Re: A cool demo of how to spoof sites (also shows how TrustBar preventsthis...)

2005-02-16 Thread Adam Fields
On Thu, Feb 10, 2005 at 06:24:46PM -0500, Steven M. Bellovin wrote: [...] One member of this mailing list, in a private exchange, noted that he had asked his bank for their certificate's fingerprint. My response was that I was astonished he found someone who knew what he was talking about.

more skype -- how are super nodes chosen/is diversity used

2005-02-16 Thread mark seiden
Anyone else actually know about these things? On 2/10/05 7:48 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: david, thanks for your helpful analysis. one thing i haven't been able to find is a description of how supernodes are selected for a particular call. (i'd assume they'd attempt

Re: A cool demo of how to spoof sites (also shows how TrustBar preventsthis...)

2005-02-16 Thread Peter Gutmann
Steven M. Bellovin [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Is a private root key (or the equivalent signing device) an asset that can be acquired under bankruptcy proceedings? Almost certainly. Absolutely certainly. Even before Baltimore, CA's private keys had been bought and sold from/to third parties,

Re: A cool demo of how to spoof sites (also shows how TrustBar preventsthis...)

2005-02-16 Thread Anne Lynn Wheeler
Steven M. Bellovin wrote: Unusual CA? I'm not sure what a *usual* CA is. Just for fun, I opened up the CA list that came with my copy of Firefox. There are no fewer than 40 different entities listed, many of whom have more than one certificate. I personally know less than half of them to be

(Fwd) OpenPGP flaw prompts quick fix

2005-02-16 Thread Stefan Kelm
http://www.pgp.com/library/ctocorner/openpgp.html 10 Feb 2005 Today, cryptographers Serge Mister and Robert Zuccherato from Entrust released a paper outlining an attack on the way OpenPGP does symmetric cryptography. They have been kind enough to give the OpenPGP community advance notice of their

House backs major shift to electronic IDs

2005-02-16 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://news.com.com/2102-1028_3-5571898.html?tag=st.util.print CNET News House backs major shift to electronic IDs By Declan McCullagh Story last modified Thu Feb 10 17:46:00 PST 2005 The U.S. House of Representatives approved on Thursday a sweeping set of rules aimed at forcing states

Re: TLS session resume concurrency?

2005-02-16 Thread Victor Duchovni
On Fri, Feb 11, 2005 at 11:31:16AM -0500, Tim Dierks wrote: On Thu, 10 Feb 2005 15:59:04 -0500, Victor Duchovni [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: If the symmetric cypher is fully re-keyed when sessions are resumed while avoiding the fresh start PKI overhead, then life is simple and sessions can be

Re: fyi: Fingerprinting CPUs

2005-02-16 Thread Jeff . Hodges
[EMAIL PROTECTED] said: This subject came up before. http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/shankar04side.html ah, yes, in various forms. The refs in that paper lead to this, fwiw.. http://dynamo.ecn.purdue.edu/~kennell/genuinity/publications.html JeffH

Break-In At SAIC Risks ID Theft

2005-02-16 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A17506-2005Feb11?language=printer The Washington Post washingtonpost.com Break-In At SAIC Risks ID Theft Computers Held Personal Data on Employee-Owners By Griff Witte Washington Post Staff Writer Saturday, February 12, 2005; Page E01 Some of the

Fighting Net crime with code / Surge in phishing e-mails to take spotlight at cryptography conference

2005-02-16 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2005/02/14/BUG3NB9UTL1.DTLtype=printable www.sfgate.com Return to regular view Fighting Net crime with code Surge in phishing e-mails to take spotlight at cryptography conference - Carrie Kirby, Chronicle

critical bits in certs

2005-02-16 Thread Ian G
Has anyone got any experience or tips on critical bits in certificates? These are bits that can be set in optional records that a certificate creator puts in there to do a particular job. The critical bit says don't interpret this entire certificate if you don't understand this record. x.509

NSA May Be 'Traffic Cop' for U.S. Networks

2005-02-16 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.kansascity.com/mld/kansascity/news/politics/10898954.htm?template=contentModules/printstory.jsp Posted on Mon, Feb. 14, 2005 NSA May Be 'Traffic Cop' for U.S. Networks TED BRIDIS Associated Press WASHINGTON - The Bush administration is considering making the National Security Agency

Making your IM secure--and deniable

2005-02-16 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://news.com.com/2102-7355_3-5576246.html?tag=st.util.print CNET News Making your IM secure--and deniable By Robert Lemos Story last modified Mon Feb 14 17:05:00 PST 2005 SAN FRANCISCO--When you hit the Send button on an instant message, do you really know who is on the other end?

'Trustworthy' Computing Now Gates' Focus

2005-02-16 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=storycid=562u=/ap/20050215/ap_on_hi_te/security_conference_6printer=1 Yahoo! 'Trustworthy' Computing Now Gates' Focus 1 hour, 21 minutes ago By MATTHEW FORDAHL, AP Technology Writer SAN JOSE, Calif. - Microsoft Corp. co-founder Bill Gates (news - web

SHA-1 broken, says Schneier

2005-02-16 Thread Andy Isaacson
From Bruce Schneier's weblog: http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/02/sha1_broken.html # SHA-1 has been broken. Not a reduced-round version. Not a simplified # version. The real thing. # # The research team of Xiaoyun Wang, Yiqun Lisa Yin, and Hongbo Yu (mostly # from Shandong University

Schneier on Security: SHA-1 Broken

2005-02-16 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/02/sha1_broken.html Bruce Schneier Schneier on Security A weblog covering security and security technology. « RSA Conference | Main February 15, 2005 SHA-1 Broken SHA-1 has been broken. Not a reduced-round version. Not a simplified version.

SHA-1 cracked

2005-02-16 Thread Steven M. Bellovin
According to Bruce Schneier's blog (http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/02/sha1_broken.html), a team has found collisions in full SHA-1. It's probably not a practical threat today, since it takes 2^69 operations to do it and we haven't heard claims that NSA et al. have built massively

Re: How to Stop Junk E-Mail: Charge for the Stamp

2005-02-16 Thread Peter Gutmann
Barry Shein [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Eventually email will just collapse (as it's doing) and the RBOCs et al will inherit it and we'll all be paying 15c per message like their SMS services. And the spammers will be using everyone else's PC's to send out their spam, so the spam problem will