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Brzezinski: "Bush's suicidal statecraft" - What gives? Richard K. Moore In the article below, Brzezinski launches a full-scale attack on Bush and the war in Iraq. He even calls for an early withdrawal, leaving the Iraqi's to sort things out for themselves, one way or the other. I find it challenging to fathom what Brzezinski is up to here, or where he's coming from. We might start by recalling two items from his past. The first regards the war between the USSR and Afghanistan, of which Brzezinski was one of the architects, and which he afterwards publicly bragged about as being a coup in the cold war. In order to launch this war, various Islamic terrorist organizations were created, armed, and funded by the CIA, recruiting from all over the Middle East. They were unleashed in order to draw the Soviets into their own Vietnam quagmire. The world "Taliban" means student; in particular a student of the CIA terrorist schools. This was an act of state-sponsored terrorism on the part of the U.S., leading predictably to a very dirty and bloody conflict. The war was also accompanied by a Matrix campaign which portrayed the terrorists as domestic, self-motivated freedom fighters. The second item to recall is Brzezinski's recent book (1997), "The Grand Chessboard". A primary thesis of the book is that the U.S. should not shrink from empire: we are top dog now and should take whatever measures are necessary to maintain that position, as the world's first truly global empire. In a very real sense, the PNAC agenda can be seen as a specific battle-plan drawn up in order to fulfill the strategic vision Brzezinski articulated. In addition, the Patriot Act is in some sense a response to Brzezinski's warning that "Democracy is inimical to imperial mobilization". With these observations in mind, let's examine some of Brzezinski's statements. First however, you may want to skip down and read Brzezinski's article, and see what sense you can make of it. --- ZB: That war, advocated by a narrow circle of decision makers for motives still not fully exposed, propagated publicly by demagogic rhetoric reliant on false assertions, has turned out to be much more costly in blood and money than anticipated. All of this applies equally to the war Brzezinski helped create in Afghanistan, apart perhaps for the part about anticipated costs. In truth he is the pot calling the kettle black, although given his stature he can probably assume most readers wouldn't be noticing his own true color. So far, it seems Brzezinski is simply doing a hatchet job on Bush, using his prestige, saying whatever works as anti-Bush propaganda. This would indicate that the CFR-level community is ready to dump Bush, as they dumped Nixon, hoping that all the shit will stick to him as they flush him away, as it did with Nixon: the scapegoat scenario. Compounding U.S. political dilemmas is the degradation of America's moral standing in the world. The country that has for decades stood tall in opposition to political repression, torture and other violations of human rights has been exposed as sanctioning practices that hardly qualify as respect for human dignity. Ditto pot & kettle; ditto scapegoat propaganda. But it need not be so. A real course correction is still possible, and it could start soon with a modest and common-sense initiative by the president to engage the Democratic congressional leadership in a serious effort to shape a bipartisan foreign policy for an increasingly divided and troubled nation. This is totally in line with a 'clean flush' agenda. they dump Bush, everyone in Washington and media-land reveals they didn't really like his policies in the first place, and Americans believe that democracy has been restored - as they did when Nixon resigned. If Bush were to scale back his goals in Iraq, that would be a retreat, a failure - not only for Bush, but for America's reputation as a tough guy that you better watch out for. But if the whole situation can be blamed entirely on Bush - a rogue President who lost it, like Nixon - then any retrenchment will be seen as well-intentioned attempt to clean up an unfortunate mess. The Establishment survives, and all options are open as regards policy shifts. But then we'd be left with Cheney and Rumsfeld. Either they'd need to be dumped as well, or else they could have 'changes of heart' - they were only taking orders and being good soldiers - like the fearsome flying monkeys who became like puppies once the wicked witch had been slain. In a bipartisan setting, it would be easier not only to scale down the definition of success in Iraq but actually to get out - perhaps even as early as next year. And the sooner the United States leaves, the sooner the Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis will either reach a political arrangement on their own or some combination of them will forcibly prevail. Brzezinski knows full well that the U.S. will never vacate Iraq. We've built, and are still building, very permanent military bases, establishing just the kind of imperial infrastructure Brzezinski himself so eloquently promotes. He never mentions in this article the elephant in the kitchen - oil - and he knows full well that the U.S. will never relinquish control over those reserves now that control has been achieved. The PNAC document says that the issue of Iraq transcends the issue of Saddam's regime; similarly it transcends Bush's regime. Brzezinski is simply taking a 'high moral ground' position with his withdrawal ruse, donning the feathers of a dove, knowing that the stand has no practical political relevance. The substance of his proposal has to do with the 'bipartisan' approach and the opening-up of options. The bipartisan part is important, because it reinforces the image of 'democracy restored'. It is a safe tactic, given that the Democrats on The Hill are not substantially different then Republicans in their politics. And they will fall over themselves with glee at being invited back into the bargain-politics arena. The opening up of options is also very important. In fact, Brzezinski is proposing that the U.S. abandon any pretense of, or responsibility for, restoring order or establishing democracy in Iraq, even to the point of simply cutting and running - even a bloodbath would be acceptable. Once options are opened up that widely for discussion, one can rather easily predict