In addition to the Bush admin's rolling back of Clinton
admin progressive policy in central asia north of
Afghanistan on the geopolitical and economic levels,
the US backing of one of the world's most repressive
dictatorships in Uzbekhistan looks even worse, and
is consistent with latin american banana republican
US policy. And they know Bush did 911 and anthraxed
the Reichstag, that the US liberated the poppies in
Afghanistan, that Iraq did not set oil wells on fire,
did not mistreat Jessica Lynch but the US almost
shot her ambulance when it tried to turn her over
to Americans and Americans did shoot a female
ambulance driver in Faluja and commited mayhem
at Faluja's hospital, and at another at Hit last month,
that Iraq did not have wmd, kept the UN seal on
HMX and it was Bush who broke the seal to release
380 tons of his father's Chilean(Pinochet, another
like Bush Uzbekh buddy) HMX for roadside bombs.
Of course central asia wants Russell Opium Trust
(ROT) out of Afghanistan, they're behind 911 and
trained the Algerian terrorists--every problem
comes from DC.
Just look at the record of the Bush family backing
Hitler, Pinochet, Guatemalan junta, the Bush coup
in 2000 and again in 2004 in contrast to Ukraine
holding a second election, then Bush backing
another dictator in Uzbekhistan, and reversing
progressive economic policies. All the US money
goes through the cruel Uzbekh dictatorship, which
is actually a negative for real economic growth in
the region--the money buys feudalist deadwood
organizationally, and that turns back the clock
economically by magnifying reverse meritocracy.
Those people are not brainwashed by Stalinist-
Goebbelistic slogans, they see the reality that the
US is providing political life support to the most
backward political entity in the region, the Uzbekh
problem. They're not ignorant morons like us.
-Bob
Vigilius Haufniensis wrote:
Foul play in the Great
Game
By M K Bhadrakumar
In a landmark speech at Johns Hopkins University in 1997, the then-US
deputy secretary of state, Strobe Talbott, said: "For the last several
years, it has been fashionable to proclaim or at least to predict, a
replay of the 'Great Game' in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The
implication of course is that the driving dynamic of the region, fueled
and lubricated by oil, will be the competition of great powers to the
disadvantage of the people who live there.
"Our goal is to avoid and to actively discourage that atavistic
outcome. In pondering and practicing the geopolitics of oil, let's make
sure that we are thinking in terms appropriate to the 21st century and
not the 19th century. Let's leave Rudyard Kipling and George McDonald
Fraser where they belong - on the shelves of historical fiction. The
Great Game, which starred Kipling's Kim and Fraser's Flashman, was very
much of the zero-sum variety. What we want to help bring about is just
the opposite, we want to see all responsible players in the Caucasus
and Central Asia be winners."
The chancelleries in the region, and indeed all chroniclers of Central
Asian politics, studied Talbott's speech with interest. Talbott's
erudition as a scholar-diplomat in Russian language and literature,
history and politics was worthy of the highest respect. Of course, the
Bill Clinton presidency was at its high noon and it was the first time
that US policy towards the "newly-independent states" of the Central
Asian region had been spelt out authoritatively.
Yet, eight years on, precisely what Talbott was keen on avoiding seems
to be unfolding in Central Asia. The geopolitics in Central Asia have
lately begun to engender rivalries. The summit meeting of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) held in Astana on July 5-6 draws
attention to it. The summit's call on the US-led "anti-terrorist
coalition" to define a deadline on its military presence on the
territory of SCO member countries is a strong signal. Washington tried
to deflect SCO's call by claiming that it was guided by bilateral
agreements with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.
Thereupon, the Uzbek Foreign Ministry promptly clarified in a statement
that no future scenarios of the US military contingent operating out of
its territory had been envisaged under its bilateral agreement with
Washington other than "the desire of Uzbekistan as a proactive member
of the anti-terrorist coalition in Afghanistan" - virtually echoing the
SCO's call. Kyrgyzstan's Foreign Minister Roza Otunbayeva also joined
issue with Washington: "All of us are part of the anti-terrorist
coalition, including our country. However, there is a time limit for
everybody who comes to stay somewhere. We are members of the SCO. We
raised this issue together with other member states."
Despite these blunt Uzbek and Kyrgyz statements, US Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice parried at a press conference in Beijing on July 10.
Rice said that it was for Afghanistan to decide on the presence of US
troops and "there is still a fight going on in Afghanistan ... there is
still a lot of terrorist activity in Afghanistan ... the terrorists
still have to be defeated in Afghanistan ... and so it is our
understanding that the people of Afghanistan want and need the help of
US armed forces." Besides, Rice claimed that it was not a matter of US
forces alone since the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also
had contingents in the region.
Just a day later, Kyrgyzstan gently but firmly nudged the discussion
back to where it belonged. In his very first remarks on July 11 after
his resounding victory in the Kyrgyz presidential election, Kyrgyz
leader Kurmanbek Bakiyev said politely but firmly: "Afghanistan has had
presidential elections. The situation there has stabilized. So now we
may begin discussing the necessity of US military forces' presence.
When and how it will happen, time will show."
The "dialogue" between Washington and the Central Asian capitals is
indeed becoming curiouser and curiouser. The "Tulip" revolution was
supposed to have been Washington's finest hour in Central Asia.
President George W Bush eloquently cited the "regime change" in
Kyrgyzstan as an inspiration for all freedom-loving peoples - and as a
vindication of his democracy project. Yet, it is no longer feasible to
obfuscate the reality that Washington's influence in Bishkek has
touched its nadir.
