--- begin forwarded text
From: Nicko van Someren [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [Mac_crypto] Apple should use SHA! (or stronger) to
authenticate software releases
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
List-Id: Macintosh Cryptography mac_crypto.vmeng.com
Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software
The company's software is designed to let voters verify that their ballots
were properly handled. It assigns random identification numbers to ballots
and candidates. After people vote, they get a receipt that shows which
candidates they
Trei, Peter wrote:
Frankly, the whole online-verification step seems like an
unneccesary complication.
It seems to me that the requirement for after-the-vote
verification (to prove your vote was counted) clashes
rather directly with the requirement to protect voters
from coercion (I can't prove
Ian Grigg[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Trei, Peter wrote:
Frankly, the whole online-verification step seems like an
unneccesary complication.
It seems to me that the requirement for after-the-vote
verification (to prove your vote was counted) clashes
rather directly with the
I'm a believer in the KISS principle.
A ballot that is both machine and human readable and is constructed by
machine seems ideal. You enter your votes, a card drops down, you
verify it and drop it in a slot. Ideally, the cards would be marked
with something like OCR-B so that the correspondence
Maybe the receipt should only allow the voter to check that his vote has
been counted. To get the detail you could require him to appear in person
with his receipt AND a photo ID or some such, then only allow him to view
his detail -- not print it.
Paul Zuefeldt
- Original Message -
Folks,
Does anyone know if there is a blind signature scheme that works with
DSA or ECDSA? I know about Camenisch, Pivetau and Stadler's Blind
Signatures Based on the Discrete Logarithm Problem (1994), but as far
as I can tell that doesn't produce straight DSA-verifiable signatures
and so is a