Re: PGP ADK Bug Fix

this with the seriousness it deserves, and has already modified two key servers to "cleanse" keys with unsigned ADK parasitic records: http://www.pgp.com/other/advisories/adk.asp ___ Michael Paul Johnson [EMAIL PROTECTED]http://ebible.org/mpj

Re: What would you like to see in a book on cryptography for programme

that Michael Paul Johnson resists the temptation to plug his own home-grown ciphers, Sapphire and Diamond. Hopefully he'll realize that including his own ciphers in the book will ruin what little credibility he has as an author. Actually, I'd rather publish your credible cryptanalysis of those

Re: Book on cryptography for programmers

sensitive data life cycles, too. Good cryptography can be so easy to defeat with simple blunders in applications. ___ Michael Paul Johnson [EMAIL PROTECTED]http://ebible.org/mpj

What would you like to see in a book on cryptography for programmers?

What would you like to see covered in a practical book on cryptography for programmers?

Book on cryptography for programmers

for payment, no key size limits)? ___ Michael Paul Johnson http://ebible.org/mpj

Re: time dependant

se the key on the appointed date. ___ Michael Paul Johnson http://ebible.org/mpj

Posting Kerberos on the World-Wide Web

Posting Kerberos on the World-Wide Web -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Pursuant to 15 CFR Part 734, notice is hereby given that the following files containing open Kerberos source code will be published at http://cryptography.org/source/kerbnet/ (with links from

Posting PGP 6.5x on the World-Wide Web

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Notice is hereby given that the following files containing open Pretty Good Privacy source code and documentation will be published at http://cryptography.org/source/pgp with links from http://cryptography.org/source:

Re: A5/1 FAQ

http://cryptography.org/cgi-bin/crypto.cgi/libraries/A51ref.zip

Re: PGP 6.5/PGPnet Announcement!

At 01:14 PM 4/6/1999 -0700, Jim Gillogly wrote: Michael Paul Johnson wrote: Of course this is dangerous, but there is a demand for it. Not everyone wants bomb-proof security. ... The real cure, of course, is to so tightly and easily integrate security into email that it is as easy

Re: Building crypto archives worldwide to foil US-built Berlin Walls

/freecryp.htm This is a quick starter-kit and is far from comprehensive. Contributions welcome. Ken Williams offers an impressive (177MB) crypto/stego archive: http://www.genocide2600.com/~tattooman/cryptography/ ___ Michael Paul Johnson http://ebible.org