Re: R: R: A case of SQL injection

2002-11-06 Thread Andrew Savory
On Tue, 5 Nov 2002, Ilya A. Kriveshko wrote: > With my limited knowledge of this subject (BTW, I'm not insecure - > I'm polite) I don't see data checking as the job of the DBMS. DBMS > simply maintains the data, executes queries that the client provides, > returns the results and ensures that pro

Re: A case of SQL injection

2002-11-05 Thread Torsten Curdt
> I do not see a possibility of the aforementioned "DROP TABLE" exploit in > this case. The only "unverified" data here is "id" and it is making its way > into the query via two mechanisms that would ensure its safety: > > 1) Integer.parseInt() > 2) PreparedStatement.setInt() that is generated by

RE: R: R: A case of SQL injection

2002-11-05 Thread Hunsberger, Peter
> With my limited knowledge of this subject (BTW, I'm not insecure - > I'm polite) I don't see data checking as the job of the DBMS. DBMS > simply maintains the data, executes queries that the client provides, > returns the results and ensures that proper side-effects occur. > If DBMS executes a ma

Re: A case of SQL injection

2002-11-05 Thread Ilya A. Kriveshko
Antonio Gallardo Rivera wrote: Just a question. Please dont take it wrong Can you send a "DROP TABLE mytable" in the following example of a XSP page? I am using mod-db stuff too. I do not see a possibility of the aforementioned "DROP TABLE" exploit in this case. The only "unverified" data here

Re: R: R: A case of SQL injection

2002-11-05 Thread Ilya A. Kriveshko
Antonio Gallardo Rivera wrote: El Martes, 05 de Noviembre de 2002 15:16, Torsten Curdt escribió: On Tue, 2002-11-05 at 18:43, Antonio Gallardo Rivera wrote: El Martes, 05 de Noviembre de 2002 09:28, Ilya A. Kriveshko escribió: Okay, modify my statement to read: Not everyone uses

Re: A case of SQL injection

2002-11-05 Thread Antonio Gallardo Rivera
Just a question. Please dont take it wrong. Can you send a "DROP TABLE mytable" in the following example of a XSP page? I am using mod-db stuff too. SELECT * FROM mytable WHERE mytable_id= Integer.parseInt(

Re: R: R: A case of SQL injection

2002-11-05 Thread Antonio Gallardo Rivera
El Martes, 05 de Noviembre de 2002 15:16, Torsten Curdt escribió: > On Tue, 2002-11-05 at 18:43, Antonio Gallardo Rivera wrote: > > El Martes, 05 de Noviembre de 2002 09:28, Ilya A. Kriveshko escribió: > > > Okay, modify my statement to read: > > > Not everyone uses $$$ DBs or PostgreSQL. > > > The

Re: R: R: A case of SQL injection

2002-11-05 Thread Torsten Curdt
On Tue, 2002-11-05 at 18:43, Antonio Gallardo Rivera wrote: > El Martes, 05 de Noviembre de 2002 09:28, Ilya A. Kriveshko escribió: > > Okay, modify my statement to read: > > Not everyone uses $$$ DBs or PostgreSQL. > > The general though is preserved though. :-) > > Sorry for the question, but:

Re: R: R: A case of SQL injection

2002-11-05 Thread Antonio Gallardo Rivera
El Martes, 05 de Noviembre de 2002 09:28, Ilya A. Kriveshko escribió: > Okay, modify my statement to read: > Not everyone uses $$$ DBs or PostgreSQL. > The general though is preserved though. :-) Sorry for the question, but: Why Cocoon must do the work of "DBMS"? Antonio Gallardo. --

RE: A case of SQL injection

2002-11-05 Thread Geoff Howard
I just tried it. Logging in as Donald Ball'; DROP TABLE employee; does exactly what you think it would. It drops the table and the next time you try to log in, the table is gone and logins fail (DOH - does the hsql db get regenerated automatically somehow?) I have to run out but will put t

RE: A case of SQL injection

2002-11-05 Thread Torsten Curdt
On Tue, 2002-11-05 at 19:53, Geoff Howard wrote: > Speaking of protecting against SQL injection - is it > generally known that DatabaseAuthenticatorAction.java > is not using PreparedStatement? I wonder what logging > in as > Donald Ball'; DROP TABLE user_table; > > would do...? Do you mind try

RE: A case of SQL injection

2002-11-05 Thread Geoff Howard
Speaking of protecting against SQL injection - is it generally known that DatabaseAuthenticatorAction.java is not using PreparedStatement? I wonder what logging in as Donald Ball'; DROP TABLE user_table; would do...? Geoff Howard __ Do you Yahoo!