the 'salvage strategy' that is likely to be adopted. That strategy will have, I imagine, two parts: one about the Iraqis, and one about the oil. As regards the oil, the decision will be that the reserves are too important to the world economy to be put under Iraqi control 'during a period of adjustment and instability'. As a trustee for the world, and for the Iraqis, the U.S. will 'protect and operate' the oil fields in 'the interim', and will need its bases for that purpose, and to ensure instability in Iraq doesn't spill over the borders. As regards the Iraqis, based on the current covert campaign to stir up a civil war in Iraq, and the relative autonomy given to the Kurds, it seems the policy will be centered around dividing Iraq up into mini-states. along ethnic-religious lines: Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds, etc. This would divide the problem of controlling the region into manageable chunks, and lead to a combination of stability and instability, providing maximum flexibility as regards future interventions. The mini-states would be a bit like the Palestinian areas in Israel: treated as autonomous with respect to dealing with their own problems of survival, yet always vulnerable to air strikes, blockades, or other relatively inexpensive yet effective interventions. We might keep in mind that Israeli security personnel have been busy training the U.S. occupation forces in how to deal with the Iraqi resistance, based on their experience with, and policies toward, the Palestinians. We might also recall the years of sanctions, no-fly zones, etc. It would not be difficult to sell this plan to the Iraqis. If the U.S. ended its attacks in Iraq, offered significant funds and assistance for infrastructure reconstruction, and promised to withdraw its forces to its bases (and pipelines, and oil fields, and national borders) the Iraqis would have little choice but to go along with the full package, despite its drawbacks. They are sick of the fighting, and life is almost impossible under the occupation and with most infrastructures not operating. This way the U.S. gets everything it ever wanted in Iraq - bases and oil - and it can free its troops from an engagement that never did serve any useful purpose for 'U.S. interests'. The world will be so relieved to see the end of the unpopular war that they will not challenge our residual presence and role, nor will they berate us for Bush's prior mistakes. Bush served a useful purpose by getting us into Iraq and creating a situation so grotesque that anything less will now be perceived as being acceptable. He took a mile and we can keep the inch we really want. That is how U.S. strategic planners will view the situation, and perhaps how they have viewed it from the beginning. The whole neocon clique were known to be a pack of attack dogs: they were unleashed; they captured territory; we can now apologize that they got off leash; and we get to keep the bits we want. It was necessary that Bush based the campaign on lies, so that we can now say that he was wrong but he was sincere and perhaps deranged - getting us off the hook for our actual oil-imperialist motivation. Before joining the neocon lynch mob, recall Bob Dylan's words to those who felt like lynching Medgar Evers' killer: "He was only a pawn in their game." As a consequence of this well-thought-out grand strategy, if that's what it has been, the U.S. would emerge not only with its oil and bases, but with most of its military forces mobilized and freed up from active assignments. After a bit of R&R, and the sending home of the most exhausted, the rest would be all ready for the next major PNAC campaign. And this time we will have a much better cover story: another false-flag event, 9/11 number two. Brzezinski is playing the role of Antony, in Julius Caesar. In his dove clothes, he tells us he "has not come to praise war, but to bury it." But in the end, his words set the stage for the next episode of combat. rkm -------------------------------------------------------- http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article10618.htm George W. Bush's suicidal statecraft Flaying away with a stick at a hornets' nest while loudly proclaiming "I will stay the course" is an exercise in catastrophic leadership. By Zbigniew Brzezinski Tribune Media Services International 10/13/05 "ICH" - WASHINGTON - Sixty years ago, Arnold Toynbee concluded, in his monumental "A Study of History," that the ultimate cause of imperial collapse was "suicidal statecraft." Sadly for President George W. Bush's place in history but - much more important - ominously for America's future, it has lately seemed as if that adroit phrase might be applicable to the policies pursued by the United States since the cataclysm of 9/11. Though there have been some hints lately that the administration may be beginning to reassess the goals, so far defined largely by slogans, of its unsuccessful military intervention in Iraq, Bush's speech of Oct. 6 was a throwback to the more demagogic formulations that he employed during the presidential campaign of 2004 to justify the war that he himself started. That war, advocated by a narrow circle of decision makers for motives still not fully exposed, propagated publicly by demagogic rhetoric reliant on false assertions, has turned out to be much more costly in blood and money than anticipated. It has precipitated worldwide criticism, while in the Middle East it has stamped the United States as the successor to British imperialism and as a partner of Israel in the military repression of the Arabs. Fair or not, that perception has become widespread in the world of Islam as a whole. More than a reformulation of U.S. goals in Iraq is now needed, however. The persistent reluctance of the administration to confront the political background of the terrorist menace has reinforced public sympathy among Muslims for the terrorists. It is a self-delusion for Americans to be told that the terrorists are motivated mainly by an abstract "hatred of freedom" and that their acts are a reflection of a profound cultural hostility. If that were so, Stockholm or Rio de Janeiro would be as much at risk as New York. Yet in addition to New Yorkers, the principal victims of serious terrorist attacks have been Australians in Bali, Spaniards in Madrid, Israelis in Tel Aviv, Egyptians in the Sinai and Britons in London. There is an obvious political