journalists, life was much more difficult. More than 
70 operating outside the pool system were arrested, detained, 
threatened at gunpoint or chased from the front line. Army public 
affairs officers made nightly visits to hotels and restaurants in 
Hafir al Batin, a Saudi town on the Iraqi border. Reporters and 
photographers would bolt from the table. The slower ones were 
arrested. 


But when the ground war started, the mighty were hamstrung along with 
the mediocre. The Associated Press, which benefited most from a 
system that turned all journalists into wire service reporters, sent 
photographer Scott Applewhite to cover victims of a Scud missile 
attack near Dahran. The warhead had hit an American tent, killing 25 
army reservists and wounding 70. It was the single biggest loss to 
Saddam Hussein during Desert Storm. Applewhite, an accredited pool 
member, was stopped by US Army military police. When he objected, 
they punched and handcuffed him while ripping the film from his 
cameras. 


Cheney made sure it was just as bad for the rest of the pool. When 
the ground war started, the defence secretary declared a "media 
blackout", blocking all reports. After the war, General Norman 
Schwarzkopf and his aides revealed that the blackout was ordered 
because of fears that Saddam would use chemical weapons on allied 
forces. Potential news reports of soldiers writhing in agony from a 
cloud of sarin nerve gas had spooked the president and his 
commanders. "No pictures of that," said General Richard Neal, who 
directed ground operations during the war. 


As a result, reports and film were delayed or "lost" by military 
commanders so that most of it arrived too late for most deadlines. 
Neal and Schwarzkopf provided the bulk of briefings and videos in 
Saudi Arabia, and these were the first reports to filter through; 
many became the basis of the most lasting perceptions of Desert 
Storm. Gun camera footage always showed empty bridges or aircraft 
hangars being destroyed by "smart bombs" - laser-guided munitions 
that never struck a single human. But only 6% of the munitions used 
against Iraq could be guided to a target. Over 94% were far less 
surgical during the 30-day air war, which often saw 400 sorties a 
day. Those bombs depended on gravity and variable winds, and were 
capable of causing "collateral damage" to nearby unarmed civilians. 


The global television audience was awed by Tomahawk cruise missiles 
roaring from the decks of US Navy warships at sea. But less than 10% 
hit their targets. The missile's accuracy depends on landmarks that 
can be spotted by an on-board camera that can shift the weapon's 
direction. But the featureless desert led many Tomahawks to wander 
away like so many lost patrols, according to Pentagon studies.


Schwarzkopf conducted televised briefings about the allied 
counterattack on Saddam's Scud missiles that had terrorised Saudi 
Arabia as well as Israel. Yet an air force study after the war showed 
that Iraq had ended up with as many Scud launchers as it had 
possessed before the war started. A murky Schwarzkopf video showed 
the destruction of what seemed to be a Scud launcher, but later 
turned out to be a bombed oil truck. 


Controlling the briefings, the videos and the press during Desert 
Storm was an extension of US policy started by President Ronald 
Reagan and his defence chief, Caspar Weinberger. It was Weinberger, 
an anglophile, who admired Margaret Thatcher's manipulation of the 
media during the Falklands war, which led directly to her political 
revival in 1982. A year later, Weinberger took control of the US 
media when Reagan found himself in a deepening hole in Lebanon. 


On October 23 1983, 241 US Marines died after a truck laden with 
explosives destroyed a makeshift barracks at Beirut airport. The 
massacre suddenly focused attention on the ageing actor's foreign 
policy decisions as the reports and pictures showed the removal of 
American bodies. Within 48 hours of the bombing, the president 
dispatched the first wave of 5,000 American troops to Grenada in the 
Caribbean. 


But the invasion angered Thatcher. Grenada was linked to the UK as a 
member of the Commonwealth. Only the previous week, Washington had 
informed London that there was no need for outside intervention, as 
local political turmoil was likely to play itself out without further 
bloodshed. Geoffrey Howe, Britain's foreign minister, was 
explicit. "The invasion of Grenada was clearly designed to divert 
attention," Howe said in an interview. "You had disaster in Beirut; 
now triumph in Grenada. 'Don't look there,' " he said, gesturing with 
his forefinger, "look over here." 


Reporters were banned from Grenada. Those who tried to land on the 
island, such as Morris Thompson of Newsday, were arrested and 
imprisoned on US ships offshore. All details and videos were supplied 
by military reporters and photographers at Pentagon briefings. 


The media barons howled, but little changed. When Bush Sr invaded 
Panama in 1989, journalists were once again banned. Democratic 
congressman Charles Rangle of New York still insists that as many as 
5,000 civilians in Panama City were killed by US invaders. But there 
are no pictures, no eyewitness accounts. 


The invasion of Panama and the arrest of Manuel Noriega were, like 
Desert Storm later, something of a political triumph for Bush. But 
the reality of that particular war asserted itself during a televised 
briefing by the president. It was just at the end of the session, 
when Bush was wisecracking with reporters, that most networks split 
their screens to show the arrival of dead US soldiers from Panama. 


Bush was caught bantering as flag-draped coffins arrived at an air 
force base in Dover, Delaware - a military mortuary. Later that week, 
Bush ordered the press banned from covering the arrival ceremonies 
for the fallen. President Clinton continued the ban. And his 
successor, President George Bush, also wants to keep the dead out of 
the national limelight. 





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