Andrew Fernandes tonight published the results of his reverse engineering of
Microsoft's Crypto API (CAPI). [This builds on work done by Nicko van
Someren from nCipher].
Background: MSFT CAPI comes pre-installed with two keys used to check the
validity of a Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP).
For more information and a program to remove the NSA's key from your copy
of
Windows 95, 98, NT, 2000, see
http://www.cryptonym.com/hottopics/msft-nsa.html
Perhaps more interestingly, the program lets you replace the key, too.
It requires no special privileges -- just uses some undocumented
In [EMAIL PROTECTED],
on 09/03/99
at 11:49 AM, "Trei, Peter" [EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
The ability to replace the NSA key with another
is an extremely serious vulnerability. This means that
*anyone* - not just the NSA - can write a compromised
module and install it on the target, as long as
The ability to replace the NSA key with another
is an extremely serious vulnerability. This means that
*anyone* - not just the NSA - can write a compromised
module and install it on the target, as long as they
also replace the NSA key with the one they used to
sign the weakened module.
Tripwire,
Looks like last night was a kind of crypto-Kristallnacht, ja?
Cheers,
RAH
(Who's not too shameless to plug FC00, here, in light of the Nicko
and Adi's URL, below)
--- begin forwarded text
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 1999 10:03:57 -0700
Reply-To: Law Policy of Computer Communications
[EMAIL
--- begin forwarded text
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 1999 16:32:38 -0400
Reply-To: Law Policy of Computer Communications
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sender: Law Policy of Computer Communications
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: David Lesher [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [dc-sage] Microsoft, the NSA, and
Shades of the plaintext-embedded-in-the-executable Netscape "policy page"?
Or is it just more stupid Microsoft crypto programming?
Father Occam prefers the latter, but you never know...
Cheers,
RAH
--- begin forwarded text
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 1999 15:34:04 -0300
Reply-To: Law Policy
--- begin forwarded text
From: "Dan S" [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: "isml" [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: IP: Microsoft Letting Government Snoop
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 1999 20:33:46 -0400
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: "Dan S" [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From http://www.news-
Wired.com:
"The key is a Microsoft key -- it is not shared with any party including
the NSA," said Windows NT security product manager Scott Culp. "We don't
leave backdoors in any products."
"The only thing that this key is used for is to ensure that only those
products that meet US export
It's not clear to me why being able to sign CSP modules is a risky thing
anyway; all it means is that Windows will load and execute your crypto. The
mechanism is designed to keep overseas end users from being able to build
and install strong crypto libraries. If the NSA has a key, all they can do
On Fri, 3 Sep 1999, Tim Dierks wrote:
Even if the key belongs to the NSA, I suspect that the NSA just wanted to be
able to load classified Crypto Service Providers into Windows and didn't
want to have to send said classified software to Microsoft for approval, so
they got the key installed
Here's what I said about this on another list:
I must admit that this doesn't make much sense to me.
I was at Crypto, but I must have missed the rump session talk in question
(and it's entirely possible that the talk occurred anyway - I was out of the
room for a good deal of that session). In
http://www.cryptonym.com/hottopics/msft-nsa.html
Perhaps more interestingly, the program lets you replace the key, too.
Microsoft prevents third parties from installing un-authorized crypto
code under CAPI by checking the signature on the code. Under their
export deal, they refuse to sign
Does anyone (or you, Bruce?) have a URL handy to/for an paper (by
Paul Brown in the UK?) speculating on a RNG weakness in Solitiare's
(Bruce's playing card cipher)? I've been searching the web
unsuccessfully. The paper may mention it as "Pontifex", as it was
referred to in "Cryptonomicon."
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