thread connecting these events: The targets are America's allies and client states in the deepening U.S. military intervention in the Middle East. Terrorists are not born but shaped by events, experiences, impressions, hatreds, ethnic myths, historical memories, religious fanaticism and deliberate brainwashing. They are also shaped by images of what they see on television, and especially by their feelings of outrage at what they perceive to be a brutalizing denigration of their religious kin's dignity by heavily armed foreigners. An intense political hatred for America, Britain and Israel is drawing recruits for terrorism not only from the Middle East but from as far away as Ethiopia, Morocco, Pakistan, Indonesia and even the Caribbean. America's ability to cope with nuclear nonproliferation has also suffered. The contrast between the attack on the militarily weak Iraq and America's forbearance of the nuclear-armed North Korea has strengthened the conviction of the Iranians that their security can only be enhanced by nuclear weapons. Moreover, the recent U.S. decision to assist India's nuclear program, driven largely by the desire for India's support for the war in Iraq and as a hedge against China, has made the United States look like a selective promoter of nuclear weapons proliferation. This double standard will complicate the quest for a constructive resolution of the Iranian nuclear problem. Compounding U.S. political dilemmas is the degradation of America's moral standing in the world. The country that has for decades stood tall in opposition to political repression, torture and other violations of human rights has been exposed as sanctioning practices that hardly qualify as respect for human dignity. Even more reprehensible is the fact that the shameful abuse and/or torture in Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib was exposed not by an outraged administration but by the U.S. news media. In response, the administration confined itself to punishing a few low-level perpetrators; none of the top civilian and military decision-makers in the Department of Defense and the National Security Council who sanctioned "stress interrogations" (torture, in other words) was forced to resign, nor to face public disgrace and prosecution. The administration's opposition to the International Criminal Court retroactively now seems quite self-serving. Finally, complicating the sorry foreign policy record are war-related economic trends, with spending on defense and security escalating dramatically. The budgets for the Department of Defense and for the Department of Homeland Security are now larger than the total budgets of most nations, and they are likely to continue escalating even as the growing budget and trade deficits are transforming America into the world's no. 1 debtor nation. At the same time, the direct and indirect costs of the war in Iraq are mounting, even beyond the pessimistic prognoses of the war's early opponents, making a mockery of the administration's initial predictions. Every dollar so committed is a dollar not spent on investment, on scientific innovation or on education, all fundamentally relevant to America's long-term economic primacy in a highly competitive world. It should be a source of special concern for thoughtful Americans that even nations known for their traditional affection for America have become openly critical of American policy. As a result, large swathes of the world - be it East Asia, or Europe, or Latin America - have been quietly exploring ways of shaping closer regional associations tied less to the notions of trans-Pacific, or trans- Atlantic, or hemispheric cooperation with the United States. Geopolitical alienation from America could become a lasting and menacing reality. That trend would especially benefit America's historic ill-wishers or future rivals. Sitting on the sidelines and sneering at America's ineptitude are Russia and China: Russia, because it is delighted to see Muslim hostility diverted from itself toward America, despite its own crimes in Afghanistan and Chechnya, and is eager to entice America into an anti-Islamic alliance; China, because it patiently follows the advice of its ancient strategic guru, Sun Tzu, who taught that the best way to win is to let your rival defeat himself. In a very real sense, during the last four years, the Bush team has thus been dangerously undercutting America's seemingly secure perch on top of the global totem pole by transforming a manageable, though serious, challenge largely of regional origin into an international debacle. To be sure, since America is extraordinarily powerful and rich, it can afford, yet for a while, even a policy articulated with rhetorical excess and pursued with historical blindness. But in the process America is likely to become isolated in a hostile world, increasingly vulnerable to terrorist acts and less and less able to exercise a constructive global influence. Flaying away with a stick at a hornets' nest while loudly proclaiming "I will stay the course" is an exercise in catastrophic leadership. But it need not be so. A real course correction is still possible, and it could start soon with a modest and common-sense initiative by the president to engage the Democratic congressional leadership in a serious effort to shape a bipartisan foreign policy for an increasingly divided and troubled nation. In a bipartisan setting, it would be easier not only to scale down the definition of success in Iraq but actually to get out - perhaps even as early as next year. And the sooner the United States leaves, the sooner the Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis will either reach a political arrangement on their own or some combination of them will forcibly prevail. With a foreign policy based on bipartisanship and with Iraq behind us, it would also be easier to shape a wider regional policy that constructively focuses on Iran and on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process while restoring the legitimacy of America's global role. (Zbigniew Brzezinski was national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter. This Global Viewpoint article was distributed by Tribune Media Services International.) -- http://cyberjournal.org Complete archives at http://www.sitbot.net/ Please let us stay on topic and be civil. OM YAHOO! GROUPS LINKS
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