The US and that 'other'
axis By Jephraim P
Gundzik
Beijing's increasingly close ties with
Moscow and Tehran will thwart Washington's foreign policy goal of
expanding US security footholds in the Middle East, Central Asia and
Asia. However, the primacy of economic stability will most likely
prevent a proxy-style military confrontation, in Iran or North
Korea, between China and the US.
Threat to 'axis of evil'
unwinds in Baghdad In January 2002 during his State of the
Union address to the US congress, President George W Bush outlined
his administration's primary foreign policy goal as preventing
"regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends
and allies with weapons of mass destruction". Bush went on to
specifically name Iraq, Iran and North Korea as state sponsors of
terrorism, infamously dubbing this group the "axis of evil". After
failing to gather multilateral support in the United Nation, Bush
declared war on Iraq.
Since the beginning of the war in
Iraq, Beijing has worked feverishly to strengthen its ties with
Moscow and Teheran in an apparent effort to prevent US military
action against the remaining "axis of evil" members, Iran and North
Korea. In addition to recent massive energy deals with Teheran,
which place Iran in China's security web, both Beijing and Moscow
have accelerated the transfer of missile technology to Teheran,
while selling the Islamic republic increasingly sophisticated
military equipment.
Armed with a vast array of anti-ship and
long-range missiles, Iran can target US troop positions throughout
the Middle East and strike US Navy ships. Iran can also use its
weapons to blockade the Straits of Hormuz through which one-third of
the world's traded oil is shipped. With the help of Beijing and
Moscow, Teheran is becoming an increasingly unappealing military
target for the US.
As in the Middle East, the
China-Iran-Russia axis is challenging US interests in Central Asia.
Washington is working feverishly to gain security footholds in
Tajikistan and Kazakhstan to complement existing US military bases
in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. China and Russia are
working equally hard to assert their influence in Central Asia. A
good portion of this work is being done under the auspices of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO.)
Composed of China,
Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the SCO
was created in 1996 and reborn in 2001 when it was bolstered to
counter the initial eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. The SCO is becoming an increasingly powerful regional
mutual security organization. Joint military maneuvers between SCO
member states began in 2003. In 2004, the SCO created a rapid
reaction anti-terror strike force. According to Igor Rogachev,
Russia's ambassador to China, the new force is designed to combat
and respond to terrorist attacks in any SCO member nation.
In 2004, Iran made it clear that it was interested in
joining the SCO. Iran's mammoth energy deals with China imply that
Tehran is now integral to China's national security. A good way to
formalize security relations between China and Iran is through the
SCO.
The autocratic governments of Central Asia have much
more in common with China, Iran and Russia than with the US. At the
same time, China and Russia can invest exponentially larger sums of
money in Central Asian countries than the US. Almost all of China's
and Russia's foreign investment is conducted by state-owned
enterprises. Investment by these enterprises is primarily driven by
geopolitical expediency.
Foreign investment in the US is
controlled by profit-driven private enterprises. While the US
government can dole out aid to Central Asian countries, the size of
this aid pales in comparison to the money that can be lavished on
Central Asian countries by China's and Russia's state-owned
enterprises. In 2004, commercial and security ties between
Kazakhstan and China were strengthened when Beijing signed a deal
with Astana to build a pipeline from the Caspian Sea to western
China.
The pipeline deal with Kazakhstan prompted Beijing to
pledge increased military and technical assistance to Kyrgyzstan,
through which this pipeline passes. Despite its small size and lack
of natural resources, the geostrategic importance of Kyrgyzstan,
which hosts military bases for both Russia and the US, is enormous.
Recent political instability in Kyrgyzstan especially alarmed
Washington.
In early April, US Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld visited Bishkek to ensure that Kyrgyzstan's new government
would continue to host US military forces. In addition, Rumsfeld
tried to persuade interim President Kurmanbek Bakiyev to allow the
US to station AWACS surveillance planes in Kyrgyzstan. At the
beginning of 2005, the Kyrgyz Foreign Ministry denied this request
by Washington, saying that such equipment was beyond the original
humanitarian and peace-keeping mission of US. forces in Kyrgyzstan.
Bakiyev made it clear that Washington would not be allowed to deploy
the AWACS or to establish any more bases or expand existing
facilities in Kyrgyzstan.
Bakiyev also stressed that US
forces would not be in the country permanently. Deepening economic
and security ties between Central Asian countries and China and
Russia could eventually reduce Washington's influence in the region
to Afghanistan. However, in addition to three operational military
bases already in Afghanistan, Washington plans on building another
six military bases, further amplifying the US military threat to
China, Russia and Iran.
