At 10:10 AM 1/20/01 -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>This analysis will focus on one particular kind of attack. Eve will make
>measurements of the photon polarization angle as it travels through the
>network and attempt to deduce information about the signals being sent
>by the participants.
Th
At 02:04 PM 1/18/01 -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>the rotation stations could
>somehow count or limit the number of photons going through so that they
>would know when there were extra. I think this is possible in theory;
Right, it is. Here's a Gedankenexperiment: temporarily trap the sign
At 11:20 PM 1/17/01 -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote in part:
>>The probability that Eve's measurement will leave the result unchanged is
>>3/4, and therefore the probability that she will perturb the result is 1/4.
OK so far. Then, for the case of two measurements,
>>Eve's chances of perturbing
At 08:35 PM 1/16/01 -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote in part:
>In some variants the photon travels around the group multiple times before
>it is measured. Let us call this number of times the "circulation count".
1) Let C denote the circulation count. The idea of having C>1 is very
nice. One
At 08:35 PM 1/16/01 -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>To recap, a group of cryptographers wants to communicate anonymously,
>without the sender of a message being traced.
To recap in more detail, as I understand it:
1) The desired result is a plain broadcast message, open to the world
(includ
At 10:35 PM 1/15/01 -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>Here is a rough idea for a quantum-cryptography variant on the DC Net,
>the Dining Cryptographers Net invented by David Chaum.
>The photon starts off with vertical polarization. Each cryptographer
>manages a station through which the photo
At 01:37 PM 1/12/01 -0800, Ray Dillinger mentioned:
>interferometry to get the exact locations
>on a keyboard of keystrokes from the sound of someone typing.
Whereupon Perry conjectured:
>A quick contemplation of the wavelength of the sounds in question
>would put an end to that speculation I su
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hi Folks --
There is a bug in /usr/src/linux/drivers/char/random.c.
Basically, it acts as if it can hold 32x less entropy
than you would think based on the configuration parameters
or the ioctls. For instance, if it is configured for 4096
bits max, and you fil
At 12:50 PM 3/25/00 -0800, Bram Cohen wrote:
>Given that f(x+1) = f(x) * f(x) + c, does anybody know how to express f(x)
>in closed form?
Well... That's an example of an iterated nonlinear map. Such things have
been extensively studied. For some values of c, for some initial
conditions, the
At 08:09 PM 3/10/00 -0600, John Kelsey wrote:
>But there's a related engineering question: Does
>it make sense to build large systems in which there's no way
>for humans to overrule the actions of programs once they're
>set in motion?
...
>To use a more common example, I believe there were some
Hi Ted --
At 11:41 PM 8/14/99 -0400, you wrote:
>
>standard Mathematician's style --- encrypted by formulae
>guaranteed to make it opaque to all but those who are trained in the
>peculiar style of Mathematics' papers.
> ...
>someone tried to pursuade me to use Maurer's test
>...
>too memory i
At 11:42 AM 8/4/99 -0400, D. Hugh Redelmeier wrote:
>
>Pluto is a "bad guy" in that it is using up the entropy-estimate.
Your modesty is charming. But I wouldn't say that pluto is the bad guy.
There "ought" to be a system service (call it /dev/vrandom or whatever)
that provides the sort of bit
At 10:08 AM 8/4/99 -0400, D. Hugh Redelmeier wrote:
>
>I think that this description reflects an inappropriate understanding
>of entropy. Entropy is in some sense spread throughout the whole
>output of /dev/urandom. You don't use entropy up, you spread it over
>more and more bytes of output. Th
At 01:50 PM 8/2/99 -0400, Paul Koning wrote:
>
>I only remember a few proposals (2 or 3?) and they didn't seem to be
>[unduly weak]. Or do you feel that what I've proposed is this
>weak? If so, why? I've seen comments that say "be careful" but I
>don't remember any comments suggesting that what
At 01:27 PM 8/2/99 -0400, Paul Koning wrote:
>
>we weren't talking about "in principle" or "in general".
>Sure, given an unspecified process of unknown (to me) properties I
>cannot make sensible statements about its entropy. That is true but
>it isn't relevant to the discussion.
>
>Instead, we're
At 10:09 AM 8/2/99 -0400, Paul Koning wrote:
>
>1. Estimating entropy. Yes, that's the hard one. It's orthogonal
>from everything else. /dev/random has a fairly simple approach;
>Yarrow is more complex.
>
>It's not clear which is better. If there's reason to worry about the
>one in /dev/random
At 08:02 PM 7/22/99 +0200, Anonymous wrote:
>> That is:
>> 1a') When there is entropy in the pool, it [/dev/urandom]
>> gobbles it all up before
>> acting like a PRNG. Leverage factor=1. This causes other applications to
>> stall if they need to read /dev/random.
>
>This does not seem to be a
At 07:31 AM 7/26/99 -0400, Bill Sommerfeld wrote:
>
>".. for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be
>questioned in any other place."
>
>But then again, i'm not a lawyer, and I'm also not sure how this
>provision has been interpreted in the past..
IANL but as you can imagine, memb
Hi Folks --
Thanks to all for the nice discussion.
Here are some comments and a proposal:
1) Linux /dev/urandom can be considered a PRNG with some good properties
but two suboptimal properties:
1a) First it reseeds too much, and then
1b) it reseeds in dribs and drabs.
That is:
1a') When
Hi Folks --
I have a question about various scenarios for an attack against IPsec by way
of the random number generator. The people on the linux-ipsec mailing list
suggested I bring it up here.
Specifically: consider a central machine (call it Whitney) that is
implementing many IPsec tunnel
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