Er, how does the criminal's calculation of this change from
before? A guy who's going to (pardon the image) chop off
your hand to get past the hand-scanner is just not likely to
have many qualms about shooting you first, to keep you from
squirming or making too much noise.
True enough,
One of the reasons they decided to do the switch is that newer
technologies ensure that the item in front of the scanner is in fact
alive :)
All that this really means is that now the thing the criminal needs to
bring to the scanner is somewhat larger. It might actually *increase*
the risk
If your compression algorithm is tuned for normal ASCII text, then
UC letterlc letter may be considered more frequent than
UC letterUC letter for all combinations of values of UC letter,
and thus pairs of uppercased letters may result in longer bit streams
than pairs of lowercase letters or one
If you sign the revocation certificate in the compromised key, then
the only way it can get revoked is if the owner of the key revokes it
or it's been compromised...
_MelloN_
Comments?
I think your proposal is not entirely unreasonable, although I wonder
if the people who have the most interest in a secure system are not
the banks, but the insurance companies and the customers. My
impression of banks is that as long as they can quantify the potential
loss, they
Rich, in the one case in order to steal your key (and thus masquerade
as you) the person has to break into your machine and read a file. In
the other case, the person has to break into your machine and *write*
a *specific* file. While both sorts of attacks are possible, the
first sort of
The only reason that justifies the existence of the player keys in the
CSS scheme is control of the DVD consortium over the licensees: they
can always threaten to revoke the player key of a given licensee if
that licensee doesn't play by the rules (Macrovision, Region Codes,
etc.).
Now
Apparently the sources to PGPphone have been released (after many
years). See:
According to that message, the license is not an open source license,
though, so this is unfortunately not very exciting. :'(
_MelloN_
SpeakFreely (http://www.speakfreely.org) is already open source, so it
sets a minimum bar on the restrictions you can expect to be able to
set on the distribution of a freeware encrypting telephone package.
Precisely. Too bad, though - I'd like to see PGPphone Open Sourced.
Another point to consider is that if the CALEA standards are arrived
at in an open and public manner, it could be made easy to tell whether
or not a given device is implementing them, and one could then use the
CALEA status of a device as part of the purchasing decision.
If the CALEA protocol
It can only be resolved by software and hardware designers choosing
to integrate it seamlessly into their products with or without the
permission of their rulers.
To some degree this is happening in the Open Source community, but in
order to make strong crypto ubiquitous for, e.g., cell
Suppose someone discovers a way to solve NP-complete problems with a
quantum computer; should he publish?
Of course!
Granted, the quantum computers aren't big enough yet, but the
prospects look bright for larger ones in the near future. It would
break all classical cryptography.
I'd
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