East Asia is another region where
the China-Iran-Russia alliance has common interests diametrically
opposed to Washington's. The most obvious country where these
interests conflict is North Korea. As with Iran, the Bush
administration is determined to force North Korea's government to
acquiesce to US security demands. Again, like Iran, North Korea
poses a strategic threat to Washington's global hegemonic
aspirations. The mutual antagonism by Iran and North Korea of the US
has naturally brought these two countries together. North Korea has
been an integral supplier to Iran's ballistic missile program over
the past 15 years.
The US State Department has sanctioned
the Changgwang Sinyong Corporation, North Korea's main missile
exporter, four times since 2000 for engaging in proliferation
activities with Iran. In 2004, US intelligence reported that North
Korea was helping Iran build long-range missiles. While Iran's ties
to North Korea are strategic, Russia's and China's ties to the
country are security driven. Both Russia and China share common
borders with North Korea.
The Soviet Union had strong ties
with North Korea between 1950 and 1990 punctuated by a mutual
security agreement. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia's
relations with North Korea weakened sharply. President Boris Yeltsin
chose not to renew the mutual security agreement with North Korea in
favor of strengthening relations with South Korea.
President
Vladimir Putin reestablished the historically close ties between
Russia and North Korea. In 2000, Putin traveled to Pyongyang. North
Korea's leader, Kim Jong-il, paid return visits to Russia in 2001
and 2002. In addition to official state visits, Moscow and Pyongyang
have exchanged several ministry-level visits in the past two years.
Pyongyang also enjoys very close relations with Beijing, with which
high-level visits have been exchanged regularly in the past several
years.
More importantly, Pyongyang and Beijing are tied
together by a mutual security agreement. North Korea is an important
security buffer for both China and Russia against US military
projection in Asia. With Beijing and Moscow clearly in accord about
countering Washington's global hegemonic aspirations, neither
country is likely to sell out their relations with North Korea and
this security buffer. More likely, Beijing and Moscow would like to
bolster the security buffer in the light of expanding US militarism.
It is extremely unlikely that the US will convince North Korea to
give up its nuclear weapons and uranium enrichment program because
both Beijing and Moscow need North Korea and the security buffer it
provides.
Playing in Washington's backyard In
2004, Russia and China launched a counter-offensive to the expansion
of US militarism in Asia. Beijing and Moscow began to court Latin
America's new leftist governments in an unprecedented slap to the
US. Both Russia and China have strengthened relations with
Washington's arch foe in Latin America - Venezuela. In November
2004, Moscow agreed to sell Caracas as many as 30 combat helicopters
and 100,000 automatic rifles. In addition, Venezuela is considering
the purchase of up to 50 MiG-29 fighter jets from Russia to replace
aging F-16s.
The Russia-Venezuela arms deal was widely
criticized in Washington. Both Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice have voiced strong
opposition to the deal. In late 2004, Venezuela's President Hugo
Chavez visited Beijing, where he signed several oil sector
investment deals with the China National Petroleum Corporation.
Chavez has also stated that he would like to give oil export
preference to China rather than the US. China also signed
significant energy-related investment deals with Brazil, Ecuador and
Argentina in 2004. The willingness of Beijing and Moscow to
challenge US security so close to home clearly indicates that a
geostrategic battle has begun.
Security threat or
strategic competitor? Beijing's expanding foreign relations
both within and outside the China-Iran-Russia alliance and China's
growing militarism have begun to repaint Washington's perceptions of
US-China relations. These perceptions have been echoed by
Washington's closest allies in Asia - Taipei and Tokyo. In mid-2004,
reports by both the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission
(USCC) and the Pentagon depicted China as a major threat to US
national security.
The USCC was created by Congress in 2000
"to monitor, investigate and submit to Congress an annual report on
the national security implications of the bilateral trade and
economic relationship between the United States and the People's
Republic of China, and to provide recommendations, where
appropriate, to Congress for legislative and administrative action".
In June 2004, the USCC released its annual report on China.
This report noted that China was deliberately using economic
warfare against Washington by creating a "competitive advantage over
US manufacturers". The report specifically referred to the
undervaluation of the yuan against the dollar and Beijing's
(alleged) disregard for World Trade Organization rules as weapons in
China's economic war with the US. The report described China's
expanding relations with Iran as countering multilateral efforts to
stabilize international oil supplies and prices.
