Re: AES HDD encryption was XOR

2008-12-11 Thread dan

Victor Duchovni writes:
 | The computing power of the microprocessor is still under
 | 32 powers of 2 from its inception, naive extrapolation
 | to the next 32 powers of 2 is unwise.

Well taken, indeed.

But what I am myself interested in is the relationship
of the three main up-curves, Moore's for CPU horsepower
per unit of money, and its two un-named siblings for
storage and for bandwidth.  As I read the tea-leaves,
storage is doubling at perhaps a 12-month rate while
bandwidth is faster still.  Yes, these are laboratory
figures, but the lab is where the action is.

This tells me, I think, that the future of computing
is ever more data-rich but, at the same time, that
that data-richness is eclipsed by ever-increasing

Suppose the doubling times are 18/12/9; then a decade
is two orders of magnitude for CPU, three for storage,
and four for bandwith.  I do not see how this does not
radically alter the economically optimal computing
infrastructure or, for that matter, the nature of the
problems we here are collectively paid to solve.

This is, of course, all irrelevant if and when the
Singularity occurs.  Kurzweil's guess of 2035 is
27 years away, which is to say 18 powers of two out,
not 32.  Perhaps relevant to this list, imagine that
the research described here:

was of two programs creating not music but a cipher.

Thinking out loud,


[ just for amusement, 2008 world production of wheat
  and rice would each cover 53 squares, with maize
  coming in at 51 squares ]

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Re: CPRNGs are still an issue.

2008-12-11 Thread James A. Donald

Jack Lloyd wrote:
 I think the situation is even worse outside of the
 major projects (the OS kernels crypto implementations
 and the main crypto libraries). I think outside of
 those, nobody is even really looking. For instance -

 This afternoon I took a look at a C++ library called
 JUCE which offers (among a pile of other things) RSA
 and Blowfish. However it turns out that all of the RSA
 keys are generated with an LCRNG (lrand48, basically)
 seeded with the time in milliseconds.

If one uses a higher resolution counter - sub
microsecond - and times multiple disk accesses, one gets
true physical randomness, since disk access times are
effected by turbulence, which is physically true

In Crypto Kong I added entropy at various times during
program initialization from the 64 bit performance
counter.  Unfortunately the 64 bit performance counter
is not guaranteed to be present, so I also obtained
entropy from a wide variety of other sources - including
the dreaded millisecond counter that has caused so many
security holes.

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Re: Why the poor uptake of encrypted email? [Was: Re: Secrets and cell phones.]

2008-12-11 Thread James A. Donald

  We discovered, however, that most people do not want
  to manage their own secrets 

StealthMonger wrote:
 This may help to explain the poor uptake of encrypted

There is very good uptake of skype and ssh, because
those impose no or very little additional cost on the
end user. Secret management is almost furtively sneaked
in on the back of other tasks.

 It would be useful to know exactly what has been
 discovered.  Can you provide references?

It is informal knowledge.

A field has references when it is a science, or
attempting to become a science, or pretending to become
a science.  Security is not yet even an art.

Cryptography is an art that dubiously pretends to
science, but the weak point of course is interaction of
humans with the cryptography, in which area we have not
even the pretense of art.

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