Re: [COSE] draft-prorock-cose-post-quantum-signatures [Was: Re: IETF 114 Call for Agenda Items]

2022-07-06 Thread Anders Rundgren
Bouncycastle support for SPHINCS shows that they treat it as a separate (unique) crypto system https://www.bouncycastle.org/docs/docs1.8on/org/bouncycastle/pqc/jcajce/interfaces/SPHINCSKey.html

Re: [COSE] draft-prorock-cose-post-quantum-signatures [Was: Re: IETF 114 Call for Agenda Items]

2022-07-06 Thread Anders Rundgren
On 2022-07-06 14:58, Ilari Liusvaara wrote: On Wed, Jul 06, 2022 at 10:04:00AM +0200, Anders Rundgren wrote: I agree. New crypto systems should follow the standard for "kty": https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7517#section-4.1 The "kty" (key type) parameter identifies the

Re: [COSE] empty KID values

2022-07-06 Thread Carsten Bormann
On 2022-07-06, at 20:14, Laurence Lundblade wrote: > > By RFC 9052: > ? 4 => bstr,; key identifier > > which says kid is either entirely absent (i.e., both the 4 and the byte string are absent, which they can be because the entry was marked with a ?, which is a shortcut for 0*1,

Re: [COSE] empty KID values

2022-07-06 Thread Laurence Lundblade
By RFC 9052: ? 4 => bstr,; key identifier which says kid is either entirely absent from the header parameters or h’’ or some byte string value . Don’t think it can be NULL or “”. I didn’t allow those in my implementation. Maybe this is different in YANG, but pretty sure this is

Re: [COSE] draft-prorock-cose-post-quantum-signatures [Was: Re: IETF 114 Call for Agenda Items]

2022-07-06 Thread Ilari Liusvaara
On Wed, Jul 06, 2022 at 10:04:00AM +0200, Anders Rundgren wrote: > I agree. New crypto systems should follow the standard for "kty": > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7517#section-4.1 > >The "kty" (key type) parameter identifies the cryptographic >algorithm family used with the

Re: [COSE] [core] empty KID values

2022-07-06 Thread Esko Dijk
Agree here, the ‘kid’ field includes a hint as to which key to use to verify the COSE object. If the hint is null, or an empty item, and the receiver isn’t able to use that as a hint, it can try to identify the key in some other way e.g. based on context. If that’s not possible, then it will

[COSE] draft-prorock-cose-post-quantum-signatures [Was: Re: IETF 114 Call for Agenda Items]

2022-07-06 Thread Ilari Liusvaara
On Tue, Jul 05, 2022 at 02:45:00PM -0500, Orie Steele wrote: > Hello, > > We've been working on JOSE/COSE representations for post quantum > cryptography here: > > https://mesur-io.github.io/post-quantum-signatures/draft-prorock-cose-post-quantum-signatures.html >