RE: A case of SQL injection

2002-11-05 Thread Hunsberger, Peter
> For things like SQL, transformers and the sitemap simple filtering > should do it. We just need to make sure each individual parameter is ok. > Everything else is up to the webapp's decision. Plain filtering would > solve problems where we cannot supply webapp-like logic. Your example is > defini

RE: A case of SQL injection

2002-11-05 Thread Torsten Curdt
> > That way is ok. But it doesn't really *enforce* security. It will just > > give user that are already aware of the security hazards an easy way of > > securing their system. > > But IMHO that's the not the best way. We should enforce security as > > default and only explicitly remove it for ce

Re: R: A case of SQL injection

2002-11-05 Thread Torsten Curdt
> > String p = request.getParameter("id","id-filter"); > > > > So filtering would be very easy and as close as possible to the request > > but not really forced - it would be an option we should document and > > promote very well. > > > > What do guys think? > > Torsten, > > call me boring, but

RE: A case of SQL injection

2002-11-05 Thread Hunsberger, Peter
>> > As you say - it's crucicial. I think we should force this in any way. >> >> I can't think of a one-size-fits-all solution. There are areas where >> input validation is impossible and unnessary, too. > > What areas do you have in mind? I could think of the whole webapp/forms > area. Anything e

Re: R: R: A case of SQL injection

2002-11-05 Thread Ilya A. Kriveshko
Okay, modify my statement to read: Not everyone uses $$$ DBs or PostgreSQL. The general though is preserved though. :-) -- Ilya Luca Morandini wrote: Not everyone uses $$$ DBs. We, the lowest common denominator, get offended when not taken care of... :-) Ilya, you might be oblivious of th

R: R: A case of SQL injection

2002-11-05 Thread Luca Morandini
TECTED] > -Messaggio originale- > Da: Ilya A. Kriveshko [mailto:ilya@;kaon.com] > Inviato: martedì 5 novembre 2002 16.05 > A: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Oggetto: Re: R: A case of SQL injection > > > Luca Morandini wrote: > > >Torsten, > > > >call

RE: A case of SQL injection

2002-11-05 Thread Hunsberger, Peter
>> String p = request.getParameter("id","id-filter"); >> >> So filtering would be very easy and as close as possible to the request >> but not really forced - it would be an option we should document and >> promote very well. >> >> What do guys think? > > Torsten, > > call me boring, but, wouldn

Re: R: A case of SQL injection

2002-11-05 Thread Ilya A. Kriveshko
Luca Morandini wrote: Torsten, call me boring, but, wouldn't it be better using stored procedures over dynamic SQL ? Our aim is to have stored procedures implemented in MySQL Server around version 5.0. Not everyone uses $$$ DBs. We, the lowest common denominator, get offended when not tak

R: A case of SQL injection

2002-11-05 Thread Luca Morandini
> -Messaggio originale- > Da: Torsten Curdt [mailto:tcurdt@;dff.st] > Inviato: martedì 5 novembre 2002 15.25 > A: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Oggetto: Re: A case of SQL injection > String p = request.getParameter("id","id-filter"); > > So filtering wo

Re: A case of SQL injection

2002-11-05 Thread Torsten Curdt
> > As you say - it's crucicial. I think we should force this in any way. > > I can't think of a one-size-fits-all solution. There are areas where > input validation is impossible and unnessary, too. What areas do you have in mind? I could think of the whole webapp/forms area. Anything else? >

Re: A case of SQL injection

2002-11-05 Thread Christian Haul
On 05.Nov.2002 -- 11:52 AM, Torsten Curdt wrote: > > As the document points out, input validation is crucial. Cocoon offers > > input validation through XMLForms and the *ValidatorActions, > > e.g. the FormValidatorAction. > > As you say - it's crucicial. I think we should force this in any way.

Re: A case of SQL injection

2002-11-05 Thread Torsten Curdt
On Tuesday 05 November 2002 12:26, Leo Sutic wrote: > > From: Christian Haul [mailto:haul@;dvs1.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de] > > > > Another important aspect is not to compose a query from > > strings but use PreparedStatements for that. > > IMO, input validation is a bad patch and *this* is the cor

RE: A case of SQL injection

2002-11-05 Thread Leo Sutic
> From: Christian Haul [mailto:haul@;dvs1.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de] > > Another important aspect is not to compose a query from > strings but use PreparedStatements for that. IMO, input validation is a bad patch and *this* is the correct solution. The fundamental security flaw is the mixin

Re: A case of SQL injection

2002-11-05 Thread Torsten Curdt
> > Today I have been thinking about what would really patch the security > > hole. What we're talking about here, by the way, is a phenomenon called > > 'SQL Injection', a term which should be familiar to every developer of > > web applications that interface with an SQL database. If you don't kno

Re: A case of SQL injection

2002-11-05 Thread Tom Klaasen
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [snip] >I refer to the pdf > >http://www.nextgenss.com/papers/advanced_sql_injection.pdf Wow, very interesting read. I for one wasn't aware of this problem. It's really nice to have a sysadmin sharing his experiences. Us

Re: A case of SQL injection

2002-11-05 Thread Christian Haul
On 05.Nov.2002 -- 12:26 AM, Carl M?sak wrote: [...] > Today I have been thinking about what would really patch the security > hole. What we're talking about here, by the way, is a phenomenon called > 'SQL Injection', a term which should be familiar to every developer of web > applications that in

A case of SQL injection

2002-11-04 Thread Carl Mäsak
Hello you list people, I joined this list just a few minutes ago in order to ask you all a question. I have not read the archives of the list discussion, so I might be completely off topic. In that case, sorry for my being clumsy. On the other hand, I might be asking a very common or often discuss