Bakiyev won on a platform offering "stability". His huge mandate tapped
into people's fears about a recurrence of the upheavals that they twice
witnessed in the recent months - in their own country and in next-door
Andijan in Uzbekistan. Russia played a crucial role in bringing
together Bakiyev and the prominent leader from the north, Felix Kulov,
which became the winning ticket in the Kyrgyz election. Moscow is not
hiding its joy in Bakiyev's victory. Washington's best hope now would
lie in the Bakiyev-Kulov combine falling apart. That is a pretty thin
hope to cling on to, after aspiring to be the kingmaker.
It is extraordinary that the US's prestige and influence as a
superpower has plummeted dramatically in Central Asia in such a short
span of time since October 2001- so much so that Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan, which used to be overtly keen to be friendly, have today
become thoroughly disillusioned with Washington's regional policy. How
could this have happened?
The fundamentals of the US policy in Central Asia as spelt out by
Talbott eight years ago identified four dimensions: promotion of
democracy; creation of free market economies; sponsorship of peace and
cooperation within and among the countries of the region; and the
integration of the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus with the
larger international community.
But what has changed is that the Bush administration has
surreptitiously redefined the thrust of priorities towards the region
in terms of its global policies. The result is that the US no longer
has a policy intrinsic to the pressing demands of the transition
economies in the Central Asian region - the substantive theme in
Talbott's speech. Today everything has become relative in the US
calculus - everything in Central Asia needs to be factored into the
priorities of policy toward Russia or China. By "promotion of
democracy", for example, Talbott envisioned a slow and gradual process
of the US assisting Central Asian countries in evolving the "requisite
institutions and attitudes" conducive for the growth of a democratic
culture. He admitted candidly that this would be a long haul as "the
very newness of democracy was itself a major obstacle to the process of
democratization" in Central Asia.
There was, evidently, no scope for "color revolutions" in Talbott's
scheme of things when he involved civil society in the Central Asian
region and the Caucasus as the handmaiden of the democratization
agenda. Again, with regard to the security dimension of US policy,
Talbott emphasized American assistance in "the resolution of conflicts
within and between countries and peoples in the region". Regional
stability and reconciliation had a centrality in Talbott's policy
framework, whereas they took a back seat in the Bush administration's
priorities. Interestingly, Talbott pinpointed "internal instability and
division" as having historically provided "a pretext for foreign
intervention and adventurism" in the region.
Thus, though the US had profoundly differed from the Russian
perspectives on the Tajik civil war (1992-96) and would have had some
good reasons to work against the Tajik settlement in 1996 (put together
by Russia and Iran), Talbott said, "The difficulties in implementation
are sobering, but the recent accord provides a real opportunity for
reconciliation, not only within Tajikistan, but with benefits for the
surrounding countries as well."
In the period of the Clinton presidency, US prestige and influence in
Central Asia peaked. The Bush administration, ironically, reaped a good
harvest of this legacy. The openhearted welcome that Central Asian
leaderships extended to the US military presence in their region in
2001 testifies to that. But the ease with which Washington squandered
such enormous goodwill is appalling.
The "Rose" revolution in Georgia in December 2003 was the turning
point. It usually takes 10 years' hindsight to cast an aspersion on
current history, but a question is bound to come up: what, ultimately,
has the US gained by deposing Eduard Shevardnadze? Do the gains
outweigh the losses?
It was in Georgia that the cutting edge in the Bush administration's
regional policy came into full view - aimed at dominating the region;
establishing unilateral advantage over other powers no matter their
legitimate interests; and, shepherding the region into a security
architecture notionally headed by NATO but firmly under US command.
Russia's Security Council Secretary Igor Ivanov and then-US secretary
of state Colin Powell worked in tandem behind the scenes to ensure that
the transfer of power from Shevardnadze to Mikheil Saakashvili did not
degenerate into a Caucasian street brawl. (They had a similar compact
in ensuring the transition in Baku from the late Hydar Aliyev to his
son.) But once Saakashvili was safely ensconced in power in Tbilisi,
Washington left Moscow high and dry. The "Rose" revolution showed that
the Bush administration preferred to compartmentalize the relationship
with Russia. This impacted on Russian policy.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said recently, "We do not accept
the attempts to place post-Soviet states before a false choice ...
either with the US or with Russia. We are ready for cooperation on a
basis of mutual consideration of interests ... We understand the West's
objective interests in the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]
space and only want that the methods of realization of these interests
should also be understandable, transparent, that they would rest on the
universally recognized rules of international law, and not infringe
either on the rights of the peoples of the CIS countries to decide
their future themselves, or on the lawful rights and interests of
Russia in this space, where we want to develop equal, mutually
beneficial cooperation with our neighbors."
Shevardnadze's fall sent shockwaves through Central Asia. He was an
iconic figure, a tough veteran of Kremlin politics - by far senior to
the CIS leaders in the Soviet hierarchy. And how Washington rubbished
its old, time-tested ally ("Shevvy") was for Central Asian leaderships
a morality play about the ephemeral nature of American friendships.
Such betrayals do not look good in the Orient. The Central Asian
leaderships began edging away from the US and closer toward Russia and
China. In the face of this, the US response was to push for "regime
change" in Central Asia as well. But the macabre events in Kyrgyzstan
and Uzbekistan in March and May this year had a totally unexpected
outcome.
The indications are that a review of American policy toward Central
Asia is underway in Washington. It cannot be a difficult exercise. It
is easy to pinpoint when things go horribly wrong. A good starting
point would be Talbott's prescient speech exactly eight years ago.
M K Bhadrakumar is a former Indian career diplomat who has
served in Islamabad, Kabul, Tashkent and Moscow.
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