Robert Kanter created HADOOP-15235:
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Summary: Authentication Tokens should use HMAC instead of MAC
Key: HADOOP-15235
URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HADOOP-15235
Project: Hadoop Common
Issue Type: Improvement
Components: security
Affects Versions: 2.10.0, 3.2.0
Reporter: Robert Kanter
Assignee: Robert Kanter
We currently use {{MessageDigest}} to compute a "SHA" MAC for signing
Authentication Tokens. Firstly, what "SHA" maps to is dependent on the JVM and
Cryptography Provider. While they _should_ do something reasonable, it's
probably a safer idea to pick a specific algorithm. It looks like the Oracle
JVM picks SHA-1; though something like SHA-256 would be better.
In any case, it would also be better to use an HMAC algorithm instead.
Changing from SHA-1 to SHA-256 or MAC to HMAC won't generate equivalent
signatures, so this would normally be an incompatible change because the server
wouldn't accept previous tokens it issued with the older algorithm. However,
Authentication Tokens are used as a cheaper shortcut for Kerberos, so it's
expected for users to also have Kerberos credentials; in this case, the
Authentication Token will be rejected, but it will silently retry using
Kerberos, and get an updated token. So this should all be transparent to the
user.
And finally, the code where we verify a signature uses a non-constant-time
comparison, which could be subject to timing attacks. I believe it would be
quite difficult in this case to do so, but we're probably better off using a
constant-time comparison.
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