The USCC
report also noted that Russia was supplying increasingly
sophisticated weapons to China and that these weapons were part of
Beijing's strategy for defeating US forces in the event of war with
Taiwan. A congressionally mandated report on China by the Pentagon
described China's Russia-assisted military buildup as giving China
the ability "to cause significant damage to all of Taiwan's
airfields and quickly degrade Taiwan's ground based air-defenses and
associated command and control". Most alarming, the Pentagon report
warned that Chinese military strategists were considering the use of
nuclear weapons against US and Taiwanese forces.
The Bush
administration's concern over China's growing military power is also
depicted in Washington's reaction to the European Union's proposed
lifting of its China arms embargo. Washington's greatest concern
about renewed arms trade between the EU and China was that this
trade would permanently tip the balance of power away from Taiwan
and toward China. Even worse, European arms could be used to kill US
troops in Asia. Of course, the possibility of Beijing using European
weapons to kill US troops presupposes that a war between China and
the US will erupt.
Taiwan's President Chen Shui-bian and his
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) share Washington's concerns about
China's military threat. The Chen government's concern stems from
its drive for Taiwan's independence from China and Beijing's
forceful reminders that Taiwan is part of China. In the lead up to
Taiwan's legislative elections in late 2004, Chen campaigned on a
platform of Taiwanese independence. Though Chen's DPP suffered
significant losses in these elections, Beijing's response was
largely entrained in the form of China's anti-secession law.
The law was meant to firmly warn Chen against seeking
Taiwan's independence from China in the event that the DPP won a
legislative majority. The DPP's losses to the unification-minded
opposition takes much of the bite out of the law. In addition,
Chen's opposition, the Nationalist Party, has permanently stalled
legislation seeking about $18 billion to bolster Taiwan's missile
defense system. The opposition has realized that Taiwan has no hope
of defending against a military attack from the mainland, prompting
renewed ties between Taiwan's Nationalist Party and Beijing.
Along with Washington and Taipei, Tokyo also demonstrated
its growing concern over China's increasing military might. In
December 2004, the Japanese Defense Agency issued a defense policy
guideline that defined China as a potential security threat. The
report noted, "China, which has significant influence on the
region's security, has been modernizing its nuclear and missile
capabilities as well as naval and air forces, and expanding its area
of operation at sea."
In a joint US-Japan security statement
issued in February, Tokyo went further, agreeing that Japan would
"encourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan
Strait through dialogue". Both the defense policy guideline and
Tokyo's concern over tension between China and Taiwan are a dramatic
departure from Japan's post-war foreign policy. The change in
foreign policy focus from military pacifism to military assertion is
being driven by Washington's own security concerns.
These
same concerns drove Tokyo to encourage oil exploration in an area of
the East China Sea that is claimed by China. Japan's military
assertion has accelerated China's defense buildup while contributing
to the creation of the China-Iran-Russia alliance. The shift in
Tokyo's foreign policy has led to a sharp deterioration in China's
relations with Japan. Foreign policies in Beijing, Washington and
Tokyo are all characterized by two separate components -
geopolitical relations and economic relations.
Cold War
redux Beijing's geopolitical relations with Washington and
Tokyo are arguably at their lowest ebb since China established
formal relations with the US and Japan in the 1970s. The
deterioration in China's relations with the US and Japan and the
resultant improvement in relations with Iran and Russia are being
driven by Washington's outsized global security concerns. These
security concerns are becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy for
Washington.
In sharp contrast to geopolitical relations,
economic relations between Beijing, Washington and Tokyo remain
quite strong. The mutual interdependence of these economies argues
strongly against the preeminence of security issues in overall
relations. China is the largest trading partner of Japan and third
largest trading partner of the US. In addition to substantial trade
links, American and Japanese companies have invested tens of
billions of dollars in China over the past 15 years. Nonetheless,
Beijing, Washington and Tokyo have all elevated the importance of
security to overall economic well-being.
While a conflict
between the US and China over Iran or North Korea cannot be ruled
out, economic interdependence suggests Beijing and Washington have
entered a period of geopolitical detente. Beijing's increasingly
close relations with Moscow and Tehran will contain Washington's
further military projection in the Middle East, Central Asia and
Asia and foil the Bush administration's plans for subduing
uncooperative governments in Iran and North Korea. Finally,
Washington's unilateralist foreign policy will increasingly isolate
the US to the benefit of China's foreign economic relations, making
Beijing all the stronger.
Jephraim P Gundzik is
president of Condor Advisers, Inc. Condor Advisers provides emerging
markets investment risk analysis to individuals and institutions
globally. Please visit for further information.
(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved.
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